Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V, Part 1

741.90F/8–1648

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Forrestal)¹

top secret

Washington , 10 August 1948.

Subject: Strategic Requirements of the United States and United Kingdom in Saudi Arabia.

In accordance with the memorandum from your office dated 14 April 1948, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the letter attached thereto from the Acting Secretary of State dated 13 April 1948.…

In the formulation of the statement of views requested by the Acting Secretary of State concerning the strategic facilities required by the United States in Saudi Arabia, the Joint Chiefs of Staff found it necessary to appraise the position and security interests of the United States not only with respect to Saudi Arabia but of the entire area of the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean.

Because of the changing and critical world conditions, criteria for assessing strategic facilities requirements are difficult to formulate in other than general terms. A summary of the criteria is as follows:

a. At this time the United States and Great Britain have the same over-all complementary but not necessarily mutually exclusive strategic interests in Saudi Arabia as well as in the Middle East–Eastern Mediterranean area.

b. These interests concern:

(1) Peace and stability.

(2) Free access to and transit through and over the entire area.

(3) The development of oil resources together with the facilities necessary for such development.

(4) Preservation of the integrity of the entire area from foreign unfriendly influence and domination, and

(5) Use of bases in the area in the event of major war.

c. United States requirements in Saudi Arabia can only be arrived at following consideration of our over-all requirements within the framework of our global strategy and in the light of changing world conditions.

d. Our interests in the Middle East–Eastern Mediterranean area cannot be viewed from the standpoint of United States security alone but must include like consideration of the security of our potential allies.

Based on the above general criteria, the United States strategic requirements in the Arabian Peninsula–Red Sea–Socotra Island area are:

a. Denial to any potentially hostile power of any foothold in this area.

b. Friendly relationships which can be promoted by social and economic assistance, together with such military assistance as may be practicable, once the present embargo on the shipment of arms to the Middle East is lifted, to insure collaboration by the indigenous peoples in the common defense of the area.

c. Development of the oil resources in this area by the United States and such other countries as have and can be expected to have a friendly attitude toward the United States.

d. The right of military forces of the United States to enter the area upon a threat of war.

e. The right to develop and maintain in that area those facilities which are required to implement d above.

Not all of the United States military requirements in this area can be foreseen because of the changing world conditions and the possibility of the formation of a general Middle East security system. However, in order to provide for the introduction of United States military forces, arrangements should be made now for the following strategic facilities in Saudi Arabia to implement d and e above:

a. Adequate telecommunications facilities at Dhahran or nearby places.

b. Airbase facilities in the Dhahran area sufficient

(1) for the operational use of all types of modern military aircraft, and

(2) for a United States training mission so expanded that it, in conjunction with Saudi Arabian nationals, can defend United States military installations in the Dhahran area.

The strategic facilities required in the remainder of the area (Arabian states not under the control of the Saudi Arabian government, the Bed Sea littoral and Socotra Island) are telecommunications and airbase facilities in Aden, Hadhramaut, Oman, Trucial Oman, Socotra Island and Asmara; air and naval base facilities at Massaua; air and advanced ship repair facilities in Aden; advanced naval base facilities at Bahrein.

In the light of the possibility of far reaching changes in Palestine, Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are keeping the situation in this part of the world under constant review. Since changes in the situation may affect United States strategic requirements in the Middle East–Eastern Mediterranean area, the Joint Chiefs of Staff will inform the Secretary of Defense when such requirements change.

Although no direct comment has been made on the British memorandum … the Joint Chiefs of Staff would point out that the foregoing analysis indicates that the strategic interests of the United States and Great Britain in the Middle East are so interrelated that they should be considered as a whole. They have no objection to the use by the Department of State of the foregoing views as a basis for reply to the Foreign Office.

While the reply to your memorandum was under consideration, the Joint Chiefs of Staff received a memorandum from the British Joint Services Mission.… The Joint Chiefs of Staff perceive no military objection to establishment by the British of the three airfields mentioned in their memorandum.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

William D. Leahy,

Fleet Admiral, U.S. Navy Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces

1. Copy transmitted to the Secretary of State by Secretary Forrestal with his letter of August 16, not printed.