501.BC/11–348 Telegram
The Ambassador in Moscow (Smith) to the Secretary of State
2527. Paris 22, October 27 to Tehran [26]1 and Tehran’s 29 to Paris October 30.2 I am not in a position to evaluate timing considerations with respect proposed Iranian communication to SC and strong Supporting statement from US, other than to say that Iran is always on Soviet active list and that SC dossier on subject should, in my view, be kept contiguously up-to-date. I do, however, find Ambassador Wiley’s thesis convincing and reiterate my opinion that “we go a good deal further than we have in the past in rebutting instantly and vigorously false and vituperative allegations by the Soviet Union and that we should never under any circumstances ref rain from immediate official abuttal when as in the present case the allegation is made officially.” (Embtel 1366, July 20) While I regard such action as long overdue with respect to the charges in the latter category cited in Tehran’s reftel, I can appreciate that our denials might be more widely heard at a time when UNGA disputes were not monopolizing the headlines.
In any case, I consider Iran the most sensitive point on the Soviet periphery requiring our most continuous and careful attention. Lack of oil in sufficient quantities for modern warfare is probably the most serious weakness in Soviet war potential and one likely to become more marked as the USSR acquires (from Italy) and builds the fleet it obviously wants to increase its strength and influence in the Black Sea and Mid-East areas. Not only is the oil to cover this shortage available in Iran, but also the simultaneous possibility of large-scale denial of Mid-East oil to the Western Powers. Moreover, the instability and ineffectiveness of the Iranian Government and its lack of the same direct US support extended to Greece and Turkey inevitably aggravate the constant temptation for the Kremlin to go after this prize.
[Page 195]Sent Department 2527; repeated Tehran 31, Paris for Bohlen 568, London 282.