Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V, Part 1

745.45F/3–448: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India

secret

Washington, March 4, 1948—6 p. m.

143. For background use on Kashmir question Dept offers following comment on recent useful cables from Delhi and Karachi this subject:

1. In formulating proposals for Kashmir settlement we do not have in mind US formal initiative in SC but have rather attempted to incorporate suggestions made by various members SC as well as GOI and GOP reps which might serve as basis of formal resolution to be put forward by president SC or of joint resolution several interested delegations representing majority sentiment. This connection we have collaborated closely with British on basic assumption that Anglo-American split this question must be avoided. Informal conversations with Chinese rep¹ who is now president SC have also been most useful. We have no intention putting forward proposals on behalf either GOI or GOP but are directing efforts toward equitable settlement in working out of which each dominion would be asked to give full cooperation even though certain features of plan might not be entirely satisfactory from GOI or GOP viewpoint.

2. Nature of informal proposals contained Deptel 124 Feb 25 to New Delhi are such that concessions and cooperation from both sides would be required.

(a) GOP would be asked give full cooperation in truce arrangements calling for withdrawal tribesmen, withholding material assistance from tribesmen and insurgents, etc. despite obvious political embarrassments involved. GOP must also recognize that SC cannot impose settlement under Chapter VI UN Charter but can only make recommendations to parties. Such recommendations must necessarily be made in light of India’s present legal jurisdiction over Kashmir which makes complete civil and military neutralization of kind envisaged by Jinnah impracticable unless with Indian consent. Even if latter given, project for neutral army unrealistic. Obvious conclusion is that only available facilities for civil administration and maintenance of law and order in interim period are those which can be found locally. Hence our proposals for interim coalition government from which it would be difficult even if considered desirable to exclude Abdullah by SC action.

(b) Indian attitude toward plebiscite arrangements has apparently become more reasonable in that GOI now willing have plebiscite machinery in hands neutral official who would, however, be constitutionally part Kashmir coalition government. We believe that such a neutral official might serve very useful purpose inside Kashmir Government (along lines para 3 Deptel 124) but that majority members SC will insist on control and supervision plebiscite by agency directly responsible SC. Since powers and functions such UN agency would be prescribed in terms of plebiscite, which GOI has already agreed should be held under international auspices in order to insure impartiality, we find it difficult to conclude that such an arrangement would violate constitutional proprieties.

3. Re various proposals for Kashmir independence we have in the past, as you know, followed line that princely states should be incorporated in either India or Pakistan on assumption that Balkanization of Indian subcontinent would jeopardize and complicate political and economic transition and create conditions of instability ultimately adverse to broad US interests that area. Our current thinking re Kashmir is influenced by these considerations subject to proviso that should concept of independence appear to be basis for GOI–GOP peaceful settlement Kashmir issue, we would probably not oppose such a solution, but certainly would take no initiative in supporting it.

4. Re suggestions for partition of Kashmir between GOI and GOP we shall certainly take no initiative this regard but would carefully consider proposals calling for partition by agreement between GOI and GOP.

5. We have noted Mountbatten’s² view that possible alternative this stage would be despatch SC Commission to area with mediatory powers as means bringing about eventual bilateral settlement GOI and GOP. Should efforts reach more comprehensive settlement New York fail, we believe Mountbatten’s idea has possibilities, particularly since it is based on assumption that in last analysis GOI–GOP agreement is essential prerequisite to peaceful settlement Kashmir issue.

Sent to New Delhi repeated to Karachi, London, and New York.

Marshall

1. Tingfu F. Tsiang.
2. Governor General of the Dominion of India.