Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Western Europe, Volume III

840.20/7–748

Minutes of the Fourth Meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security, July 8, 1948, 10 a. m.

Washington, July 8, 1948, 10 a.m.

top secret

Item (3) Security Relations with Other Western European Countries

Mr. Lovett, in opening the meeting, recalled Mr. Bevin’s words that no western security system would be complete unless Spain and Germany played their proper roles. The U.S. was not a party to the Five-Power Treaty but would like to know at this time how far the thinking of the Brussels nations had gone in the direction of a general regional security arrangement. The U.S. Government regarded the Brussels Treaty as the affair of the signatories thereto but would appreciate some friendly advice and information from them at this stage.

Mr. Pearson said that there was no question of extending the Brussels Treaty to include Western Hemisphere countries; what he envisaged was the possible formation of a new arrangement covering the North Atlantic community.

Mr. Lovett suggested that any such new association would have the same purpose.

Mr. Van Kleffens said that nothing in the relations between the parties to the Brussels Pact and other European countries implied any disparagement toward the latter. The Pact was not intended to be a closed shop. It recognized the need and desirability for early association of other countries, which up to now had been unable to join for one reason or another. The Netherlands Government nevertheless thought it might be wise to permit the Brussels group of nations to crystallize and strengthen their new ties before admitting other states. On the other hand, he believed that it would be desirable to compare notes on other countries, inasmuch as the Brussels group was not a closed shop.

Mr. Lovett stated that it would be valuable for the U.S. Government to know what security arrangements had been developed in connection with Western Union and what the nations of the latter contemplated in the formation of collective security relationships with other nations.

Sir Oliver Franks said that it was his impression that very little if any discussion had taken place among the Brussels group on the question of admitting additional members. No doubt each nation had in mind what would be desirable in this direction, but he knew of no discussions along these lines as a group. As the United Kingdom saw this problem, there were two planes: there were certain countries with a vital interest in, and of vital interest to, the security of the North Atlantic area; this was the bigger plane. The other plane was European: there were countries which might be associated with the Brussels Pact, for instance Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Iceland, and Italy. This was not an exclusive list but the readiness of the Brussels Powers to enlarge and of the others to join was conditioned by the attitude of the U.S. and Canada toward the subject matter of Item (4) of the agenda. In this respect, Items (3) and (4) could not be separated. He added that in the long-term view the position of certain other countries, such as Eire, Spain, and Portugal, and their relation to any security arrangements, would have to be considered.

Mr. Lovett said that the Brussels Pact had been set up without association with the Western Hemisphere Powers. Was it considered that such an association, if formed, would have a bearing on the extension of the Pact?

Sir Oliver Franks, referring to the community of interest between the Atlantic countries, expressed considerable doubt about the readiness of others to join the Brussels Pact without the simultaneous conclusion of some arrangement for the North Atlantic area.

Mr. Lovett observed that regional security arrangements should be based both on reasonable geographic proximity and community of interest.

M. Bonnet thought that there were two main considerations involved: first, that among the Brussels countries there was a general feeling that there must be closer cooperation among the states of Western Europe; what had been accomplished in the economic field was evidence of this. Secondly, there was the question whether the admission of other countries would be a liability or an asset. He believed that some countries would be liabilities and that it would not be prudent at this time to extend the field of military responsibility of the Western European Powers. If the Brussels Pact were to be enlarged a problem would immediately arise as to what geographic lines should be drawn. The inclusion of Italy, for instance, would raise the question of the whole Mediterranean. He suggested that, for the time being, the Brussels Powers should limit themselves to dealing with the security problem of Western Europe by trying to reinforce the Brussels Pact through an association with the United States and Canada.

Mr. Lovett observed that, without trespassing on Item (4), the relationship of other Western European countries to the Brussels Treaty should be considered. Greenland and Iceland were more important than some nations in Western Europe to the security of the United States and Canada. The bridge across the Atlantic could be a collective defense arrangement making all the North Atlantic countries a unit. As far as the U.S. was concerned, and also presumably Canada, the ultimate criterion was whether or not its national security was affected by such an arrangement. He asked Mr. Kennan to discuss Scandinavia.

Mr. Kennan stated that the United States had doubted the advisability of pressing certain countries close to the Soviet Union into making military engagements when their neutrality might in certain circumstances be more desirable. He gave Sweden as an example. He inquired about the possibility of gradations in membership of the Brussels Pact, pointing out that Portugal’s relationship to England had long had this qualified character, obligating her to assist England in war only if her own neutrality militated against her ally. He added that, as a prerequisite to U.S. association with security arrangements under the terms of the Vandenberg Resolution, the U.S. Government would have to satisfy itself that countries such as Sweden had been adequately considered in connection with such arrangements.

Mr. Lovett observed that the Vandenberg Resolution should not be over-emphasized, except as representing the absolute maximum to which the United States might go. It carried no assurance that the U.S. would go that far. It was an act of one element of the U.S. Government and did not provide enabling legislation or appropriations. There must be flexibility of approach; the final result might differ markedly from the concept contained in the Vandenberg Resolution.

Baron Silvercruys wished to stress that the Brussels Treaty was an inclusive, not an exclusive, agreement, in spirit as well as in fact as shown by the text of Article IX.¹ The Treaty aimed at bringing together, immediately, adjacent nations irrevocably tied together for historical as well as geographical reasons and whose security was interdependent. The signatories of the Pact felt that, at this stage, they had taken the first necessary step in consolidating security in their part of the world. They were doubtful whether profitable results would be attained by enlarging this enterprise forthwith. Developments would be more likely to take place if indications were obtained regarding the nature of United States association with European security arrangements. It seemed to him that the key to Item (3) of the agenda was Item (4) and he suggested therefore that discussion of Item (3) be resumed when Item (4) came under consideration.

Mr. Van Kleffens said that the Brussels Pact did not keep any door closed to any Western European countries; it was a fact, however, that no other Western European country had knocked on that door. In this respect Mr. Van Kleffens believed that it was important to consider the point of view of prospective adherents to the Brussels Pact, suggesting that they might hesitate to adhere to that Pact, but might be willing to join some other security system of a wider adherence.

Mr. Lovett stated that whether additional members joined the Brussels Pact was entirely a question for the original signatories to decide. What the United States had to consider, before again going before Congress, was whether the unit with which it was dealing was exerting the absolute maximum of self-help and mutual aid, and what considerations of U.S. national security were involved. He wished to make it clear that the U.S. was not making any proposals. It was anxious to get full understanding of what Western Europe had in mind in order that it could estimate the degree of self-help and mutual aid.

M. Bonnet observed that in attempting to establish security in the Western European area the five nations had taken certain definite risks and suggested that these risks should not be unwisely increased by admitting certain nations close to the Soviet Union. The Western European countries, which did not feel very strong, should not be asked to develop a system increasing their risks without being assured of American support. Would it be wise, for example, to enlarge the system in such a way that could, however wrongly, be considered by Russia as encirclement? He suggested rather that it would be well to strengthen the present consolidation of nations in the ease of peace and not enlarge membership too rapidly.

Sir Oliver Franks said that in looking at a map of the area in which all seven countries represented at these talks were interested, there were certain obvious gaps, e.g., Greenland, Iceland, Norway, and Denmark. Any arrangement appealing as much to the U.S. and Canada as to the countries on the Atlantic’s eastern seaboard would have to take account of these gaps. He believed that the difficulty was that the Western Hemisphere nations desired to know, before they could make their decision, what the nations on the Eastern side of the North Atlantic planned to do so far as security arrangements were concerned, but that the decisions of the latter states were equally dependent upon what action the United States and Canada intended to take.

Mr. Lovett stated that the present discussions would be justified if they brought out what was necessary and possible on the Eastern side of the Atlantic and what was requisite and desirable for the Western Hemisphere nations; any recommendation to the Congress would have to take account of both elements. He cited the problem of a hypothetical nation in Western Europe, “Neuralgia”, which was prepared resolutely to defend itself if it could obtain appropriate assistance. If it saw the U.S. associated with some European group to which it was not a party it might see only two alternatives, either to yield to Soviet pressure, or to appeal piecemeal to the U.S. for military assistance. Before ERP every country had brought in its own uncoordinated list of requirements. The only yardstick had been what the U.S. could afford. The result had been relief rather than recovery. Ultimate recommendations to Congress would have to take account of these points. The Brussels Pact was a bold, encouraging step, but the necessity for bold treatment of the problem was not terminated by it and other steps would have to be taken.

Mr. Van Kleffens believed that, although there was a certain parallel between the the basic formula of O.E.E.C. and that of the political problems now confronting Western Europe, there was also a difference, inasmuch as it had proved to be relatively easy to get 16 European countries around the E.R.P. table, but not around the table of the Brussels Pact. He was certain that it was easier for Sweden, for example, to join O.E.E.C. than the Brussels Pact. Mr. Van Kleffens believed that the problem, at least in part, was to find a political formula which was sufficiently attractive to induce other Western European countries to join in an European security arrangement either along the lines of the Brussels Pact or on some other basis.

Mr. Lovett said that unless the Western European nations showed a high order of determination to solve their problems through some form of union based on self-help and mutual aid, the enterprise would not possess the degree of assurance for the future which the U.S. expected. He reiterated that the U.S. could not “rebuild a fire-trap”, that wars in this area had twice involved it, and that now the people of the United States desired to avoid mistakes of the past and make a constructive contribution to world security. He added that the differences of opinion expressed here were merely an index to the difficulties of the problem and did not at all make the task impossible.

Mr. Van Kleffens appreciated Mr. Lovett’s explanation, but wished to point out that the Brussels Pact was concerned [conceived?], not without some courage, as a new approach for Western Europe. Of course, this was not the only possible solution of the problem.

Mr. Kennan stated that one reason he had raised the question of gradations in membership was that as a practical matter the U.S. Government had to decide from time to time on certain shipments to such nations as Sweden, for example, and that instead of making independent judgments in each instance it would be preferable for the answer to depend upon the relation of Sweden to the Brussels Pact.

Mr. Pearson said that it should not be forgotten that people living in a “fire-trap” were the first to suffer in the event of trouble. Europeans were therefore more conscious than anyone of the dangers ahead. Canada was more interested in the relationship of “Neuralgia”, for instance, to a wider North Atlantic arrangement than in its relationship to the Brussels Pact. Nevertheless, Canada would wish to know what concrete responsibilities the Western European nations were willing to take, what determination actually motivated them and what evidence they could furnish as to this determination.

Mr. Lovett stated that U.S. and Canada were concerned not only with the Brussels Treaty countries, but with “Neuralgia” and other countries and where they fitted in. He agreed with Baron Silvercruys that the discussion could return to Item (3) after Item (4) had been considered.

M. Bonnet reiterated that the Brussels Powers should not be asked to undertake by themselves the formation of a stronger system before knowing the plans of the U.S.

Mr. Lovett replied that the U.S. was not asking the Brussels Treaty nations, or any of the Western European nations, to do anything. It was merely exploring what could be done. The result might be three groups of nations: A (the parties to the Brussels Treaty), B (the U.S. and Canada), and C (others). We were talking to the Brussels countries as a group in being. The result should not be such as artificially to limit U.S. association with others.

Mr. Bohlen inquired whether the Brussels Pact was not perhaps only the first step in setting up security relations among the nations concerned, and whether all security possibilities had been fully explored. This was a question which the U.S. Senate would certainly raise.

Mr. Wrong agreed with Mr. Van Kleffens that it would be useful to discuss the individual positions of European countries outside the Brussels Pact so far as their possible adherence in the future was concerned.

Mr. Lovett stated that his government was interested in the positions of these other countries, pointing out, for example, that the importance of Greenland and Iceland to the Western Hemisphere was indicated in the Rio Treaty. Scandinavia flanked the Brussels Powers. The question of Germany would be difficult to appraise. In considering Portugal’s relationship, the Azores were of great importance. He added that it was important to agree upon some approach to this problem, which would be based both upon geographic regional factors and upon the character or status of membership.

Sir Oliver Franks suggested that the hesitation of some countries might be resolved by stating explicitly on which articles of the United Nations Charter the security association would be based.

Mr. Lovett said that it was understood that these discussions were proceeding within the terms of the United Nations Charter and that it was, in effect, the license for them.

1. For text of Brussels Treaty, see American Foreign Policy, 1950–1955, Basic Documents, vol. i, pp. 968–971, or Department of State Bulletin, May 9, 1948, p. 600.