868.20/11–2248: Telegram
The Ambassador in Greece (Grady) to the Secretary of State
Amag 1652. With my approval General Van Fleet, director of JUSMAPG, on November 20 sent to Washington by special courier two copies of JUSMAPG’s report of estimated needs of Greek armed forces under plans “A” and “B” for fiscal year 1950, as requested Gama 13291 and War 92306. One copy of report, bound in three volumes, will be delivered immediately to Department.
I have not had time since completion JUSMAPG’s report on November 20, nor will I have time before its presentation to Budget Committee on November 24 to make thorough study of document. I have, however, read carefully director’s memorandum to me transmitting report and statements at beginning of each volume of report. I have made cursory examination of supporting tables of JUSMAPG’s estimated [Page 188] needs of Greek ground, air and naval forces, totalling $450,000,000 under plan “A” and $541,000,000 under plan “B” for fiscal year 1950. This is sufficient to give picture of JUSMAPG’s thinking on problem and its solution.
JUSMAPG sees AMAG’s mission in Greece, as stated paragraph 4 of director’s memorandum: “To assist Greek armed forces in re-establishment of internal security in Greece at earliest practicable date and to reduce Communistic inspired guerrilla movement to point where it can be controlled by military forces and civil police of policy (police) proportions.” JUSMAPG’s concept of AMAG’s mission and its own has remained practically unchanged since JUSMAPG was set up in its present form.
Throughout its life JUSMAPG, whenever threatened with stalemate, has sought to accomplish its mission by increasing size and fire power of Greek armed forces. Thus, in analysis, the key to success according to JUSMAPG thinking is always more: more men, more money and more equipment. In this the thinking of JUSMAPG is in line with that of Greek political and military leaders. Now as over-all AMAG objective, as interpreted by JUSMAPG, and as far removed as ever from fulfillment, JUSMAPG proposes to attain this objective through plan for fiscal year 1950 that calls for further increase of armed forces, with increased striking power and replacement of all British vehicles and large numbers of British weapons.
With the past a matter of record and with this recommendation for the future, it is useful to examine briefly results obtained in Greece from actions based upon this thinking in military, economic and psychological spheres.
We have today in Greece an armed forces organization of 263,000 men, which is fed with American purchased daily rations of 4200 calories, clothed in American purchased uniforms, equipped with American arms, transported by vehicles and pack animals supplied by America and trained and advised in operations by American and British officers. Supporting land army is heavy artillery, an air force and navy. This armed force, thus equipped, trained and advised, has been unable to make appreciable progress, defined in terms of JUSMAPG’s statement of mission, against bandit organization of some 25,000 men fed with what they could steal or buy locally, clothed in remnants, armed with old weapons found in Greece or others supplied by their northern neighbors, transported on their own or their donkeys’ legs, and trained by their own leaders on both sides of Greek frontier. Bandit land army is not backed by a single airplane, heavy gun or naval vessel. In view of fact we have in course past year on several occasions increased size and equipment of Greek armed forces, during which time strength of bandit forces has remained proportionately [Page 189] constant to that of Greek army, and as we have not achieved greater security by these actions, it seems to me that we are not justified now in assuming we will attain our objective through the use of the old method of increasing again the size and equipment of armed forces. Additionally, I believe that by maintaining even the present large Greek army during the next fiscal year, we may be playing directly into the Communists’ hands for with little money and equipment and relatively few men they are attaining their objectives against our mounting investment.
Even though dollar cost of present Greek military establishment of 263,000 men is met entirely by America, the economic impact of an army of this size upon Greece is staggering. Direct drachma cost of this army contributes heavily towards budgetary deficit. Indirect cost to country is even greater. Workers and farmers needed for increasing industrial and agricultural output became non-producers when serving in the army. Key men from civil service are drafted to detriment of civil administration. 750,000 refugees and 1,500,000 indigent persons now living from precarious government dole represent crushing economic burden. A continuing up to 1950 of the drain coming from military establishment of present size without concurrent improvement in security conditions, will become a burden which will paralyze all economic recovery. ECA recovery program then will become simply a relief program. From layman’s viewpoint it seems that in present circumstances a large army defeats itself. Within present large army much spiritless fighting can be attributed to presence of old and weary personnel. Within the country each increase in army has been interpreted as our admission that hitherfore the Greek army, due to American decisions, has been inadequate in size and equipment. Hence, in one way each increase has lessened the determination of soldiers to prosecute war as they see no reason to extend themselves to do the job that can be shared later with larger army. Each numerical increase, with corresponding increase in supplies, has added proof to Greeks that this, in first instance, is America’s war rather than Greece’s.
Greek politicians, echoing local press, for a year and a half have spoken of Greece as the focal point on democratic front. Whereas this may have been true eighteen months ago, I believe in our world strategy today, as important as Greece is, as mimic [vis-à-vis?] Russia, it deserves to have only secondary consideration. It seems to me the democratic defense of Europe must hinge on England and Turkey. In the chain that connects these countries Greece is one of weakest links. It would have little value to us in case of shooting war between Russia and the US. But in the cold war, the Communists must be prevented from controlling Greece. Assuming my thinking is in line [Page 190] with American policy, I believe that our military efforts in Greece next year should be limited to approximately its present proportions, although this may result in an operation in the nature of a holding action. With our resources what they are and the world condition what it is today, we are not justified in asking Congress for half billion dollars to be spent in Greece where we will derive little benefit in case of war, nor do I think it realistic to assume availability of military supplies in this quantity in light probable commitments for support of western union defense establishments. Even in absence of war, these funds used to maintain a large military establishment are not likely to benefit us materially since the proposed pattern is the same that has been used in the past and it has not succeeded in reestablishing order and improving hopes for economic recovery.
I recommend, therefore, that director of JUSMAPG be instructed to submit a study of needs of Greek armed forces based on a predetermined maximum budget for fiscal year 1950 which I recommend to be not substantially larger than that of present fiscal year, namely $150 million. I recommend Embassy plan to use such a sum to maintain an air force and navy approximately present size and an army of only such size as can be supported for balance of funds. I believe there is in Greece the leadership and men with which to build a well-led and vigorous army of this size. In its training emphasis should be placed on mobility and strong striking power. An increase in use of commandos and paratroopers should provide means to attack and eliminate more bandit concentrations and with more bandit casualties, attrition will work in our favor. As I stated in Amag 1613,2 I think greater emphasis should be placed on psychological warfare. In the past I suspect at times the Greeks have directed their ability in this line more towards getting additional material from US than causing deserters from bandit bands.
Should these thoughts become known in course of Congressional and budgetary hearings, they will create a profound shock in Greek political and press circles. But sooner or later the leaders of these circles, who have convinced themselves that Greece can expect to live indefinitely on American bounty, will have to learn the realities of life. The blow can be delayed but it will come and we must prepare for the reaction. Although we know the reaction of these circles and do not discount their influence, I believe that in eyes of most forward-looking Greeks the old leaders are largely discredited. Eventually, therefore, we must look to new men to lead the vital elements of the nation. I think plan for a smaller army, if properly presented in Greece, particularly if there is at that time a strong and efficient government in [Page 191] power, to which I am lending my efforts, will have a real appeal to the vigorous element in the Greek nation. The plan translated into a new army with the effective help of JUSMAPG, has a greater possibility of clearing a way for real accomplishment and restoring order than the plan for continuing the presently constituted army or increasing it by prolonging the mobilization of a reluctant citizenry.