Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

867.20/8–1348

Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs (Jernegan) to the Coordinator for Aid to Greece and Turkey (McGhee)

secret

[Washington,] August 13, 1948.

Subject: Plans for Reduction of Greek Armed Forces

After further discussion of your memorandum of August 11 with Ray Hare¹ and Leonard Cromie, I think I can state NEA’s position as follows:

(1) We are in substantial agreement with the recommendations of pages 5 and 6 of the memorandum.

(2) We still feel that the tone of the body of the memorandum is a little too optimistic. Despite the recent successes of the Greek forces, the latest report of the Military Attaché at Athens estimates a slight increase in the total number of guerrillas in Greece. There is still no evidence of collapse or disorganization among the guerrillas in the Grammos concentration, and the bands elsewhere in Greece are continuing at a high rate of activity. It appears that the guerrillas are still able to recruit new members by impressment.

(3) Because of the uncertainty as to the time when the present guerrilla forces may be “brought under control” and as to the possibilities of their reforming in Albania for new incursions into Greece, we would prefer to see your memorandum phrased more on the basis of an hypothesis rather than as a prediction of early victory. I realize that in the memorandum you have emphasized the necessity for careful timing and cautioned against premature reduction of the Greek forces, but it still seems to me that the first few paragraphs would give a casual reader the impression that the fight is virtually over and that we should immediately begin retrenchment.

(4) It appears to us that the only question which we might decide in Washington without further consultation with our people in Athens is that of our long-range interest in the Greek armed forces. This, of course, requires consultation with the Armed Services and probably with the British. NEA’s present view on this question is that while it might be politically desirable to maintain a fairly large Greek force as an encouragement to the Greek people and as a deterrent to attack by the neighboring countries, it would be practically impossible for us to support such a force once the guerrilla menace is substantially eliminated. We do not see any means of obtaining large funds from Congress for this purpose, especially since the next Congress is generally expected to be even more economy-minded than the past one. Furthermore, I believe AMAG considers that the internal costs of the present Greek Forces are so heavy a drain on the national budget that real economic recovery is impossible until there is a reduction in their size. You probably know more about this than I, but if it is true it would seem that in Greece’s own interest we should choose the lesser of the two evils and risk the undesirable consequences of Army reduction in order to release funds and material for economic rehabilitation, once the immediate internal security threat is eliminated.

(5) In line with your recommendations, we feel that Ambassador Grady and General Van Fleet, in consultation with the ECA Mission, should be requested immediately to make a thorough re-study of the situation in all its aspects and provide the Department with full information to enable us to estimate the timing, manner and extent of retrenchment which may be made in the Greek forces. I do not think we need necessarily have a firm decision regarding our possible long-range interest in the Greek forces before requesting such a study. We can simply tell the Ambassador that for the present we are still operating on the assumption that we would not have such a long-range interest but that it is not a final position. He might himself have some observations on this point which would be of use to us.

I shall be glad to join you in any meeting you may arrange with appropriate officers of the National Defense establishment.²

1. Raymond A. Hare, Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs.
2. Mr. McGhee’s memorandum of August 11 was discussed on August 16 by Messrs. Wilds, Hare, Jernegan and George H. Butler, Staff Member of the Policy Planning Staff. The group concluded unanimously that “no basic policy decisions are to be taken until after the receipt and study of the reports called for in the telegram to Embassy Athens.” (Mr. Butler’s memorandum of August 16 to Mr. McWilliams, 868.00/8–1148.) The telegram referred to, Gama 1246, August 16, is printed on p. 135.