CFM Files: Lot M–88: Box 2172: TRI Documents

Report of the Working Party on the Ruhr of the London Conference on Germany1

secret

TRI/7 (Final)

International Control of the Ruhr

Whereas international security and general economic recovery require:

that the economic resources of the Ruhr shall not again be used for the purposes of aggression;

that access to the coal, coke and steel of the Ruhr should not in the future as it was in the past be subject to the exclusive control of Germany;

that access to them for the benefit of the economic life of an extensive area including Germany shall be without discrimination, and

[Page 136]

Whereas it is essential for the political and economic well being of the countries of Western Europe and a democratic Germany that there be close association of their economic life, and

Whereas it is important that trade between the European countries mentioned in the preceding paragraph should be facilitated by lowering trade barriers and by any other means.

Therefore it is agreed that:

1.
An international control shall be set up in the Ruhr as soon as possible and at least prior to the establishment of a provisional German Government.2
2.
The International Control Agency shall be composed of representatives of United States, United Kingdom, France, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg and Germany.
3.
The International Control Agency shall take its decisions by majority vote. The U.S., U.K., France and Germany shall have three votes each and the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg one vote each.
4.
Until the occupying powers party to this Agreement decide otherwise the representative of Germany shall be designated and the vote for Germany exercised by those powers which share the responsibility for the economic administration of that part of Germany which includes the Ruhr, and in such a way as may be decided by those powers.
5.
The functions of the International Control Agency shall, in the light of existing or future international agreements, be as follows:—
(a)
to determine the allocation of coal, coke and steel from the Ruhr as between German consumption and export, in order to ensure adequate access to supplies of these products taking into account the needs of Germany; and, subject to the provisions of paragraph 8 below, to ensure the fulfilment of the terms of such allocations.
(b)
subject to the provisions of paragraph 8 below, to prevent the German Government or German management from instituting or carrying out artificial measures or practices which would distort the movement of these products in international trade.3
(c)
to exercise controls in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 8 below.
6.
The International Control Agency shall have the right
(a)
to receive regular reports on production, distribution and consumption of Ruhr coal, coke and steel;
(b)
to demand relevant interim reports whenever necessary;
(c)
to verify the information at its disposal by visits on the spot or by the subpoena of witnesses.
7.
During the period of exercise of supreme authority by the Allied Powers the occupying authorities concerned will maintain the extent of control over management of the Ruhr coal and coke industry at present exercised by the United States/United Kingdom Control Group.
8.
During the same period the occupying authorities concerned will maintain such control over the Ruhr coal, coke and steel industries including the control of the allocation of these products for internal consumption and the implementation thereof as may be necessary to ensure
(a)
that the decisions of the International Control Agency with respect to the export of these products from Germany are carried out,
(b)
that the mandatory requirements of the occupying powers are met,
(c)
that the disarmament provisions of any present or future agreements or treaties are not infringed thereby,
(d)
that the German Government or German management do not institute or carry out artificial measures or practices which would distort the movement in international trade of coal, coke and steel from the Ruhr.

The powers as under (a) and (d) shall, at the end of the period in which the Allied Powers exercise supreme authority in Germany, be transferred to the International Control Agency. The powers exercised by the occupying authorities under (c) shall be transferred to such authority as may by the terms of any international agreement or peace settlement be designated for that purpose, provided that if no such authority is established the powers herein mentioned shall be transferred to the International Control Agency.

9.
Should the German Government not carry out the decisions of the International Control Agency, the International Control Agency may, by a majority vote of the allied representatives find that the German Government is in default on its obligations, and recommend the application of such enforcement measures as are necessary to ensure the attainment of the objectives set out in this agreement. During the period of the exercise of supreme authority by the Allied Powers the responsibility for the execution of such measures will lie with the occupation authorities concerned. In the subsequent period [Page 138] enforcement of such measures shall be in accordance with the terms of any German settlement.
10.
This agreement shall not prejudice the conclusion of subsequent arrangements for the better coordination of the Ruhr coal, coke and steel resources with those of other areas. Any such subsequent agreement would not invalidate so far as the Ruhr is concerned the provisions agreed to herein.
11.
This agreement constitutes a statement of principles which if accepted by the participating governments shall form the basis for a more detailed agreement setting up the International Control Agency.

London, 5 March, 1948.

  1. This is the Second Report of the Working Party of the Ruhr as discussed, amended, and approved by the London Conference on Germany at its 11th Meeting, March 5; for the report on that meeting, see telegram 896, Delsec 1617, March 5, from London, supra. Regarding the establishment of the Working Party and its First Report, see telegrams 876, Delsec 1611 and 875, Delsec 1612, March 4, from London, and footnote 2 to the former, pp. 124, 126.
  2. In telegram 901, Delsec 1619, March 6, from London, not printed, Ambassador Douglas explained this paragraph as follows: “It is clearly understood that the language ‘as soon as possible and at least prior to’ means immediately prior to, even one day prior to, the establishment of a provisional government.” (740.00119 Council/3–648)
  3. Telegram 895, Delsec 1618, March 6, from London, not printed, reported that Ambassador Douglas had put into the record of the 11th Meeting of the London Conference on Germany a strong statement pointing out that while the restrictions provided for in this paragraph were necessary and desirable, it would be most difficult for the United States to see them put into force with respect to German business if at the same time other countries were not prepared to accord similar treatment to Germany. Ambassador Douglas emphasized the importance of bringing Germany into the framework of the International Trade Organization or of some similar arrangement which would ensure that on trade questions of this kind German trade would receive reciprocal treatment. He also emphasized the competitive disadvantage in which German business would otherwise be placed with no compensating gain of security and with an adverse effect on the load the United States was forced to bear in financing German imports. (740.00119 Council/3–648)