740.00119 Control (Austria)/2–548: Telegram
The Minister in Austria (Erhardt) to the Secretary of State
secret
130. Following are comments on possible Soviet motives in submitting new treaty proposal.
If objective is merely to prolong negotiations and shift onus to US for failure to reach settlement, question of Soviet motivation presents no problem. Soviet tactic of delaying final decisions through this means would seem wholly plausible pending clearer view of results ERP and US election trends.
If, however, Soviets now actually wish to reach early settlement, fundamental alteration of strategy is involved, and new conception of Soviet motivation called for. May be noted in passing that Gruber is inclined to consider offer genuine and to characterize it as first step in major shift in Soviet policy which he believes certain to result relatively soon from ERP (if carried through effectively) and from overall US policy of firmness.
Whether or not one accepts this optimistic view of broad picture, there can be no doubt Soviets have suffered substantial political losses in Austria in past year. Soviet Union has become increasingly odious to mass of Austrian people; Communist Party continues insignificant faction; USIA (Administration of Soviet Enterprises in Austria) firms, mismanaged by Soviets, starved of raw materials by Austrians and with equipment rapidly obsolescing, have certainly proved less profitable than was anticipated; US aid continues to have increasing economic and psychological effect; Austrian leaders, encouraged by [Page 1456] US element, and proving more and more recalcitrant to Soviet demands, are using AC as vehicle of their resistance.
Department will recall several recent Soviet retreats in Austria, notably final approval of currency conversion (at a price) and cancellation of oil price increases.1 Austrian Communist Party has suffered several important reversals, notably removal of Communist secret police chief, failure in trade union election, resignation of old [only] Communist Cabinet member and removal of Fischer as editor of Coalition newspaper.
It is, therefore, conceivable Soviets may have been persuaded by unfavorable developments here and elsewhere in Europe to make, or at least prepare ground for, major shift in strategy for Austria which would involve termination of four-power military occupation and pursuit by more indirect means of long-term objective domination of country. Such means might be either internal political and trade union sabotage based on Communist Party, similar to tactics in France and Italy, or external armed pressure based on Yugoslavia, similar to tactics in Greece.
Chances of Soviet success along these lines do not appear bright. First would suffer from extreme weakness Austrian Communist Party, strong democratic orientation trade unions, and diminished ability of Soviets after evacuation to intimidate Austrian officials. Second tactic would be made unattractive to Soviets by indicating at appropriate time that US troops in Germany and Trieste, either with or without UN sanction, would be available to defend Austrian sovereignty.
On glance [balance?] we consider that, while Soviets might well be correct in believing their present Austrian policy a failure, they would be mistaken to suppose termination four-power occupation would increase their capabilities here. Only abandonment or failure ERP and collapse resistance to Communism in Western Europe would be likely to bear out such Soviet calculation re Austria. On other hand, it is believed here withdrawal of Soviets from Austria would be interpreted in several critical European countries as major victory for west and would substantially further over-all US and European interests.
Sent Department 130; repeated Moscow 5.
- For documentation on the currency conversion see Foreign Relations, 1947, vol. ii, pp. 1208–1220; documentation on the cancellation of the oil price increases in January 1948 is in Department of State file 863.51.↩