861.00/11–948: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Secretary of State
2592. 1. Despite frequent reiteration accusations West aggressive policy, post-election outpourings of Soviet propaganda and activities and pronouncements in connection anniversary Bolshevik revolution seem to us to have been marked by shift of emphasis, apparently designed [Page 932] to leave impression Soviet Government wants peaceful international settlement and believes it “can do business with Truman”.
2. Recent comment on international subjects has to great extent taken its themes from Stalin’s Pravda interview of October 28 on Berlin question. While this may have seemed to Western eyes uncompromising, subsequent propaganda has tended to stress: (a) Soviet readiness for agreement; (b) hopes of people everywhere for peaceful settlement; (c) responsibility of relatively small group of “aggressors and warmongers” in USA and Britain for war plans and talk; and (d) inevitable failure instigators new war (i.e. continuation of peace).
3. After a few days of obviously surprised hesitation, Soviet propaganda organs have practically done about-face on President Truman. While on election eve, Soviet propaganda described Democratic and Republican parties equally as creatures of American monopoly capital in contrast to Progressive Party representing interests working people, Molotov a week later (in his address of November 6) explained “victory for Democratic Party and President Truman” as due to rejection by people of “frankly reactionary and most aggressive program … of Republican Party and Dewey.” First indication change of line was November 5 Tass despatch citing US papers as explaining Truman victory largely due his opposition Taft–Hartley Act, methods Thomas Committee and racial discrimination and his “adherence to principles of Roosevelt”. In November 6 Pravda, Ehrenburg1 said “Politically unsophisticated average American voted for Democrats because Republicans seemed more militant to him (and) feared that by voting for new Progress Party he would guarantee success Dewey”. In Pravda on November 7, major commentator Marinin elaborated the theme at length. While acclaiming the role and future promise of the Progressives, he explained that the Democrats had “passed off as their own goods” Wallace slogans and had in many areas received Progressive support. “At the tensest moments of campaign,” Marinin continued, “they (Democrats) pronounced a number of sermons on necessity of strengthening peace and relieving tension of international situation. Moreover, the Democratic leaders even advanced proposal to send Chief Justice Supreme Court Vinson to Moscow for direct negotiations with Soviet Government on settlement disputed questions.” When Republicans objected, Democrats dropped project, but “outcome elections clearly reflects desire of American voters to reject clearly reactionary and aggressive clique of Dewey–Vandenberg–Dulles2.”
[Page 933]4. In comparison with last year the 52 Communist Party slogans for anniversary were much more subdued and Moscow was not plastered with anti-American posters. Embassy personnel at Molotov reception received unusually friendly attention. Both Mr. and Mrs. Molotov surprisingly cordial, as were several other Soviet officials who made effort to leave general impression on lines indicated above.
5. Obviously any shift toward US representatives, American people, and President Truman himself, long previously attacked as reactionary warmonger, will be tactical in nature. If Kremlin really considered President a “social reformist”, then ideologically he would be much worse, in Communist theory, than a frankly reactionary regime which would hasten rather than delay the inevitable crisis. In my view, indications of a change in tactics may be expected as result of following factors. On the one hand, the Kremlin probably discouraged by the unity, determination, and defensive preparations of the west, by the weak showing of Wallace in the elections and the demonstrated solidity of US bi-partisan foreign policy. On the other, it has been encouraged by such factors as the revelation of the Vinson proposal and the mood prevailing in France to see possibilities of disrupting both internal US and international unity and thus seriously reducing the strength of the west. If this is correct, as I believe, then the current signs of shift may be the prelude to a further “peace” move, with some offer of negotiations and possibly even minor concessions calculated to cause us to drop our guard and to spread the germs of suspicion and distrust among the Allies of the West.
Sent Department 2592. Department pass Paris Gadel 590, London 286.