891.00/11–348
The Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Satterthwaite) to the Ambassador in Iran (Wiley)
Dear Mr. Ambassador: I refer to your top secret letter of August 19 to Mr. John D. Jernegan,1 Chief of the Division of Greek, Turkish and Iranian Affairs, in which you refer to the expressed intention of the Shah, should a foreign power attempt to occupy Iran, of remaining in the country in order to maintain a government on Iranian soil and to direct resistance. With that letter you enclosed a memorandum prepared by Mr. Gerald F. P. Dooher regarding the possible formation of a “free government” in Iran in the event of a Leftist coup d’etat [Page 193] or a Soviet invasion of the country. You suggested that this memorandum should be considered by the interested agencies of the government.
Your letter and the enclosed memorandum have been brought to the attention of the competent officers of the Department, who are informing the other appropriate agencies of the government.
I am authorized to inform you that the Department believes this question should be given further attention and would be glad to receive from you a detailed analysis of all factors bearing on it, together with such detailed plans as it may be possible for your staff to prepare and such further general observations and recommendations as you may wish to submit. The Department requests that, for the time being, you refrain from discussing with the Shah the possible formation of a “free government” or resistance movement. It is feared that any approach you might make in this regard would be taken by the Iranians as an implied promise of American support and assistance in executing the suggested plan, whereas the appropriate agencies in Washington have not yet had an opportunity to give even initial consideration to the question. Furthermore, it seems likely that any discussion with the Shah of plans for a resistance movement would lead into broader questions of the role Iran plays in American strategic thinking and the political and military guarantees or assurances which we are willing to give that country. We are not yet prepared to answer such questions in any manner which could be expected to satisfy the Shah. We believe any decisions as to the time or manner of approach to the Iranian authorities or other elements who might take part in a resistance movement should be deferred until the American Government has decided whether it is desirable to encourage and support such a movement when and if the need arises. It is felt that this decision cannot be made until we have received from you a further analysis and a more detailed plan, including the military and intelligence plans referred to in Mr. Dooher’s memorandum.
The Department would like to have your views regarding the desirability of consultation with the British Government on this subject. On preliminary consideration, it appears to us that the British should be brought into the picture at some early stage, in view of our community of policy in Iran, the important political influence of the British in Iran, and the intimate knowledge of the country and wide experience in dealing with all elements of its population possessed by officials of the British government. Since the British have such large material interests at stake and are in such close contact with many segments of the population, including especially the southern tribes, it would seem that failure to coordinate with them in advance of the [Page 194] anticipated emergency might result in great confusion as well as neglect of the real positive contribution which they might be able to make. We will, however, take no action with respect to the British pending receipt of your recommendations.
We await with much interest your further reports on this important subject.
Sincerely yours,
- Copy not found in Department of State files.↩