Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

868.00/8–948

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Leonard J. Cromie of the Division of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs

secret

[Washington,] August 10, 1948.

Participants:	Under Secretary Lovett
	Greek Ambassador Vassili Dendramis
	[Mr. Cromie, GTI]

Ambassador Dendramis called at noon, August 10, 1948, by appointment at his request.

Woumding of Lt. Col. Darnell

Ambassador Dendramis conveyed the regrets of the Greek Government and people at the wounding of Lieutenant Colonel Darnell, US UNSCOB observer, and their gratitude for the courageous and valuable activities of all the UN” observers.

Requested Intervention re Albanian Aid to Guerrillas

Ambassador Dendramis stated that the Greek Army had been unprepared to undertake the Grammos offensive¹ but had nevertheless done so to comply with US wishes for the earliest possible liquidation of the guerrilla movement. The operation was apparently successful but at the cost of very heavy casualties, reaching as high as 10%. This effort and these sacrifices would be in vain if the guerrillas could now retreat into Albania and eventually return to Greece. Would it be possible, he asked, for the US to take advantage of the present conversations in Moscow² to ask the Russians to instruct their Albanian satellite to intern and disarm the guerrillas? The Greek Government was addressing a note direct to the Albanian Government on this subject, but thought this would have little effect. An alternative procedure would be a direct request to the Albanian Government in this sense by the US or French Governments.

Under Secretary Lovett replied that it would be quite impossible and improper for the US to interject the Greek question into the current Moscow conversations, which were being conducted on a tripartite basis and which concerned one specific area.

As for the Grammos operation, Under Secretary Lovett said he had supposed that the Greeks were just as anxious as the Americans for the earliest possible liquidation of the guerrilla movement. He had been informed that the Greek Army was fighting well and successfully, and that the Greeks were excellent soldiers. Casualties were inevitable in fighting of this kind, and he wished to stress that the casualties suffered by the Greek Army to date were low, namely 510 killed, 2812 wounded, and 34 missing out of approximately 70,000 troops in the general area. US forces had suffered very much higher casualties during the war in air operations over Europe and in operations on certain Pacific islands where casualties had reached 34%. Unfortunately, Greek Army casualties were caused mainly by non-magnetic mines which inflicted leg wounds necessitating amputations and were therefore very apparent to the civilian population. He understood there were a large number of these amputee cases in one Athens hospital.

Despite the inevitability of losses, the Under Secretary continued, the only way to beat the guerrillas was by fighting and not by writing notes. Every effort should be made to wipe them out. Some would, of course, escape across the border but they would have no heart for returning to Greece if they had received sufficiently rough treatment by the Greek Army and were assured of more of the same. The Albanian Government had shown very little respect for international law in the past and the chief deterrent to further Albanian or other foreign aid to Markos would be vigorous prosecution of offensive military operations in Greece, just as the punishment of criminals in domestic society is the chief deterrent to crime. If the guerrillas are cleared out of Greece, it should be possible for UNSCOB and the Greek Army to prevent further incursions into Greek territory along the short Albanian border. The Department would, of course, give consideration to the Greek proposal for some direct approach to the Albanian Government, but he could give the Ambassador no assurances as to what action, if any, would be taken. Ambassador Dendramis replied in the negative when asked whether the Greeks have requested the French to intervene with the Albanians.

(NB. The Ambassador left a note verbale, No. 782, of August 9, 1948,³ on this subject.

The US member of UNSOOB has been instructed to propose that UNSOOB address a note to the Albanian Government stating that it expects that Albania will either refuse admission to the Greek guer-ril] las or disarm and intern them in accordance with international law. Balcom 197, August 9.⁴)

Allocation of Bombers to the RHAF

Without making any specific request, Ambassador Dendramis raised the problem of air support for the anti-guerrilla offensive. Spitfires carried only one small bomb each, he pointed out, and it would therefore be desirable to provide the RHAF with bombers. This would have the additional advantage of raising GNA morale and lowering that of the guerrillas.

Under Secretary Lovett observed that bombers would be of little value in destroying small fortified points in mountainous terrain. This was the case in Okinawa. It was necessary to close in on such fortifications, preferably with artillery. Moreover, as an airman, the Under Secretary felt that diving and strafing by fighter planes was about as shattering to enemy morale as bombing. The Under Secretary also pointed out that the Greek forces had the advantage of no enemy air opposition.

Progress of Moscow Conversations

Before taking his departure, Ambassador Dendramis inquired as to the progress of the Moscow conversations and whether a Foreign Ministers meeting was likely to be held. Under Secretary Lovett replied that one must always be optimistic but that he could not yet say whether the current talks, which were in the nature of pourparlers rather than negotiations, would result in a meeting of the CFM.⁵

1. In a briefing memorandum of August 10 to Mr. Lovett, Mr. Jernegan stated that “There are strong indications, though no positive evidence, that Yugoslav and Bulgarian aid to the guerrillas has been reduced or eliminated in recent weeks—possibly as a result of the Tito–Cominform rift and in anticipation of the forthcoming GA. The Markos forces in the Grammos are logistically based on Albania.” (868.00/8–1048)
2. For documentation on the quadripartite conversations on Berlin held at Moscow during August 1948, see vol. ii, pp. 995 ff.
3. Not printed.
4. Identified also as telegram 1131 to Athens, not printed.
5. This memorandum was summarized, partially, in a telegram of August 12 to Athens. The telegram noted additionally Mr. Lovett’s statement to Ambassador Dendramis concerning the “opinion US mil authorities Greece that high morale and excellent fighting qualities Grk soldiers would assure victory over guerrillas with present scheduled equipment if offensive vigorously pursued”; that if UNSCOB sent the communication to the Albanian Government suggested in Balcom 197, the Greek request might thereby be answered; and that the Department would call to the attention of the Greek Government the “deplorable morale effect of public discussion in Greece of alleged high casualties and equipment deficiencies” (No. 1153, 868.01/8–1248).