Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

868.00/8–1148

Memorandum by the Coordinator for Aid to Greece and Turkey (McGhee) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)

secret

[Washington,] August 11, 1948.

Subject: US Military Assistance to Greece

Following is a summary of my impressions of the current military situation in Greece obtained during my recent visit, together with certain recommendations as to future US policy in furnishing military assistance to Greece.

discussion

1. When present US policy of supplying military and economic assistance to Greece was announced by President Truman on March 12, 1947, there was imminent danger that Greece would fall to the communists, either through:

a. Military control of the country by the communist-led guerrillas, or

b. Economic collapse followed by communist seizure of the government.

At that time Greece appeared to be in greater danger than any other country outside of the “iron curtain” threatened by communist domination.

2. Although objectives of the Greek Aid Program have not as yet been fully achieved, the situation is so much improved that there is at present believed to be no immediate danger that Greece will fall, unless the communists adopt some entirely new approach, such as armed invasion or substantial infiltration by non-Greeks, of which there is no present evidence. This fact, together with increase in communist pressure in other areas, has reduced the disparity between the situation in Greece and that in other European countries facing economic difficulties and the threat of communist aggression. It is believed that Greece is now much less a “special case”, demanding special consideration and treatment. (Current British view is that Greece is no longer a “special case”.) This view is based on the following reasoning:

a. US and UK military representatives in Greece believe that it is within the capability of the Greek armed forces to defeat the main guerrilla concentration in the Grammos area, consisting of some 8000 men, during this season’s campaign (weather makes effective operations difficult after September). With the assistance of the US military advisory group the Greeks are now displaying the fighting spirit required to realize this capability. (See Amag 1472,¹ received August 7, 1948.) It is expected that a considerable number (perhaps 20–30%) of the Grammos guerrilla forces will be killed or captured, and that the supply routes leading into Greece from Albania through the Grammos will be denied.

There will still remain at least 15,000 guerrillas dispersed over the mountainous areas, particularly along the northern border of Greece. Away from the border areas, however, these concentrations will be small in comparison with the Grammos concentration, and the morale of the guerrillas should be lowered by the defeat of their principal concentration and the capture or expulsion of the Markos government. The already precarious supply lines of the guerrillas should be further jeopardized and they should have difficulty in maintaining control over troops serving under duress.

b. Once the Grammos concentration is defeated, it is not believed that a force of Greek guerrillas of the size or with the morale of the Markos movement at its height can be built up again under communist auspices. It is believed that Greeks have by now become convinced that the Markos movement is controlled by Greece’s enemies, who seek to dominate their government and separate from Greece Greek Macedonia and western Thrace, and that Greeks who were not attracted when the true nature of the movement had not yet been revealed, will not volunteer now in substantial numbers. With continued American assistance, even though on a reduced scale, the Greek armed forces should, moreover, be able to keep the residual guerrilla movement under sufficient control to prevent its growth by impressment.

c. Even though the economic situation in Greece remains critical and though economic recovery can not be assured within the period of the ERP, economic collapse has been averted, reconstruction of Greece’s vital transportation facilities has been substantially completed, and it is believed that the Greek economy can at least be held together for the next four years, assuming continuation of the ERP and cooperation of the Greek government.

3. Even when the Grammos concentration is defeated, it will still be necessary for the Greek forces to remain on the offensive, in order to complete the liquidation of the guerrillas in so far as possible while their morale is low and their supply and command disorganized. It is assumed that this “mopping-up” operation will continue through the winter and into the spring and that even at that time, and possibly for an indefinite period in the future, there will remain a residual guerrilla movement in Greece, which will require a continued holding action by the Greek army and gendarmery forces.

4. As soon after the defeat of the Grammos concentration as is practicable, however, and increasingly as the remaining guerrilla bands are liquidated, positive efforts must be initiated to reduce the size and cost of the Greek armed forces. This is in accordance with US policy of supporting the Greek army only to the extent required to maintain internal security, and in accordance with the mandate of Congress, who cut the Greek Aid appropriation requested by the Department of State by $50 million on the assumption that support of the Greek army would be drastically reduced after successful termination of the guerrilla campaign this fall. A reduction in the internal Greek military budget and a return of manpower in the Greek armed forces to productive occupations is, moreover, necessary, if Greece is to take full advantage of the 4–year opportunity she has under ERP to achieve economic self-sufficiency.

This reduction should, however, be done in an orderly way and in accordance with a plan worked out by the Greek government and AMAG, which will assure a gradual transition to the residual Greek armed forces which AMAG feels is required to control the residual guerrilla movement expected. This must assure, among other things:

a. An orderly absorption of the excess army manpower into the Greek economy through regular employment or work relief;

b. Efficient reorganization of the Greek armed forces at the reduced level; and

c. Prevention of loss of Greek morale and encouragement of Greece’s enemies which would result from too rapid withdrawal of US support

5. Seduction in the size of the Greek armed forces and in US military assistance to Greece will be strongly opposed by the majority of Greek military and political leaders, who desire to maintain large forces for defense against possible future invasion and for bargaining power in the general Balkan struggle. Responsible leaders even press at this time, when victory in the Grammos is in sight, for an actual increase in the Greek National Army up to totals of 250,000 men. In addition, there is a disturbing tendency, which is quite similar to the Greek demands for mountain artillery last fall, to insist that new weapons, such as bombers, must be provided the Greek army before the guerrilla forces can be liquidated, even though:

a. The guerrillas have not received air support thus far.

b. Introduction of new types of aircraft would require a considerable training period of Greek pilots before they could become operational and would not appear soon enough to influence current operations.

c. The cost of US fighter-bombers is prohibitive compared to the cost of British Spitfires.

d. New problems of maintenance and supply would accompany the introduction of new types of aircraft.

6. Three telegrams (Nos. Amag 1445, July 28, 1948; Amag 1454, July 30, 1948; and Amag 1470, August 3, 1948²) which have come forward recently from AMAG should be considered in the light of this background.

a. Amag 1454, July 30, 1948, recommends absorption of the existing National Defense Battalions into the Greek National Army, increasing the army from the present temporary ceiling of 147,000 to a permanent ceiling of 182,000. The representation that this can be done within the existing budget is not believed to be realistic in view of the increased transportation, communication, supporting weapons and overhead requirements, and in the light of the cut of $50 million in the Greek-Turkish Aid appropriation forced by Congress. In addition the budget is dependent upon the allocation between Greece and Turkey which has not yet been determined.

b. Amag 1445, July 28, 1948, recommends the inclusion of thirty P–47 aircraft in the Greek military program. This involves a large initial expenditure plus the cost of an expanded Greek air force and continued upkeep.

c. Amag 1470, August 3, 1948, recommends increase in the size of the US Air Mission in Greece.³

7. In taking action to reduce future US military assistance to Greece, the overriding consideration is believed to be the necessity for eliminating guerrilla threat to internal security and providing reasonable assurance against its reappearance. Future US assistance must assure that Greece remains a free and independent state, and this factor must be taken into consideration in determining the timing of the reduction, the manner in which it is presented to the Greek people, and the nature and magnitude of US assistance to the Greeks in coping with the residual guerrilla problem Greece will encounter. At no point must the impression be given either to the Greeks or to the rest of the world that the US has lessened its determination to assist Greece in maintaining her independence and territorial integrity.

recommendations

It is recommended:

a. That a review be made of US policy to determine what if any long range interest this Government has in a Greek military establishment over and above that required to maintain internal security in Greece. This is of course a matter for joint consultation with the UK, which is known to have a long range interest at least in the Greek navy, and is related to US policy with respect to support of the “Western Union” countries, as well as to the other countries bordering the communist sphere of influence.

b. That AMAG be advised that no steps are to be taken which would result in greater permanence or increase in the size or cost of the Greek armed forces, and that as soon after the defeat of the Grammos concentration as is practicable an orderly reduction in the size and cost of the Greek army is to be effected.

c. That AMAG be requested to make a study recommending the size of the Greek army, navy, air, NDC, and gendarmery forces that will be required:

(1) To conduct necessary operations following the defeat of the Grammos concentration during the period required to bring the guerrilla movement under control.

(2) To maintain neutralizing action against the residual guerrilla forces, and

(3) To give best estimate as to time schedule for reducing to these levels.

d. That at the same time AMAG be requested to make a study as to what types of current supplies and equipment now on order or currently projected will not be needed if the recommended reduction in the size of the Greek armed forces and change in their mission is effected.

e. That AMAG also be requested to advise the earliest practicable date on which the Greek armed forces can be taken off the US army rations now being furnished them, and responsibility for their feeding placed on the economy of Greece.

f. That AMAG be requested to advise what reductions can be made in the size of the US Military Missions in Greece and what their function should be after the guerrilla movement has been brought under control, as well as what personnel changes will be required in order to reflect the change in mission.

g. That as soon as the external cost of the Greek armed forces can be reduced to an amount which can be supplied from Greek foreign exchange earnings, the US discontinue the furnishing of military supplies and equipment directly to Greece, the increased burden on the Greek economy which will result must be taken into consideration in allocation of economic assistance to Greece. The present agreement between the Greek government and this Government gives the US adequate control over Greek military expenditures, both internal and external. This implies that there will be no need for a special request to Congress for Greek military aid after this objective can be achieved.

h. That at the time the Greek government is advised of the foregoing, the policy of this Government of supporting Greek territorial independence and integrity be reaffirmed and assurance given that the US will, either directly or indirectly, assist the Greek government in maintaining the internal security forces required to maintain this objective.

1. Dated August 4, not printed.
2. None printed.
3. This telegram requested additionally that the Air Section of JUSMAPG be established as a separate Air Force Group, on a parity with the Army and Navy Groups (868.20 Mission/8–348).