740.00119 Control (Germany)/9–1648: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Secretary of State
1989. Eyes Only for the Secretary. Post-mortem of Berlin discussions to date leads me to following estimate:
Believe that when we first went to Stalin, Kremlin estimated two [Page 1161] possibilities: western governments might be prepared to make a trade on basis of suspension of London decisions in return for truce in Berlin, or as second and more likely alternative, west was looking for a face-saving solution in Berlin and would accept formula leading to actual Soviet control while providing for time being some color of quadripartite participation. My opinion is Kremlin discounted completely the possibility that we might actually force the issue to point of hostilities, just as we estimated no similar intention on their part, and that their belief has been reinforced during protracted course Moscow talks. Presumably Politburo ruled out likelihood of first alternative during early stage of conversations here (Embtel 1663, August 171) and decided to develop possibility of second alternative by discussion in Berlin, as we decided similarly to test their willingness to make satisfactory agreement. It must have become evident to them during first two days in Berlin that we are by no means to be satisfied with purely face-saving agreement. Thereafter they intensified their pressure tactics and apparently began to maneuver for favorable position in preparation for next stage.
Our intention to turn to the UN has been rather thoroughly advertised, and believe as stated in my 1976 September 142 that Kremlin is determined to place onus of a break on US by attitude of reasonableness, willingness to continue discussions and rejection of any suggestion that such continuation would not produce satisfactory solution.
It appears to us that Soviets are in favorable position. While we may obtain ⅔ majority of those voting in General Assembly, large number of abstentions (entire Far and Near Eastern bloc, Scandinavia, India and Pakistan and possibly a few Latins) would rob such a vote of the implication of world condemnation of Soviet tactics. Soviet offer to feed Berlin draws teeth of inhumanity charge and waverers in UNO will grasp this and Soviets’ willingness to continue discussion as indication of reasonable attitude on their part and unreasonableness on ours. Soviet representatives in UNO will play a symphony on “democracy” and acclaim the Berlin disturbances as “resurgence of democratic forces which will inevitably make themselves felt despite oppressive efforts of reactionary imperialists”. Meanwhile as Kremlin sees it entire grain harvest will be in while west will begin to feel effects of winter weather. Undoubtedly Russians have estimated adverse effect of their policy on German public opinion, whether correctly or not it is of course impossible for us to tell. We can be sure, however, that their estimate has been made in cold blood and they are counting on hunger and unemployment to induce in population western sectors that acceptance of Communist control and despair [Page 1162] of the effectiveness of western assistance which propaganda has so far failed to produce. From Soviet viewpoint ultimate result of above should be situation comparable to that which would have been produced by second alternative mentioned in first paragraph, i.e., Soviet control of political and economic life of Berlin with western garrisons tolerated but impotent.
Hope reply to our aide-mémoire will prove me incorrect in all this.
Sent Department as 1989. Department pass Berlin as 387, Eyes Only for Clay and Murphy, London as 220 Eyes Only for Douglas, Paris as 333 Eyes Only for Caffery.