860H.00/9–2648: Telegram
The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kohler) to the Secretary of State
2141. We have reviewed Belgrade’s latest excellent analysis Tito’s position (Belgrade’s 1250 to Dept, September 15), with view evaluating probable effect Tito–Cominform conflict upon Soviet attitude towards possible east-west hostilities.
While continuing independence Tito regime and other tendencies toward “nationalist” deviations within satellite fold constitute element of obvious weakness and uncertainty in general Soviet-Communist world position, it is difficult to judge degree to which this reduces Kremlin’s willingness turn from present “cold” to actual warfare if other considerations should enter. Kremlin has lost former close dependable control over largest satellite military force, and presumably could not immediately fully exploit Yugoslavia’s highly strategic location. On other hand, it seems quite possible that in event hostilities, Tito’s Yugoslavia would seek outdo all satellites in her participation Communist cause. Such hostilities might in fact facilitate submergence of present unpleasant embarrassing spectacle Tito–Cominform drift, though this could at same time facilitate, under guise common war effort, Moscow’s efforts to undermine gradually Tito’s position within Yugoslavia. Principal unknown factor is independence Tito might [Page 1111] feel in making and being guided by his own estimate as to his position and eventual outcome of east-west conflict, but it is hard to see how he would have much choice in view his physical vulnerability immediate application overwhelming Soviet power.
On balance we do not believe Tito’s defection has as seriously reduced Kremlin’s willingness engage world hostilities as is generally believed.
Sent Dept 2141, Department pass Belgrade 88, London 241, Paris for Gadel 397.