SWNCC Files, Lot 52–M45
Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Forrestal)
SANACC 358/8
In response to the request contained in a memorandum from the Executive Secretary of the State–Army–Navy–Air Force Coordinating Committee dated 15 October 1948 (SANA–62651 the Joint Chiefs of Staff have formulated the following statement of their views on the matter of United States long-range strategic interests in the military establishments of Greece and Turkey, for forwarding by you to SANACC with such comments as you consider appropriate.
From the military point of view, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that, as long as the USSR pursues its expansionist policies, the security of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East is of critical importance to the future security of the United States. Greece and Turkey stand in the way of Soviet expansion in this area and thus it is highly important to our national security interest that neither falls under the control or domination of the USSR.
Both countries offer bases from which the USSR could launch operations against the islands of Crete, Rhodes, and Cyprus and against communications in the Eastern Mediterranean and to the Middle East. Turkey is strategically more important than Greece since in addition it dominates major air, land, and sea routes from the USSR to the Cairo–Suez area and to the Middle East oil fields.
The present economic and political situation in Greece is precarious. Even with considerable military and economic assistance from the United States, Greece will in all probability never have the capability of successfully resisting those attacks in force which the USSR and/or her satellites could launch against her long northern frontier. Greek military spirit is now woefully lacking. On the other hand, the military potential of Turkey, coupled with its high national spirit and geographic situation, makes it possible for that nation now to resist [Page 192] Soviet aggression to the extent of imposing appreciable delay and eventually, with continued U.S. aid, to offer strong resistance to invasion.
Based upon the foregoing considerations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff offer the following definition of United States long-range strategic interests in the military establishments of Greece and Turkey:
- a.
- Greece: A Greek military establishment capable of maintaining internal security in order to avoid the communist domination of Greece.
- b.
- Turkey: A Turkish military establishment of sufficient size and effectiveness to insure Turkey’s continued resistance to Soviet pressure; the development of combat effectiveness to the extent that any overt Soviet aggression can be delayed long enough to permit the commitment of U.S. and allied forces in Turkey in order to deny certain portions of Turkey to the USSR.
Since the State–Army–Navy–Air Force Coordinating Committee is considering military aid priorities on an overall basis in SANACC 360/112 and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have submitted comments on this paper*, no specific reference with regard to the priority of aid programs for Greece and Turkey is believed necessary at this time.3
Fleet Admiral, U. S. Navy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces
- Not printed; but see footnote 1, p. 158.↩
- Dated August 18, not printed. SANACC approved the document in amended form on March 15, 1949. It is anticipated that the amended version will be printed in a forthcoming volume in the Foreign Relations series.↩
- Memo for Secretary of Defense dated 1 November 1948 (SANACC 360/12). [Footnote in the source text.]↩
- SANACC, by informal action on February 4, 1949, “concurred in the redefinition by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of U.S. long-range strategic interests in the military establishments of Greece and Turkey as a basis for planning in respect to the extent and type of future U.S. military aid to Greece and Turkey.” (SANACC 358/9, note of February 4, 1949, by the Secretaries of SANACC, SWNCC Files, Lot 52–M45)↩