711.61/5–1048: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Secretary of State
us urgent
866. For the Secretary’s eyes only from Smith. Molotov sent for me this evening1 at six and made from notes an oral statement, text of which he handed me at conclusion of our conversation. This text being transmitted in immediately following message, and you will note that it is, in effect, simply our statement in reverse. No proposals or feelers of a more definite nature were made during subsequent conversation. I interpret Soviet statement to mean that they have taken note of our declaration of intention, appreciate fact that we are determined to proceed as indicated, and wish us to know that they are not going to change their own policy for the time being. They are going to watch developments closely, and will be guided by them, and not by our words. They are not ready to talk yet, but have not closed the door. Just as we have made a statement for the record, so have they.
At conclusion of Mr. Molotov’s statement I said I would comment briefly. With regard to remarks about “development of US bases, our policy of encirclement and our war-like threats,” I had only to say that our entire history was refutation of any suspicion of a policy which involved aggressive war. As I stated during our previous conversation, the drawing together of the western European countries and the support which was being given them by US was a direct reflection of the apprehensions and fears which had been aroused by the expansionist policy of USSR, and that while I had no right to disbelieve his statements, I could not refrain from paraphrasing Mr. Vyshinski’s comment that facts spoke for themselves.
The US was secure in its honesty of purpose with regard to ERP. Our” people were, as stated previously, completely unable to understand implications placed on that program by USSR. US appreciates and fully understands the desire and indeed the necessity of close and friendly relations between USSR and its neighbors, but that here again facts spoke for themselves, and I was fully familiar with events [Page 852] which followed the acceptance by Czechoslovakia of invitation to ERP conference in Paris and subsequent reversal of this acceptance during the immediately following visit of Mazaryk2 and Gottwald3 to Moscow. A country like my own which permitted complete freedom of political thought and expression did not oppose Communism because of its Marxian ideology but purely and simply because we had seen repeated instances of Communist minorities coming into power by illegal means and against the will of the majority of the population in the “Countries referred to. The US remained convinced that these minority coups d’etat would have been quite impossible without the moral and physical support of the USSR.
With respect to trade agreements, there was nothing US would like ‘better under conditions of reasonable and honest understanding than to participate in expanding trade with USSR and to contribute to the economic recovery of the Soviet states which had suffered during the war. If proof were desired of our previous feelings in this respect it could be found in fact that under Lend-Lease we had shipped to USSR enormous values in basic industrial plants which when shipped obviously would not be in production in time to contribute to the war effort. Our change in views with regard to trade was again a direct reflection of the Soviet expansionist policies referred to in my previous conversation.
I did not wish to indulge in a contest of words which might be interpreted as the “pot calling kettle black”, but I had recently reviewed some of our past agreements with USSR, particularly Roosevelt-Litvinov agreement, and that I would remind him of what I am sure he already knows, i.e., that the only provision of this agreement which had not been violated by USSR was that permitting presence of a catholic priest in Moscow.
However, these were matters which it would be profitless for us to pursue to the exclusion of the major issues. I had, I believed, made completely clear the policies of US and the reasons which prompted the adoption of these policies. I appreciated Mr. Molotov’s statement of the policies of his government, which I would communicate at once to Washington.
Molotov said he did not intend to make a lengthy reply, but in connection with my own remarks he wished to say that as for the bases which were being established, almost everywhere and the military alliance of the western European states, it was well-known that the western European and American press was openly saying that these measures were directed against USSR and that to explain all of these [Page 853] actions by arguing self-defense did not seem at all convincing to Soviet Government. He could only add that all this is being done by Great Britain and US outside UN, and even without UN being informed, which of course, emphasized character of the foreign policy of US and of the western countries. With regard to economic questions, since I had reminded him of Lend-Lease, he would reply that Soviet Government has always been grateful for assistance given USSR by Lend-Lease during the war, but that US policy had changed markedly in this respect. The USSR has stated its position with regard to ERP, and he would only repeat that US has not even fulfilled its trade agreements.
With respect to USSR and its neighbors and other states where democratic forces were exercising authority, and with regard to the Communists who are now playing an outstanding part in the direction of affairs, he would reiterate what he had said before, that the explanation can be found in the resurgence of democratic forces which had suffered under the oppression of Fascism and which considered the Communists to be the most determined and effective fighters against Fascism. He would like to recall once again that a great deal had been written with regard to these events and the connection of the USSR therewith which is completely untrue. No one has been able to find any facts to prove these false allegations, nor can anyone state with authority that the Communists have used illegal means. In Czechoslovakia, for instance, all the Parliament as well as the President took part in the reformation of the Government and if the actions of certain rightists circles gave rise to these events, responsibility falls on such circles which wish to induce changes by violence.
The Soviet Union was fully alive to the difficulties in our present relationship and the differences in views. Nevertheless, USSR has always considered that it could live in peace and in good relationship with US and with all other countries. It has never pretended to interfere with the internal policies of other nations, but it cannot ignore the actions and developments which have taken place during the past years which infringe on its legitimate interests.
At the end of this statement I took the occasion to repeat to Mr. Molotov what I said to Vyshinski in London with regard to the danger inherent in the actions of junior and irresponsible individuals who are in contact over about two-thirds of the earth’s surface and who might by violent and ill-considered action touch a match to the powder train. Molotov replied that this was quite impossible for Soviet officials and citizens. I said I hoped so, but I could not disregard fact that others beside Soviet officials also were involved and that without reiterating past events would remind him that when planes are shot down and men [Page 854] are killed, incidents arose which it was to the interest of the USSR as well as of the US to prevent. This terminated the conversation.
Doubt very much if any really pointed suggestion will be made here or in the immediate future. I had thought that Molotov’s conversation might lead up to a suggestion for another CFM, but do not think this will be made now. Molotov was grave, attentive and courteous. His final personal remarks were pleasant. He wished me “good fishing” and remarked that he also intended to take a little rest.
I intend to leave early Tuesday,4 but will be gone for a short time only and can get back in eight or ten hours if instructed via Paris or Berlin.