868.20/8–1348
Memorandum by the Secretary of the Army (Royall) to the Coordinator for Aid to Greece and Turkey (McGhee)
top secret
Washington, August 13,
1948.
Subject: Future Governmental Policy in Greece Affecting Greek National Army
- 1.
- Reference your draft letter, Subject: US Military Assistance to
Greece, dated 11 August 1948,1 the Plans and
Operations Division is in general agreement, but requests
consideration of the following specific comments in connection with
future (military) policy in Greece:
- a.
- Reference paragraph 2a: The Grammos Operation, while
progressing at an accelerated tempo in the past few weeks,
will not result in a decisive, conclusive defeat of the
guerrillas in the Grammos area. The net results of the
operation will probably be:
- (1)
- Ejection of guerrilla forces from the Grammos area.
- (2)
- Destruction or capture of approximately 20 to 30% of the guerrilla forces now in the Grammos area.
- (3)
- Release of some of the GNA divisions now engaged in the Grammos area for operations elsewhere.
- (4)
- Denial of logistic support through the Grammos area from routes leading into Greece from Albania.
- b.
- Reference paragraph 4: It is believed that the conclusion of the Grammos Operation will not reduce guerrilla capabilities to such an extent that an immediate reduction in GNA strength can be planned. The reduction phase can only occur after a definite and significant reduction in over-all guerrilla capabilities is an accomplished fact. The Greek military establishment as it presently exists appears to have a sufficient preponderance of means to accomplish this objective without an increase in strength.
- c.
- Reference paragraph 5b: It is agreed that the
introduction of new types of aircraft, particularly, is not
advisable based on consideration of the following factors:
- (1)
- The guerrillas have not received air support thus far.
- (2)
- Introduction of new types of aircraft would require a considerable training period of Greek pilots before they could become operational and would not appear soon enough to influence current operations.
- (3)
- The cost of US fighter-bombers is prohibitive compared to the cost of British Spitfires.
- (4)
- New problems of maintenance and supply would accompany the introduction of new types of aircraft.
- d.
- Reference paragraph 6a: Any raise in the authorized
strength of the GNA through
absorption of NDC spaces or
other means does not appear justified at this time.
Absorption of the NDC into
the GNA will greatly
increase costs by:
- (1)
- Increase transportation and communication requirements.
- (2)
- Increase the requirement for supporting weapons.
- (3)
- Serve as a justification for an increase in overhead in the form of more headquarters, etc.
- 2.
- In connection with the recommendations made, the following factors
should be considered:
- a.
- A specific determination of how the future supply of the Greek Army is to be effected.
- b.
- Initiation of definite assurance to the Greek Government that US interest in the maintenance of their national integrity is not a transitory matter, but that restoration of civil order and economic stability are matters of paramount immediate importance, and that a reduction in military expenditures may be necessary to achieve this.
- 3.
- A reduction in Greek forces immediately after the Grammos Operation appears to be premature and should be based upon recommendations from the field.
- 4.
- Recent reports that the satellite countries have withdrawn support from Markos should receive careful scrutiny and continuing study.
For the Secretary of the Army:
Lt. Colonel, GSC
Walter H. Grant
Lt. Colonel, GSC
- Copy not found in Department of State files.↩