Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

761.00/12–2348: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Secretary of State ¹

top secret

Moscow, December 23, 1948—7 p. m.

3008. Looking backward, as year draws to close, on agitated events of 1948, we believe that several phenomena difficult to interpret currently are beginning to form a pattern indicating some revision of our basic estimate of Soviet intentions. Hindsight reflection on fundamental significance of such events as Tito–Cominform conflict agricultural collectivization program in East Europe, continuing Varga dispute and Berlin situation, to mention only principal factors, leads us to preliminary conclusion that:

(1) Soviet Union not only “will not deliberately resort to military action in the immediate future” (Embassy despatch 315, April 1²) but seems to be basing its policies and actions on expectation of peace for the near future, probably several years.

(2) Believing itself safe from attack, Soviet Government is in fact deliberately choosing to weaken itself to a certain extent during next few years vis-à-vis West in order to gain greater strength for later inevitable conflict in which it continues believe.

(3) “War scare” campaign has been carefully planned and developed over past 2 years in order to frighten Western peoples and impede West recovery efforts, facilitate maintenance internal controls on Soviet population; and hide Soviet weaknesses.

(4) American policies should be carefully re-studied and re-adapted in light of this estimate and Western public opinion made aware of longer-range prospects requiring maintenance preparedness, firmness, unity and patience to degree and for period heretofore considered beyond capacity Democratic regimes.

Our retrospective view of the main events leading to these conclusions follow:

(1) Tito–Moscow break did not just happen, but resulted from deliberate decision of Politburo. Tito’s growing independence may have surprised Moscow somewhat, but would surely have been handled with carrot instead of club if Kremlin had either expected or intended to precipitate serious international conflict in near future. Instead, it chose to risk open break in united orbit front presented to outer world and to initiate purge action which might clearly require years to complete. Speculation as to “Zhdanov’s mistake” seems refuted by Kremlin’s persistence on the course set, which is that indicated by Leninist-Stalinist teachings unless temporary deviation is required by circumstances.

(2) Agricultural collectivization program was postponed in Soviet Union itself for over 10 years, until regime considered results NEP had made it strong enough to undergo such drastic purge. Present vigorous pushing of collectivization in Baltic states, where it is meeting strong resistance (Embtel 2865, December 8²) and throughout orbit countries, where it is likely to meet even more (e.g. Poland, Embdes 819, November 27²) stands in considerable contrast to Soviet experience. This suggests Kremlin feels itself strong enough to undertake such action and secure enough to risk temporary resulting weakness in favor of greater strength expected from improved control some years hence. If actually expecting resort world hostilities near future, Moscow planners would surely have moved more cautiously in this field or even have postponed program indefinitely.

(3) A similar phenomenon, based primarily on some Leninist-Stalinist doctrinal concept of accepting temporary weakness in order to develop subsequent unity and strength, is found in the post-war ideological revival which has been pushed relentlessly through every field of Soviet artistic, literary and scientific endeavor. Somewhat out of pattern but of primary significance in this connection is the long-continuing economic controversy raging around the bloody but unbowed figure of Eugene Varga (Embtel 2850, December 6). This conflict indicates at least basic uncertainty extending into the Politburo itself regarding capitalism’s post-war prospects and possibly even growing conviction world capitalism is heading for another period of “temporary stabilization” as in 1920’s. These considerations, if true, would have negative effect on Kremlin’s willingness resort to war in near future. In accordance Stalin’s theory of ebb and flow of revolutionary movement, Communist tactics should be aggressive while tide rises but devoted to consolidation and regrouping of forces when time [tide] begins to fall.

(4) If this is an incipient period of consolidation and regrouping of Communist forces in Europe, then ousting Western powers from strong points within Soviet European orbit, notably Berlin, becomes essential element of Soviet policy. Kremlin’s preoccupation with this objective is only too apparent, but desire avoid hostilities even for this vital position is indicated:

(a) By efforts drag out talks interminably in Moscow, Berlin and SC while maintaining physical pressure on US in Berlin itself; and

(b) More recently by evident Soviet intention of organizing and using German puppet agencies and forces to carry on battle in front lines, while removing Soviets more to background.

(5) With utter defeat of Axis, it became essential to ideology of Communism and maintenance of a totalitarian dictatorship that a new, menacing bourgeois-imperialistic foreign enemy be identified to Soviet population, consistent with Marxist-Leninist teachings and worthy of might and prestige of the victorious Socialist Fatherland. This could only be the United States, and first shift of Soviet policy in this direction took place within a few weeks after Yalta. This shifting line was soon developed into a real “war scare” beginning with Stalin’s branding of Churchill’s Fulton speech³ as “warmongering”, which set tone for Vyshinski and lesser spokesmen and for waxing flood which has subsequently spewed from all Soviet propaganda channels. (Embtel 2953, September 20 [30], 1947⁴). While this campaign may not have had expected results in America, it has certainly sown dread and uncertainty in West Europe, is diverting attention and productive effort from recovery and reconstruction, has kept Soviet population in a state apprehensive submission, is in keeping with party’s uncompromising ideology and has created throughout the world a highly exaggerated impression of Soviet intentions and strength.

(6) While foregoing are main considerations impelling us to review our estimates, many other factors seem to us to support the thesis or to fit into the pattern, for example:

(a) Recent successes in Far and Near East, particularly Communist advances in China and deteriorating Western position in Palestine and Arab East must encourage Kremlin to follow policy of seeking objectives by means short of war;

(b) Unexpected speed and vigor American and West European reaction to Soviet menaces in form ERP, Western defense system, rearmament and build-up US air forces in Europe—an over-all strengthening which already enables West contemplate stand on Rhine—presumably have similar effect and discourage any Soviet elements who might favor “now or never” decision. Moreover, absence indications any military build-up suggest such immediate decision unlikely.

(c) Possibilities of achieving serious setback to Western strength and unity without direct contest through advent De Gaulle⁵ to power in France likewise argue against resort to force. Soviet awareness this prospect and intention to exploit it seem clear.

(d) Labor, materials and money required for recently announced grandiose soil conservation and reforestation plan (if plan is seriously implemented) would presumably have been devoted transport, industrial or even direct military projects if Soviet regime contemplated hostilities in near future. As soon as year-end statistics are issued, Embassy plans prepare full review basic estimate in its despatch No. 315, April 1, and recommends Washington agencies do likewise. If above tentative conclusions are considered correct, their impact on our planned actions and policies during next few years should be carefully weighed. This is a task beyond Embassy’s capacity, but we venture following comments:

(1) Soviet “war scare” has not been without advantage to USA as it has been factor in evoking public support for necessary defense and aid measures. Danger is that this strong public feeling may recoil in opposite direction if it becomes apparent war is not in immediate prospect. Task of our leaders, therefore, seem to be effort to base present public sentiment on more solid foundation, to replace the present fever heat by a calm, informed determination to see the thing through on a long-range basis. Similarly, acute war fear now sapping political courage and impending recovery West Europe should be alleviated and non-Communist world made confident its steadfast exertions and increasing strength can in fact ensure peace indefinitely.

(2) Most careful estimates must prevent ineffective dissipation of our national resources by ensuring optimum distribution of our national product between domestic economy, European reconstruction and military preparations. Reduction might be justified in immediate military preparations in favor of sounder long-term military consideration and development, but diminution of our apparent military strength would be signal for increased Soviet pressure. Minimum present program in any case must take into account 2 main factors affecting estimated Soviet intentions, i.e.:

(a) Possibility of Kremlin miscalculation of Western reaction to its “measures short of war” particularly with regard Berlin or Near East (notably Iran); and

(b) Certainty that Soviet plans would be altered to exploit any disruption Western unity of [or] reduction Western strength

(3) Western unity must be maintained and job of European reconstruction carried through to completion. A precarious “recovery” would be an open invitation to Kremlin to begin with sabotage and end with conquest.

(4) Our own economy must be maintained in highly efficient running order and world persuaded it will so continue indefinitely. Nothing would be more important to our cause in long run than confirmation of Politburo suspicions that capitalist world may be in for an era of stabilization.

Smith

1. The Department in telegram 1433 to Moscow on December 29 expressed its appreciation for the views herein set forth and stated that the telegram had been given special high level circulation. (761.00/12–2348) It was circulated for the information of the National Security Council, whose Executive Secretary, Adm. Sidney W. Souers, wrote in a memorandum of January 4, 1949: “Mr. Lovett indicated that the Department of State is in general agreement with Ambassador Smith’s analysis and conclusion.”
2. The despatch under reference was concerned with Soviet intentions; see the editorial note, p. 825.
2. Not printed.
2. Not printed.
3. Concerning the reaction to Mr. Churchill’s “iron curtain” speech delivered at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri, on March 5, 1946, see telegrams 751 from Moscow on March 11, and 809 from Moscow on March 14, Foreign Relations, 1946, vol. vi, p. 712 and p. 716.
4. Ibid., 1947, vol. iv, p. 590.
5. Gen. Charles de Gaulle had resigned as President of the Provisional Government of the French Republic on January 20, 1946.