Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

711.4027/7–2648

The United States Embassy in the United Kingdom to the British Foreign Office ¹

Aide-Mémoire

1. Ever since the Chicago Conference in International Civil Aviation at the end of 1944,² and until a few months ago, the United States Government actively endeavored to induce the U.S.S.R. to participate on a basis of full equality and reciprocity in the orderly development of international civil aviation. A like endeavor was made, without exception or discrimination, in regard to the various countries which one after the other became satellites of the U.S.S.R. (Poland, Yugoslavia, Rumania, Hungary). Throughout those years the products of American aircraft and related industries and aviation material of all kinds from Army surplus were available to the U.S.S.R. and her satellites.

This attitude was in conformity with the objective—shared by the United Kingdom Government—of promoting worldwide air transport to serve as an effective vehicle of trade and commerce among peace loving nations in a peaceful world.

2. In the fall of 1947, it became evident that our active and repeated endeavors of more than two years to obtain a reciprocal air transport agreement with the U.S.S.R. were unsuccessful; that the U.S.S.R. is unwilling to join I.C.A.O.; that through the control it exercises in the satellite countries, the U.S.S.R. is preventing the satellite governments from entering into operationally reciprocal air transport agreements with countries outside the Soviet orbit.

It further became evident that while the U.S.S.R. persevered in excluding civil aircraft of Western nations from Soviet-controlled areas, it sought purely unilateral penetration beyond the iron air curtain erected by its exclusionary measures. This has been substantially accomplished by non-reciprocal link arrangements or by Soviet-controlled and operated satellite airlines which are in fact Soviet airlines.

Through this ingenious policy, the U.S.S.R. has effectively accomplished their political and military objective or wide penetration of non-Soviet territories at the negligible cost of granting access only to the periphery of the Soviet-controlled area.

3. In the fall of 1947, after more than two years of negative results, the United States Government in consultation with the United Kingdom Government decided to follow a new, though admittedly an interim, policy. In essence this policy reflected our reluctance to draw the final conclusion that the U.S.S.R. had irrevocably committed itself to a policy of non-cooperation, even of hostility, and was definitely determined to bar access by civil aircraft of her former Allies and of other presumably friendly nations to Soviet-controlled airspace. Under this interim policy the United States refrains from taking the initiative toward the conclusion of air transport agreements with the U.S.S.R. or its satellites, but is prepared to consider on its merits and in light of all relevant factors proposals made by any curtain country.

4. The interim policy did not contemplate any change in regard to the sale of aircraft and aviation equipment to the U.S.S.R. and its satellites. However, the continued exclusionary policy of the U.S.S.R. and persistent Soviet attempts aiming at unilateral penetration of the non-Soviet world by their aircraft, caused the United States increasing concern over the broader implications of freely supplying such equipment to the curtain countries. This concern was expressed in form of advice to manufacturers and distributors of such equipment as a result of which the flow thereof to curtain countries began to slow down at the beginning of this year. The export license requirements for certain categories of war potentials—including aircraft, components and electronic equipment—foreseen in Presidential Proclamation No. 2776, effective April 15, 1948,³ although imposed for different reasons (i.e. the Palestine situation), enabled the United States Government to exercise a more direct and effective control and practically to stop the direct sale and export of such equipment to the curtain countries.

5. Penetration by the U.S.S.R. and by the satellites of the non-Soviet world—particularly Western Europe, the Near and Middle East—with their air services on a unilateral and non-reciprocal basis, when viewed in the light of their persistent attempts at further expansion, have caused increasing concern to the United States Government. Our concern, of course, arises not from economic considerations but from the obvious political and security implications of this situation.

The opinion of the United States Government that the primary objectives of Soviet air transport operations are strategic and political rather than commercial is strongly supported by the uneconomic management and operation of the Soviet-controlled satellite airlines. The sudden burst of activity following the Prague coup, seeking to expand operations of the Czech airline CSA (now completely under Communist control) to the critical Near and Middle East region is further indication of the correctness of this estimate of the true Soviet aim in this regard. The coup in Czechoslovakia in February, 1948, completely changed the picture. It gave the U.S.S.R. for the first time a relatively competent and experienced airline with routes, actual and potential, reaching into all parts of the non-Soviet world and capable of serving, under Soviet controls, as a convenient instrumentality of penetration into all corners of the globe.

6. The abrupt and disingenuous termination on April 30, 1948, by the Hungarian puppet government of negotiations which it had initiated with the United States, for an air transport agreement has finally convinced the United States Government that it is necessary to re-examine with the United Kingdom the civil aviation policy heretofore applied to the U.S.S.R. and the satellites. A careful and searching analysis of our past course of action, of the premises upon which our policy was based, and the wholly negative results, have convinced the United States Government that unless the United States, the United Kingdom and other countries outside the Soviet orbit adopt a more restrictive policy, comparable to that actually followed by the U.S.S.R., we shall fail in our major objective of lifting the iron curtain and shall be giving away for virtually nothing, and, in the present circumstances, to the detriment of our security, the operating privileges which constitute our sole leverage and bargaining power.

7. As a result of this examination of the problem, the United States Government has formulated certain views as to the line of action which we are prepared to follow if the United Kingdom agrees and is prepared to join in this course.

The course of action (summarized hereafter) which the United States now proposes to the United Kingdom Government has been concurred in by the United States Occupation Authorities in Germany and Austria, has been approved by the National Security Council of the United States upon recommendation of the Department of State, and has the express approval of the President of the United States.

(I) It is proposed that: The United Kingdom and the United States, together with countries of Western Europe and the Near and Middle East outside the Soviet orbit would seek to prohibit civil air operations (scheduled, non-scheduled and charter) by airlines of the U.S.S.R. and her satellites to and through non-curtain territory until the U.S.S.R. grants, on a truly reciprocal basis, transit and commercial landing rights in U.S.S.R. territory proper to civil air carriers of the United Kingdom and the United States and such other countries outside the Soviet orbit which adopt this line of action and desire such rights.

The proposed measure of containment is intended to apply to civil air transport only. It is not intended to prevent the exchange with the U.S.S.R. and/or the satellites on a fully reciprocal basis of noncommercial, military, courier, diplomatic, or other government sponsored flights. The immediate objective of this proposal—the confinement of Soviet and satellite aircraft to Soviet-controlled airspace—is of a political and security rather than of a commercial or economic character. The primacy of political and security considerations, even though dealing with civil air transport, is, however, justified, first because civil aviation is a vitally important element of air power (just as the merchant marine is the indispensable foundation of sea power); secondly, the U.S.S.R. regards civil air transport largely from the political and military point of view; thirdly, the present international situation puts the accent on airpower not on civil aviation.

The ultimate civil aviation objective of the United States Government remains, as before, the development of worldwide air transport on the basis of factual and operational reciprocity with the least possible restrictions consistent with national security. It is possible that the proposed course of action may build up sufficient pressure to persuade the Soviet of the advantage of a more cooperative attitude, although admittedly such a change in the foreseeable future appears remote.

(II) To implement this proposed course of action:

a. The United Kingdom, the United States and other countries cooperating in this course of action would refrain from concluding air agreements with the U.S.S.R. or its satellites and from exchanging or authorizing commercial flights to or through their territories until the ultimate objective defined in paragraph (I) above is in sight.

b. Any of these countries which have air transport agreements with curtain countries would take such steps as are necessary and open to them to prevent the further exercise of rights under these agreements.

c. The United Kingdom, the United States and France would withdraw or suspend authorizations granted to curtain countries for commerical services involving overflight or landing in their respective occupation zones of Germany and Austria, and would refuse to grant such permits in the future.

d. The sale and export to the U.S.S.R. and her satellites, directly or indirectly, of aircraft, engines, spare parts and electronic equipment used in connection with aircraft operations would be prohibited.

e. The use of facilities for overhaul, refitting and maintenance to the aircraft of the U.S.S.R. and her satellites would be denied.

(III) The suggested course of action would apply to the U.S.S.R., Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Rumania, Bulgaria and Albania. So long as the present situation as regards Finnish-Soviet relations remains unchanged it is felt that Finland should be considered as a special case and the measures of containment should not be applied to her. However, it is believed desirable that any air agreement which a cooperating country may conclude with Finland should be subject to cancellation on short notice; and that the sale of any kind of aviation equipment to Finland should be closely scrutinized and adequately protected against possible diversion to the U.S.S.R. or a Soviet-controlled airline.

We believe that the proposed course of action and the measures of implementation should be put into effect by the cooperating countries with as little publicity as possible. It is recognized that the adoption of a course of action on so broad a front as is envisaged cannot be kept secret. At the same time it is believed its effectiveness would be enhanced by taking the necessary steps with the minimum publicity. By refraining from announcing a policy or course of action, we would avoid, or at least delay, reaction in the form of hostile propaganda or retaliatory measures by the countries affected. Moreover, this tactic would permit quiet and inconspicuous relaxation or retraction in case this course of action is effective in penetrating the iron air curtain.

8. In formulating this proposal, we have taken into account the following considerations:

a. The effectiveness of the proposed course of action depends upon the obtaining the agreement of a number of countries in Western Europe, the Near and Middle East to cooperate fully in all phases of implementation. To secure such agreement is admittedly difficult, but it is believed that the identity of national security interests is a sufficiently strong motive for agreement. It is also evident that through our control of the airspace over Germany and Austria and the participation of key periphery countries, this course of action can be made effective even without the cooperation of all countries whose participation may be desirable.

b. The proposed course of action involves the risk of retaliatory measures and hostile propaganda by the countries affected and, possibly, though by no means necessarily, of adding to the tension between the West and the U.S.S.R. On our part, we are prepared to assume these risks.

c. The proposed course of action if put into effect, will probably not accomplish its objective immediately; neither can we expect 100 per cent effectiveness. However, the choice between taking the initiative and using what leverage we have and on the other hand doing nothing, would appear to be obvious. It is the view of the United States Government that positive action should now be taken.

9. Should the Government of the United Kingdom agree with the Government of the United States upon a positive course of action, it is further proposed that the two governments consult at once upon the means to be employed in obtaining the widest cooperation of the other Western European, Near and Middle Eastern countries.

London, July 19, 1948.

1. This aide-mémoire, a copy of which was transmitted to the Department as an enclosure to despatch 1638, July 26, 1948, from London, not printed, was submitted to the British Foreign Office in connection with discussions on July 17 and 21, 1948 between American and British officials on civil aviation policy towards the Soviet Union and the East European satellites. Regarding those discussions, see telegram 3302, July 21, from London, infra.
2. For documentation on the international civil aviation conference held in Chicago, November 1–December 7, 1944, see Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. ii, pp. 355 ff.
3. See editorial note, p. 528.