891.20/9–348: Telegram
The Ambassador in Iran (Wiley) to the Secretary of State
1041. Forgot to report in mytel 1037 September 21 that Shah also made drive for a large quantity 7.9. I think he talked of three billion rounds. British told him they did not know whether this type small arms ammunition was still available. They promised to investigate.
General Grow, chief military mission, received by Shah yesterday afternoon. Grow has reported by telegraph directly. I again saw Shah last night at an official reception. Though Shah apparently showed an even temper and considerable understanding while talking to Grow, with me he continued his plaintive jeremiad. After exhausting question of tank ammunition, he then accusingly asked, “And how about mortars?” Then he complained that he could not fight the Russians with bare hands. Once again he insisted in minatory fashion he would have to change his policy and revise his plans unless he could learn exactly what we planned with regard to Iran. He clearly wants some sort of joint staff work and is still aspiring to greatly increased military assistance. I replied that since the US would under no circumstances ever embark on policy of military aggression our planning was necessarily defensive and that in his case if he had only bare hands with which to defend his country we would expect him in case of foreign aggression to use his bare hands to their best advantage. Regarding arms credit program, I told Shah Iran was getting very much for very little and referred to the fact that program had to be whittled down some 30 percent in order to fit it within the ten million authorized by Majlis. I then added that if by delaying thing’s Iran had missed the big bargain counter rush it was not our fault. Iran [Page 177] had had every kind of warning from US to strike while iron was hot. I concluded, reminding Shah that Army was prepared gratis to furnish all technical assistance necessary for Iranian procurement through American commercial channels. He then asked “Who provides the money for these purchases?” I answered, “You do”. Shah aggressively retorted that Iran could not possibly finance commercial purchases and he wanted to know what we would do about it. I explained very patiently that we were not now in position to do anything about it.
What the Shah discussed in London in the way of military equipment and training would run into astronomical figures yet I have been unable to obtain any indication that the question of financing was even touched upon with the British. I shall discreetly make further inquiries.
His attitude towards execution of our arms credit program is, I think, unreasonable. Possibly moment has come for Shah to receive gentle harpoon therapy. Perhaps instead of overlap of Grow and successor the announcement of nomination Grow’s replacement and his arrival might be slightly retarded. Such step might have wholesome but noncommittal effect on thinking of Shah and Chief of Staff General Razmara. Naturally, if Shah does not disclose his military initiatives to advisory military mission, latter’s functions become impossible of successful accomplishment.
I am unfavorably impressed that Shah has been entirely reticent with us regarding his conversations in England. He is obviously entirely unconscious of intimate US–UK relationship and retains traditional Persian conviction that unique policy is that of playing off one great power against another.
Wish to add that Shah last night reproached Military Attaché Colonel Sexton that US had failed to live up to its promises. [Here follows a personal observation.]
Why is there such a delay in my receiving reply to mytel 998, August 26,2 re article 20? Colonel Pierce is anxious to have gendarmerie matter settled. So am I.
Sent Department 1041; repeated London 87.
- Not printed; it reported information from the British Ambassador to Iran that while the Shah was in London, he had made Requests for jet planes, the training of pilots, tanks, and anti-tank guns with ammunition (891.20/9–248).↩
- Not printed; it gave the text of a new Article 20 as proposed by the Iranian Minister of Interior, which would require the Chief of the Gendarmerie Mission to submit his recommendations through the Iranian Commanding General of the Gendarmerie to the Ministry of the Interior. Ambassador Wiley stated that he considered the next text entirely satisfactory and that Colonels Sexton and Pierce were in complete agreement (891.105A/8–2648).↩