Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

Department of Defense Files: Telegram

The Under Secretary of the Army (Draper) to the Secretary of the Army (Royall)

secret   priority

Vienna, 6 July, 1948.

SVC 684. From ComGen USFA¹ Vienna Austria from Under Secretary of Army Draper sgd Keyes to Department of Army personal eyes only for Royall.

1. Lacking information regarding Washington evaluation of significance Yugoslav developments and what strategy is contemplated by our government to exploit situation to fullest, I suggest that following information and tentative suggestions be given consideration in connection with State–Army appraisal of and approach to situation.

2. View of many observers here is that Yugoslav developments may represent a real and serious breach between Tito government and Moscow which even if patched up may continue to be source of irritation and mutual distrust. This view derives from numerous aspects of situation interpreted here as significant including strong character of Tito and traditional independent Yugoslavs as well as overt acts of hostility including arrest and possibly execution certain leading Communists.

3. Local observers reason from this that Soviet may initiate drastic steps to bring into line and that if strenuous diplomatic and psychological efforts fail the possibility of prompt and forceful military measures should not be overlooked. Latter might take form of establishment and support of independent government of faithful Communists thus provoking internecine struggle or fratricidal war.

4. There is considerable support for view that Yugoslavia is anxious obtain economic and other benefits from closer relationship with west and that Tito may be making a play for ERP. Upon this assumption, and further assumption that it would be to our interest to encourage any attempted reorientation with western European countries and thus do what we can to assure that the breach between Yugoslavia and Soviets will reach full maturity, I should appreciate receiving State–Army reaction to the following suggestions.

5. That an unofficial, informal and oral approach be made by appropriate United States representative designated by Mister Cannon in Belgrade, to responsible representative of Tito, for purpose ascertaining whether Tito desires discuss improved relations with west and if so to give some indication of our willingness to consider development of trade relations and extension of economic aid. This initial approach would be as secret and discreet as possible in order:

(A) To avoid embarrassing Tito by public evidence of western “interference”,

(B) To leave way open to denial of official approach if Tito reaction hostile or generally unfavorable, and

(C) To avoid adverse reaction upon Greeks, Italians and other western European nations which might object to unilateral United States approach and action.

6. If a favorable reaction should be received from an initial approach such as outlined above, both Harriman² and myself, as well as Wisner,³ would be available to visit Belgrade if this should seem desirable or appropriate, assuming of course that such a visit could be properly cleared by Cannon. The purpose of this visit would be largely for psychological effect, but would also afford excellent opportunity to evaluate the situation and possibilities for further maneuvering. Harriman’s presence would in my mind have electrifying effect not only in Yugoslavia, but in other satellite nations which are thought to be restive and perhaps are seeking relief from the oppression inherent in satellites position within Soviet orbit.

7. Harriman, Wedemeyer⁴ and Wisner have carefully considered all the implications in this proposal and agree with me that it may provide an excellent opportunity to gain important and timely psychological advantages. They also agree that it would not be appropriate for Wedemeyer or members of his group to visit Belgrade at this time since this might suggest an unwarranted and undesirable military significance. Perhaps this same thinking eliminates me as well.

8. Keyes and Erhardt⁵ concur.

9. Harriman concurs with comments but he doubts that events will move fast enough to have high level talks in Belgrade during my present European visit. He believes chief value of suggested approach is possibility it will stiffen Tito’s resistance to Kremlin domination.

10. All of above may be none of my business, in which case please so advise me and then forget it.

1. Lt. Gen. Geoffrey Keyes, Commanding General, United States Forces in Austria.
2. W. Averell Harriman, United States Special Representative in Europe under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948.
3. Frank G. Wisner, Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas.
4. Lt. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Combat Operations, General Staff, United States Army.
5. John G. Erhardt, Minister in Austria and Political Adviser on Austrian Affairs to the United States High Commissioner for Austria.