Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Western Europe, Volume III

840.20/7–748

Minutes of the Fifth Meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security, July 9, 1948, 10 a. m.

Washington, July 9, 1948, 10 a.m.

top secret

Item (4) Nature of U.S. Association under Vandenberg Resolution with European Security Arrangements

Mr. Lovett inquired as to the views of those present on this item.

Dr. Van Kleffens thought the inter-relation of items (3) and (4) had been made clear at the previous meeting. He asked whether Mr. Lovett himself might care to express any views as to whether the U.S. contemplated, under the Vandenberg Resolution, some form of participation in a general western European security scheme. He thought certain ideas might emerge which would afford a basis both for meeting the needs of the western European nations, not only the Brussels Powers, but of others as well in order to leave the fewest possible gaps, and for the possible participation of the United States and Canada. It would be helpful if Mr. Lovett could give some indication of what would be acceptable. The ECA could be called enlightened self-interest for the United States but was, at the same time, very much in the interest of the countries in Europe. Similarly, it could not be a matter of indifference to the United States, what happened to Norway, with its long coast line, or what happened to Britain. Conversely, with the advent of new weapons and new techniques the single-handed defense of Western Europe by Western Europeans alone would be extremely difficult. That was particularly true for countries like the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg, but also true for the whole area.

Mr. Lovett did not feel that he could do more than reiterate what had previously been said about the basic criteria which must be applied to any proposals submitted by the Brussels Pact countries. These might be considered as constituting a combination of do’s and don’ts, or withs and withouts. The overriding question of national security and the yardsticks commonly and currently applied in E.C.A. were amply clear. Discussion of Item (4) involved the question of what form of association would most fully meet, from the U.S. point of view, its basic and essential requirements. He thought that the need, at the moment, was for some fairly precise indication of the type of organization with which the U.S. might be dealing in the future. For example, did the Brussels Pact constitute the central point from which expansion might take place, or would the purpose and security of all be better served by some alternative method of approach through an enlarged or separate form of community or collective security. This could usefully be explored because it was not now possible to say what system might best contain the elements on which the U.S. would have to place greatest emphasis. He could specify those elements but could not state that a given program, whatever it might be, would necessarily meet them. That could come only at the very end.

Dr. Van Kleffens expressed the personal hope that the ultimate outcome would be some North Atlantic Pact, not necessarily in too narrow a sense as he would not want to exclude Italy, for instance. That would mean full membership not only for the countries on the eastern fringe of the ocean, but for those on the western fringe as well. In so far as the Vandenberg Resolution was concerned, he did not think the Brussels Pact, as such, a suitable basis. He could not conceive of the United States adhering to the Brussels Pact. If this were so it was necessary to find a formula which would be agreeable to all and which would take into consideration other nations such as those of Scandinavia, Ireland, and Portugal, none of which had yet knocked on the door of the Brussels Pact. They were not in it and it was not known dieter they had basic objections or whether ways and means might be found to associate them with it. He believed that Norway, for instance, was increasingly desirous of joining. He did not think the Brussels Pact should be abolished; something else might be devised which would appeal to a greater group and be more widely acceptable. Perhaps comparison could be made with a peach, the Brussels Pact would be the hard kernel in the center and a North Atlantic Pact the somewhat less hard mass around it.

Mr. Lovett said this was exactly the type of thing which needed discussing this morning in order to produce as many ideas as possible.

M. Bonnet said that he, too, would like to hear what kind of association was contemplated under the Vandenberg Resolution. In discussing the kind of association contemplated, the question of security must be the first preoccupation. It was with this view that the Brussels Pact was negotiated within the framework of the U.N. Charter. He proposed that a study be made of the different points involved, such as the kind of association between the North Atlantic countries, the delimitation of the area concerned, the kind of undertakings that could be assumed with respect to attack, and the drafting of a pre-established plan of assistance to be applied in case of emergency. Should the powers outline such a pre-established plan or create machinery for consultation with a view to implementing the obligations of the pact? Cooperation in the economic and other fields could be added on the agenda of the working parties. By discussing these points together, countries on both sides of the Atlantic could determine their common attitude and what they were prepared to do. In the first place would come the undertakings necessary in the case of attack or danger of attack against the members of such a pact.

He did not think a general discussion would be productive, and suggested taking up the engagements which might be undertaken, within the framework of the UN, against the danger of attack upon the members of such a pact. It should be understood that such engagements would have the aim of preventing war and maintaining peace.

Mr. Lovett said the meeting was dealing with a subject of which military security was one aspect, yet adequate knowledge of the military picture with respect to the points discussed at previous meetings was lacking. He thought it would be unprofitable at this time to try to be too precise as to details; that could be taken up later by the working parties. What he had hoped might be possible at this meeting would be to indicate that a certain form of association might be possible, whereas a different form might be quite impossible from the point of view of the western hemisphere countries. Dr. Van Kleffens had referred earlier to the possibility that a mere association with the present signatories of the Brussels Pact might not meet the tests which would be applied to it by Canada and the United States. He personally thought this completely correct. United States National security would most certainly not be adequately served by an arrangement providing for U.S. association with the Brussels Pact signatories alone. He assumed the Canadian position would be similar.

Mr. Pearson agreed that it would be.

Mr. Lovett said that as the various successive steps were considered it would be useful to keep this in mind.

M. Bonnet agreed. He was not referring only to the outlines of a possible pact of mutual assistance. Mutual aid should not be limited to the European nations; there should be aid between the nations of the Western Hemisphere and Europe. What could Canada and the United States do for them? He would not know what they could do unless the complete points he had mentioned were discussed. Only thus could it be known exactly what Canada and the U.S. could do. It was of vital interest.

The Five Powers had already tried to do what they could from the point of view of mutual aid. They were giving something to collective security in that field, something important as a whole. They were taking big risks. He personally hoped that there was no threat of war. At the last meeting everyone had said that there was no direct threat of war, but it was not possible to be sure. He agreed that there was no threat of that kind but felt that all must do what they could to establish a firm and durable peace. The Five were giving something, were risking the lives of their nations. When would the discussions get down to concrete points, not only in the military field, but as to the form of association which might be formed?

Mr. Lovett thought the discussion was approaching the points he had been trying to draw out. He asked in turn what form of agreement or political association and what kind of undertakings M. Bonnet had in mind.

M. Bonnet did not think it feasible at this meeting to outline any pact of this kind in detail, but said it should be some kind of treaty or agreement which should go through the usual parliamentary processes in each country. It should be a regional agreement within the framework of the United Nations by which the various nations would agree to cooperate for economic reasons, common interests, and the desire of promoting peace. It would be a regular type of pact or association for mutual assistance and for the maintenance of peace. If there were any other propositions for different types of associations or agreements, he would be glad to discuss them.

Mr. Lovett said he had endeavored to ascertain what form of obligation M. Bonnet envisaged but that was perhaps a matter of detail which could be left to the working committees. In his own view the obligation must be positive, in favor of something and not merely against something. It must be within the general terms of a preamble like that of the Rio Treaty or the Vandenberg Resolution itself. He would appreciate a more specific indication as to what form of obligation M. Bonnet had in mind. An obligation to do what?

M. Bonnet believed pacts of this nature usually provided that the contracting parties would regard an armed attack against any of them as an attack against all of them.

Mr. Lovett said that this approached the military field.

M. Bonnet demurred. The military discussions were taking place in London. The five governments were sending an official invitation to the U.S. to take part in that work. This work would constitute a different enterprise from that now under discussion concerning the possible association of the United States and Canada with the defense of the Brussels Powers. The former could conceivably proceed without any decision as to the latter. General pacts such as Rio and Brussels wore long range measures dealing with the promotion and the maintenance of peace. Both of these pacts contained, in addition to others, provisions for mutual aid in the event of attack.

Mr. Lovett asked how the U.S. could deal with the maintenance of peace and the prevention of war with a group whose capabilities were unknown. He had no idea of the military potential of the Brussels Pact signatories.

M. Bonnet thought that might mean a delay of months. He agreed that the U.S. and the Five must all ascertain their military potential. But what should be discussed in the meantime?

Mr. Lovett asked whether M. Bonnet regarded as an element of the political field some engagement by the Western Hemisphere countries to look upon an active [act of] aggression against the members of the Brussels Pact as an active [act of] aggression against the Western Hemisphere.

M. Bonnet said that he would regard it as an aggression against the members of the new association.

Mr. Lovett emphasized that under the United States constitutional system there could be no event such as aggression against a member of an association which could automatically bring the United States into war. United States constitutional processes would have to be followed first and, therefore, the engagement would, if undertaken, involve a decision by Congress prior to any action by the United States.

It was not possible at this stage to prejudge the form which any collective security arrangement might ultimately take. It might be useful to consider what elements would make a new association most useful to the Brussels Pact group as well as to the Western Hemisphere.

Sir Oliver Franks said that the signature of the Brussels Pact, which had been a bold act and a contribution to the security not only of the five signatories but also of other countries, had been an earnest of the determination of the powers concerned to strengthen their powers of resistance. A second fact which had to be kept in mind in these discussions was the evidence which existed of a strong mutuality of interest amongst the countries of the north Atlantic area. The entry of a new power into this area would be of concern to all the countries there. An explicit recognition of the mutuality of interest of these countries would be a factor making for stability. Such recognition would not result merely from an increase in the membership of the Brussels Pact. He was thinking in terms of a new pact to deal with the problems of the whole area. While he could not be specific, there would undoubtedly be some relationship between the members of this new pact and the members of the Brussels Pact. While an increase in the membership of the Brussels Pact might be possible and desirable, it was doubtful whether it would be possible to admit to the Brussels Pact all the countries on the eastern side of the Atlantic which were of interest to, as well as interested in, the north Atlantic area. As Mr. Lovett had expressed it the day before there were in fact three groups of countries: Firstly, those which were members of the Brussels Pact (these might be more than the present five); secondly, the western hemisphere, and thirdly, a group consisting of certain other countries on the eastern side of the Atlantic.

The talks would involve discussion of a new pact corresponding to the positive interests of the countries bordering upon the north Atlantic area. He had an open mind about the relationship of such a pact to the Brussels Pact. While attention should be paid to extending the Brussels Pact where this was both possible and desirable, the pact was still young and it was of importance to crystallise what had already been accomplished before trying to stretch it too quickly.

He understood the desire which Mr. Lovett had expressed to receive proposals on this subject from the countries on the eastern side of the Atlantic. He saw a whole range of questions, particularly on the military side, in which this would be necessary. But he wished to make a complementary suggestion, namely, that in considering such questions as the terms of a new pact, its relationship to the Brussels Pact, and the extension of the Brussels Pact,—all matters of common interest to both sides of the Atlantic—it would be of the greatest help if the exploratory work could be undertaken jointly by those on both sides of the Atlantic.

Mr. Lovett said that the Brussels Pact, in his opinion, fell short of what was needed to meet the tests which Sir Oliver and he wished to apply. The direction of these discussions would be greatly clarified if it could be decided whether to approach the problem on the basis of an expansion of the Brussels system or by considering a wholly new arrangement for collective security.

Mr. Pearson said that the Canadian government could not make any contribution to the collective security of the area by any unilateral guarantee of western union security.

Mr. Lovett interjected that the United States Government could not contemplate any such idea.

Mr. Pearson continued by saying that what he had in mind was the creation of a new system. He thought that even if there had been no Brussels Pact the Canadian Government would still be interested in an Atlantic security system. The members of such an Atlantic system would be associating themselves with the security of each and all. As he saw it there were already two groups of states who were willing, in the hope thereby of obtaining greater security, to take on obligations greater than those involved by membership of the United Nations. The Brussels countries were one group; the United States and Canada were the other. There was a third group of states concerned with the Atlantic which, though not members of these other two groups, should somehow be associated with them. Some of these states were of as much importance to the national security of the western hemisphere as were certain countries of the Brussels Pact. There were certain principles concerning the nature of such an association upon which agreement should be sought before an attempt was made to work out details. Firstly, there should be as close a connection as possible with the United Nations, not only under Article 51 of the Charter, but also under Article 56, which concerned cooperation for economic, cultural and spiritual purposes (Mr. Lovett indicated agreement with this point). Mr. Pearson wished any new pact to involve positive cooperation in fields other than purely military. Secondly, while the obligations undertaken by a party to the new arrangement would be conditioned by certain constitutional limitations, that did not prevent the creation of something far reaching.

The Rio Pact stated that an attack on any signatory was to be considered as an attack upon all the signatories. This was the kind of obligation which should eventually be considered in connection with an Atlantic Security Arrangement. Such an obligation did not mean that each party to the pact was obliged automatically to go to war if one of the others was attacked. The obligation called for “assistance” which did not necessarily involve a declaration of war. Moreover, each country would be able to decide for itself whether an attack, the occasion for “assistance,” had occurred.

Some kind of obligation on the lines of the obligation in the Bio Pact should be explored in connection with a North Atlantic system. He assumed that when the details of the Rio Pact were being worked out the United States had not had details of the military assistance forthcoming from every prospective member of the Pact.

Furthermore, aggression in the future might not constitute an armed attack but be indirect. This had been provided for in both the Rio and Brussels Pacts.

The actual machinery for implementing a pact would probably have to be worked out later. But as regards the idea of the pact, the Canadian government were already on record in favour of participation in some form of north Atlantic collective assistance or mutual assistance arrangement. They were also on record as saying that their participation would not be effective unless the United States also participated.

Mr. Lovett said that the Rio Pact served as a take-off point but that, in his opinion, it did not meet the specific requirements now under consideration. The inter-American relationship had a long history. Although the potential military help from the countries involved was, with the exception of three, not very great, they could give considerable “assistance” in the form of raw materials. The countries of the north Atlantic area now under consideration did not, on the other hand, have these resources; in fact they would require rather than give them.

Baron Silvercruys remarked that the United States association envisaged by the Vandenberg Resolution was possible either with a regional arrangement or with some other collective arrangement. He thought that in either case the association of the United States—and the association of Canada—might well be the determining factor in the implementation of the arrangements. Whether the United States elected to be associated with a progressive development of the Brussels Pact or with some other collective arrangement such as an Atlantic Community agreement, he felt sanguine about one point, namely that the association of the United States would be instrumental in inducing other nations to jump on the band-wagon, making it possible to close the security gaps that had been mentioned.

Mr. Lovett thought the expansion of the Brussels Pact might take place simultaneously with the creation of some collective security arrangement. An expansion of the Brussels Pact would not necessarily exclude the need for a North Atlantic Pact. From the American point of view, the fact that the group was primarily “Atlantic” in nature would make a tremendous difference in the commitments which could be undertaken.

Mr. Wrong suggested that the position of the Brussels Pact powers on the European continent might be regarded as corresponding to that of the United States and Canada in the western hemisphere. Mr. Lovett said that this was the definite pattern in his mind.

Mr. Kennan said that it was necessary to look forward to changes in Europe in the long run which would permit of a general unification of the whole continent. It was hoped that countries now behind the Iron Curtain would be able eventually to come into the European family. It was necessary that when the Marshall Plan period came to an end, or even earlier, there should emerge an economically self-supporting Europe which was on the road to greater political unity and which was militarily capable of taking care of itself. That could not be just part of Europe; eventually it would have to comprise the whole of the continent. The United States did not wish to see a return to the conditions existing before the war in eastern and central Europe where there were either petty nationalisms or very small military alliances which could not stand the test when the strain came.

It seemed to him important that the door should be left open for everyone in Europe to come in at the proper time so that there could be a real unification of Europe and the development of a European idea. If that did not happen it seemed to him that, whatever might be worked out along the lines of the present discussion must remain impermanent and unsatisfactory from the long-term point of view of the United States.

The discussions should not concentrate solely on the question of a military guarantee against a military danger which would be mitigated, he hoped, in the course of time.

Finally, Mr. Kennan wished to clarify a point concerning previous statements made by Mr. Bohlen and himself about the danger of war in Europe. They had not meant to imply that there was no danger of war nor threat of war. What they had meant was that they did not consider that the Soviet Union had deliberately drawn up a program of aggression. There was a difference between planning aggression as a deliberate step of policy, and aggression as something following upon a situation from which it was impossible to withdraw.

Dr. Van Kleffens recalled Mr. Lovett’s reference to the fact that the Brussels Pact in one sense did not go far enough inasmuch as it left out certain states whose participation was indispensable from the point of view of both European and North American countries for the security of Western Europe as a whole, and in a broader sense of the North Atlantic community. He asked whether in another sense the Brussels Pact did not go too far to serve as a model for North Atlantic security arrangements in that its terms in some respects were a little too stringent to find general acceptance.

Mr. Lovett agreed.

Dr. Van Kleffens thought it important to underline the two orders of exception being taken to the Brussels Pact.

Mr. Lovett agreed and said that there might be even others.

Dr. Van Kleffens then raised a second matter, which to his mind presented a very real difficulty and which the Belgian Ambassador had already touched upon. Insofar as certain states were concerned, some of the Scandinavian states and Iceland, Ireland and perhaps Portugal, it would probably make the difference between participation and non-participation for them to know in advance that they would be adhering to a scheme which there was reason to believe would ultimately have the adherence of the United States and Canada. Possibly this difficulty would ultimately resolve itself by the method of presentation, which might be in the form of some sort of an invitation to all countries of the North Atlantic to join in. Care must be taken not to deter certain nations from joining from the start.

In the third place, certain patterns of thought seemed to have emerged in the United States in the last few years which could serve as a guide as to what would ultimately be the best solution. He referred to the Act of Chapultapec, the Rio Pact, the President’s message of March 17, the Vandenberg Resolution, the debates in the Senate, and the Charter, particularly Articles 51 and 56. He thought that the North Atlantic community was too good to be limited merely to material welfare and military security, in that it rested on a community of certain basic conceptions of the highest moral order.

Sir Oliver Franks referred to the particular problem of Ireland. He thought it would be easier for that country to join an arrangement to which countries on the west side of the Atlantic were also parties rather than one which was limited to the United Kingdom and other European countries alone.

Mr. Hickerson said that Dr. Van Kleffens had put his finger on the kernel of thinking on the working level in the State Department in saying that in one sense the Brussels Pact was not broad enough as to membership and in another sense was too broad as to obligation. The economic and cultural clauses of the Pact seemed to the State Department wholly commendable as regards an associaton in Europe, but rather broader than would be appropriate for an association of countries not tied together by exactly the same factors.

He wished to underline what Mr. Kennan had said earlier. To the extent that the United States properly could do so it wanted to urge closer economic, spiritual and other ties among the free countries of Western Europe, and ultimately of Europe as a whole. It had been the thinking at the working level here that, if such an association could be worked out, it should proceed simultaneously, with encouragement for the natural members of the Brussels Pact to adhere to it and to the North Atlantic community idea wherever appropriate.

Mr. Lovett thought that the discussion had added a good deal both to the clarity of purpose here as well as perhaps to the means of going about it. It might be profitable to consider again matters under Item 3—the specific countries which would have to be envisaged as possible members of any Atlantic community arrangements. He referred to the problem of forming a regional association which was truly regional in both a geographic and security sense. It seemed clear that Greenland, Iceland, the Scandinavian Peninsula, England, Ireland, the Brussels Pact countries, ultimately Western Germany, perhaps Portugal and eventually Spain would be the group beyond which the North Atlantic community would get out of the North Atlantic and begin to get into a mid-European, Near Eastern or Mediterranean group. An attempt should be made to define so far as possible what was meant by the North Atlantic community.

Mr. Pearson emphasized the difficulty of including, certainly at the beginning, borderline geographical communities which lead from one to another until the original geographic area had no longer any meaning.

Mr. Wrong remarked that Switzerland was spiritually and economically a member of the North Atlantic community, and that in spite of its traditional policy of neutrality this was worth mentioning.

Mr. Hickerson said that State Department thinking had taken this into account, and had proceeded on the assumption that Switzerland might not wish to join at the beginning but would be welcome if she did.

Mr. Pearson pointed out the difficulty which arose in connection with Italy in that, once in the Mediterranean, Greece became involved.

Dr. Van Kleffens thought that the definition should be kept some-what flexible to allow for the application at the same time of the geographic test and a test in the realm of general ideas, some basic conception of society and the value of the individual.

Mr. Lovett thought that that would be one general approach, but also that a part of the solution might lie in different degrees of membership. He mentioned Iceland as an example of a country which would have a very definite interest in such an association, but because of her peculiar situation would have to limit her agreement of assistance. He thought that there were all sorts of gradations of interest among the various possible adherents.

Dr. Van Kleffens suggested that there might be members and associate members. Greece, for example, might be included in some sort of association, but obviously could not be considered as a real member of the North Atlantic area.

Mr. Wrong pointed out that in the Rio Treaty equal formal obligations were accepted by all parties. Difficulties might arise in applying the concept of associate membership in a North Atlantic arrangement, particularly in the case of countries which had successfully maintained their neutrality during the war such as Iceland, Portugal and Ireland. The incentive for such countries to join would be smaller on political grounds because they had lived through two great wars safely without invasion or occupation. Nevertheless, from the strategic point of view participation of these possibly reluctant countries would be very important. If associate membership were contemplated, these countries were among those most likely to press for an association which would not commit them to the same sort of obligations as the full members. Yet the use of their territories would probably be essential in the case of war. Politically, therefore, in cases such as this there was one answer and strategically there was another.

Mr. Lovett agreed that the question was a difficult one. He pointed out that the Rio Pact left assistance to the decision of the assisting country. In the present case the problem was a definite one for Canada and the United States because some of these countries are of immediate concern, not only from the security point of view, but as stepping stones to get to the assistance of partners in Western Europe. It should, however, be noted that both Greenland and Iceland cooperated as if they had been allies by treaty during the last war.

Mr. Wrong thought that undoubtedly if war came this would have to be done again. He wished to make one other point in connection with associate membership, unless it was defined carefully it might be found that guarantees of security would be given by some states to others without much obligation on the other’s part.

Mr. Pearson noted one factor which would affect the problem of peripheral countries. If a North Atlantic security arrangement were to be worked out, it was possible to contemplate other collective security arrangements for other areas which would have a bearing on the problem of the association of countries within those areas with the North Atlantic arrangement. There might ultimately be a series of arrangements, the common factor in them all being the membership of the United States.

Mr. Lovett said that the United States was not unaware of the problem presented by such a chain reaction. One of the disturbing aspects of the matter was that a series of regional pacts might mean using the regional pact system as a substitute of the basic conceptions of the United Nations—collective security per se. Another problem was that, if the effectiveness of other regional pacts were to depend upon North American countries at this stage and perhaps for some little time to come, there was a limit of assistance beyond which neither Canada nor the United States could go without spreading the butter so thin that it would not feed anyone. On the other side, these regional arrangements would be tied necessarily to some extent to the vagaries of economic conditions in Canada and the United States.

M. Bonnet did not feel that a solution could be reached now on the problems of various kinds of membership. Too many questions were involved, a previous study of which was necessary, particularly strategical as well as constitutional, political, economic and legal considerations. It was not yet possible to give a satisfactory answer to the question of the membership of Ireland, Sweden and still less Greece or even Portugal. The discussion today had been centered on the strategic field, which showed the need of determining the objectives to be sought and what kind of obligations the participating countries would be prepared to accept.

Mr. Lovett inquired as to views on the procedure from here on, and whether it would be agreeable to let working parties produce a schedule which would indicate the tasks ahead so that the meeting could reconvene with a program aimed at reaching conclusions which would permit more precise definition of the ultimate form.

Sir Oliver Franks thought that there was a process of digestion due on this week’s discussions as well as the question of getting a reaction from home.

Mr. Lovett said that this had been understood from the beginning; he suggested that working parties could use the intervening time in setting out a schedule of procedure.

This was generally agreed.

Baron Silvercruys said there had been a most useful exchange of views and exploration on some points of the agenda. He had not, however, as yet a very clear picture as to the sort of association which the United States and Canada were prepared to contemplate. Views had been exchanged on the kind of association which might be envisaged, but he was not sure of its nature nor of the role of the two North American countries in it.

Mr. Lovett thought that an effort had been made to find the form of organization and the method of association necessary to bring the United States into some form of collective security enterprise as a member. This might be associations between three separate groups an enlargement of the Brussels Pact or a wholly new North Atlantic arrangement.

Mr. Achilles inquired whether it was intended to formulate terms of reference for the working parties.

Mr. Lovett thought that should be left to informal exploratory talks in the working parties.

Mr. Hickerson suggested that the working group should go over the present agenda and examine some of the items in much more detail against the background of these discussions.

This was generally agreed and a meeting of the working group will be called by Mr. Hickerson and Mr. Bohlen.