Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V, Part 1

846B.014/8–2748

The Department of State to the British Embassy

top secret

Aide-Mémoire

The Department of State acknowledges the receipt of the British Embassy’s aide-mémoire dated August 27, 1948,¹ in which the views of the Foreign Office concerning Iranian claims to Bahrein are presented.

This Government would view with serious concern any action by Iran which would have the effect of prejudicing the security of the Persian Gulf area, or of aggravating unrest in that strategic part of the world. Any attempt by the Iranian Government to press formally or to place its claims to Bahrein before an international forum might, in the opinion of the Department, will have such effects. In this connection it will be recalled that American representatives in Iran have taken every opportunity during recent years to persuade the Iranian Government of the unwisdom of publicly airing its asserted claims to Bahrein.

The Department has studied the memoranda prepared by the India Office and the Foreign Office concerning the historical and modern status of Bahrein.² Several studies have been prepared in the Department during the past few years bearing upon this same subject, which have also resulted in the conclusion that the Iranian claim would be legally untenable if it were submitted to an international body for judicial decision. However, the Department concurs in the view of the Foreign Office that the present state of international relations and the composition of the International Court make it impossible to predict with certainty the nature of the Court’s decision on the question of Bahrain if this issue were referred to it for an advisory opinion.

The Department agrees in principle with the four recommendations of the Foreign Office as to the course which should be pursued by Great Britain and the United States, namely: (1) that we should not raise the question in any international forum; (2) that we should continue to discourage Iran from raising it in any manner; (3) that if Iran, nevertheless, raises it in the United Nations, we should hope that this would be in the Security Council rather than the General Assembly; (4) that, if the matter should be raised either in the Security Council or the General Assembly, it would be best to try to direct the meeting towards a request for an advisory opinion from the International Court.

With regard to the recommendation of the Foreign Office that the United States and Great Britain continue to discourage the Iranian Government from raising its claim, it is suggested that the Foreign Office give consideration to the possible desirability of a parallel formal approach to the Iranian Government by the British and United States Governments. Such an approach might emphasize the following points: (1) in our opinion the asserted Iranian claim is wholly untenable both on political and legal grounds; (2) we believe that the raising of the Bahrein question by Iran would lead to undesirable and fruitless disagreement with the United States and the United Kingdom, would have markedly unfavorable repercussions in the Arab States, and would redound only to the benefit of the USSR; (3) if Iran should raise the Bahrein question before any international forum, we would be obliged strenuously to oppose such Iranian claim.

In the event that Iran, despite such advice, should decide to submit the Bahrein issue to the United Nations, this Government would be prepared to lend strong support to a resolution requesting an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice. It is not, however, proposed that the Iranian Government be so informed.

The Department believes that a formal approach as outlined above would have considerable influence in deterring the Iranian Government from an ill-advised course with respect to Bahrein, and that it would serve as a matter of record for future Iranian cabinets which might contemplate action in this regard. It is felt, however, that the proposed approach should not be made unless a situation should arise which appears to necessitate such action. Such a situation might be created if the Iranian Government, acting on its own initiative or under stimulus of irredentist propaganda or because of Soviet pressure, should decide to press the Bahrein issue. It is more probable, however, that a situation justifying Anglo-American action may be precipitated when the proposals of the British and United States Governments concerning jurisdiction and control over the submarine resources of the Persian Gulf are presented to Iran and other littoral states. It is, therefore, suggested that the, proposed approach, to Iran be made at that time if the Iranian reaction should appear to justify such action.

The views of the Foreign Office concerning the Department’s proposal and the question of its timing would be greatly appreciated. In view of the contemplated approach to the littoral states of the Persian. Gulf in the near future with respect to offshore oil rights, it would, seem advisable for the British and American Governments to arrive at a final decision concerning the question of Bahrein at the earliest possible date.

Washington, [September 17, 1948.]

1. Not printed, but for summary, see telegram 869, September 14, to Tehran, p. 44.
2. Transmitted with the British note of August 27 were two historical memoranda prepared in the India Office, which carried the story concerning Bahrein to the end of 1946 and copies of notes exchanged with the Persian Government and the League of Nations from 1927 to 1934. These papers are not found attached.