Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Western Europe, Volume III

757D.00/7–748: Telegram

The Ambassador in Norway (Bay) to the Secretary of State

secret

Oslo, July 7, 1948—8 p. m.

459. During meeting Foreign Office July 3 to sign ERP agreement Foreign Minister Lange requested me call today for more detailed explanation Norway’s position with respect organization Nordic group within provisions Article 51 UN Charter.

During visit of hour and 20 minutes Lange detailed Norway’s position particularly vis-à-vis Sweden’s neutrality attitude which summarized as follows:

1. Both at Copenhagen June 5 and at Stockholm June 16 Lange discussed Nordic pact at length with Danes and Swedes but reached no definite conclusion. Root of problem was Sweden’s insistence upon neutrality policy as pre-condition to organization Scandinavian Defense Pact.

2. During Copenhagen meeting Danish Defense Minister told Swedish Prime Minister if stalemate continues due Sweden’s insistence upon neutrality pre-condition Denmark might join with Norway in application for admission to western group leaving Sweden pursue her policy alone. Replying my question Lange would be opposed to such action now preferring to nurse situation hoping gain Sweden’s acquiescence in formation Nordic group without neutrality pre-condition.

3. Lange summarized Undén’s neutrality reasoning as follows:

A. Sweden would rely on strengthening her own military defenses thus giving some measure of protection even as neutral.

B. In giving satisfaction to Soviet neighbor Sweden might avoid any attack in event general European war.

C. Naive though it sounds Sweden would through avoiding calls for aid and materiel from western powers indirectly enable them concentrate their strength among remaining western states.

D. US, UK are presently unable under any circumstances offer aid.

E. Neutrality likely be more respected if all Scandinavian states adopted common neutrality policy.

F. If Scandinavian group followed neutrality line and emergency arose US and UK would nevertheless rush all possible aid in event of attack or violation Scandinavian neutrality by Soviets. I suggested that at proper opportunity Lange might suggest to Undén desirability of obtaining confirmation of such US and British attitude before placing too complete reliance on this expectation.
Lange believes some logic in points A B D but disagrees with C E F.

4. Lange believes inclusion Sweden in Nordic group essential to Norway because of long common border undefended and incapable of defense by either Sweden, Norway in emergency. Therefore countries with small population weak defenses necessarily bound together.

Lange also considers it politically inexpedient apply pressure on Sweden now. Important section of Norwegian Labor Party as well as Norwegian population believes every possible means should be adopted before admitting failure to persuade Sweden to join with Norway.

With above in mind Lange has developed following tentative program for action which he has already proposed to Undén and Erlander¹ who he believes will approve and cooperate:

Norway, Sweden, Denmark to inaugurate about October 1st series of meetings of representatives with emphasis on military defense group those countries to explore program of defense collaboration and adopt complete detailed program to be followed including availabilities of matériel and weapons required under coordination program.

Meanwhile the haunting principle of neutrality which has kept the governments apart so far in such efforts to be shelved without any commitments by any of the three governments.

Lange emphasized to me that definite termination date for such meetings must be agreed upon should be approximately end January 1949 thus giving 3 or 4 months for completed discussions exploration of possibilities. Lange emphasized necessity such definite termination date to avoid possibility of carrying over needless discussions into indefinite future with possibly inconclusive results.

Lange believes these discussions would show error conclusively demonstrate Nordic defense group must in own interest be linked primarily to US, secondarily to UK and would generally point way to affiliation with western powers. Further weakness and faults in neutrality theme recognized by Norway but not by Sweden would be glaringly exposed and result in complete discard Swedes neutrality hopes.

I asked Lange what his position would be if meetings failed. He replied he would then recommend to his government and Norwegian people that Sweden be left to herself and would recommend declaration of Norway’s affiliation with west through whatever channel might be open at that time.

He reasoned further that after such efforts government’s obligation to diehard party members and Norwegian people will have been fulfilled and that all sections of people will accept inevitable conclusion that Norway must go along without Sweden.

I asked whether his proposal contemplated any advantage in ascertaining results of Swedish September elections. He answered in negative indicated that probably Swedish foreign policy would not be affected by presently anticipated election results. Lange believes election will result in slight decrease Social Democrat strength with corresponding increase in Liberal and Farmers Parties; as Farmers traditionally exponents of neutrality Undén’s present neutrality policy would not be weakened.

Without proposing question to me Lange indicated his belief that Norway does not and in light of all circumstances could not expect aid from US quickly enough and in strength enough to save Norway from aggression from Soviet Union notwithstanding Norway would undoubtedly on its own be able carry on delaying action similar to defense at beginning last war and for perhaps month or two.

I asked Lange whether he had noted any deterioration Norwegian, Swedish relations as result of defense and neutrality controversies. He said some unimportant manifestations of surface irritation during May had subsided. He feels basic relations remain sound friendly and must be so maintained. Asked about Sweden’s insistence on payment in dollars for steel purchased for construction of Norwegian vessels in Swedish shipyards he indicated that could well be a part of numerous evidences of the above mentioned attitude of Swedish firmness during recent months especially in economic field.

On subject of Western Union Lange expressed his understanding that Belgium, Netherlands feel reluctant have Nordic nations invited into group for reason that Nordic states could add little to strength of defense but on contrary would tend to detract strength through their own need for aid which must be forthcoming from western powers which would otherwise be devoting more aid to present limited membership.

In general, Lange believes time will favor Norway’s desire to: (1) Hold exploratory talks with Sweden and blueprint Nordic Defense Pact. (2) Condition Norwegian neutrality for break with Sweden through independent action on Norway’s part in joining with west in event of failure at termination of exploratory talks. (3) Note results of conversations between US and Western Union members pursuant to provisions of Vandenberg Resolution. Obtain clearer view of ability and willingness of western powers to furnish aid in event emergency.

Sent Department 459, pouched to London, Stockholm and Copenhagen.

Bay

1. Tage Erlander, Swedish Prime Minister.