863.20/5–748
Memorandum by the Secretary of the Army (Royall) to the Department of State
top secret
Washington, May 7,
1948.
Memorandum for the Department of State:
(Attention: Mr. Jacob D. Beam, Director of Central European Affairs.)
Subject: Comments on British Aide-Mémoire re Austrian Arms.
- 1.
- The following are Department of Army informal views concerning British proposals to build up Austrian forces of sufficient strength to maintain internal security in Austria. The British proposals aré set forth in the attached Aide-Mémoire which you transmitted informally to the Department of the Army on April 13, 1948.1
- 2.
- On 5 March 1948 the Joint Chiefs of Staff reported to the
Secretary of Defense their views concerning the desirability of
concluding an Austrian peace treaty in which one of the
conclusions was as follows:
“Regardless of the trend of treaty negotiations at the present conference, Austria should be permitted to begin now the organization of her armed forces.”
- 3.
- You will note that these conclusions agree in principle with
British views that the Austrian Government should be assisted
now in the planning, organizing, equipping, and training phases
of a limited development of armed forces prior to withdrawal of
allied occupation forces. Since a general agreement exists as to
the advisability of this [Page 1368] measure, a decision as to the next procedural
step appears necessary to determine:
- a.
- The size, category and composition of forces. This is now being considered in Vienna.
- b.
- The extent and method of allied participation on which our views follow in the next paragraphs.
- 4.
- A police strength of 14,000 armed and 4,000 administrative is deemed a minimum requirement. At present the police force is subject to a certain amount of Communist infiltration and continues to be completely occupied with normal police security and frontier control missions. The need of a mobile striking force is paramount, and can best be constituted as an integral part of the Austrian Army. The equipment of the U.S. Constabulary Regiment now in Austria might be suitable for the initial supply of this force. We are in agreement with Delsec 16402 which suggests that the initial problem of organization can best be determined in Vienna by the U. S. and U. K. High Commissioners and then with the French and Austrian Governments. General Keyes’ recommendations and proposed courses of action have been solicited in this respect.
- 5.
- Standardized equipment for all components of the Austrian Armed Forces is desirable and it is at least mandatory by major category within each component. We will give sympathetic consideration to the British proposal that they equip the Austrian Air Forces and the U.S. equip the Austrian Army, however, we will insist that maintenance and replacement items be provided by the supplying power as well as initial allocations. This maintenance responsibility applies with equal force to re-transferred U.S. lend-lease equipment. General Keyes reports (20 April) that there are sufficient British-owned personal-type weapons stored in the British zone to arm a combined internal security force of Gendarmerie and police of approximately 22,000. These weapons have been earmarked for that purpose (Delsec 1640). It therefore appears reasonable to suggest that the U.K. assume responsibility for equipping the police forces completely. If the British were willing to assume responsibility for equipping the Air Force and the police forces, the U.S. might assume responsibility for equipping the Austrian Army. Due to the close relationship in training and operation of the Gendarmerie and Army it would appear necessary to establish interchangeability of their arms and equipment. Such a plan will facilitate procurement of items and insure standardization within each component.
- 6.
- However, no comprehensive planning can be done and no
commitments can be made until the following two conditions are
met:
- (1)
- An integrated total military aid program is evolved.
- (2)
- General authorizing legislation such as the Lend Lease Act (and appropriations for military foreign aid) is enacted by Congress.
- 7.
- Surplus stocks of the U.S. Army are practically non-existent.
- 8.
- A determination of priority and collation with other foreign aid programs must be made by the Department of State and the National Military Establishment. It is suggested that the Department of State prepare a formal presentation of this matter to the Secretary of the Defense stating the importance and urgency of furnishing military equipment for Austria and establishing a priority relative to the existing and proposed aid programs for other nations.
- 9.
- In the meantime we shall continue to study the problems raised in the British Aide-Mémoire, and shall keep in close touch with your office. We shall also keep you informed of General Keyes’ recommendations, and of any developments he reports from Vienna.
For the Secretary of the Army:
Lt. Colonel, GSC
Walter H. Grant
Lt. Colonel, GSC