Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Germany and Austria, Volume II

740.00119 Control (Germany)/9–1448: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Secretary of State

top secret   us urgent
niact

Moscow, September 14, 1948—11 p. m.

1976. Eyes Only for the Secretary.

1. Met with Molotov and Smirnov.¹ When we referred to our original desire to see Stalin, Molotov repeated with emphasis that Stalin really was away on a vacation and that “his treatment would not permit of interruption.” He made this so definite that we did not see any point in pressing further to see Stalin.

2. We presented Molotov with aide-mémoire² with brief explanation that it dealt with the three main questions of principle on which the four Military Governors had failed to reach agreement. We emphasized that we did not wish to go into details here since these were more suitable for discussion in Berlin.

3. Molotov, after reading document, said he could only express his first impressions. He thought that it had been drawn up in a one-sided manner, his own information being that the Soviet Military Governor in Berlin had acted in strict conformity with the directive. He therefore proposed that we should now ask the four Military Governors to provide us with a joint report on the results of their work which would bring out the points of agreement and the points of disagreement. This would give us something on which to work better than a one-sided document directed against the other side.

4. We stated that it was precisely because of the divergencies on these three fundamental points that it had been impossible for the Military Governors to produce an agreed report. We already had full records of what had passed in Berlin, and presumably Molotov also had them. No progress could be made in Berlin or anywhere else unless there was agreement on the interpretation of these three basic principles which had been discussed (and we thought agreed) in Moscow and not in Berlin.

5. Molotov repeated his proposal which he maintained would be more businesslike and would expedite our work. He emphasized that the Soviet Government’s position was completely in accordance with the agreed directive and that the Soviet Military Governor in Berlin was guided only by that. He therefore proposed that the four Military Governors should be given two days in which to prepare a joint report showing the points of agreement and disagreement, which would form a working document for us here.

6. We pointed out again that, since we all had full reports from our Governors and since the basic issues listed in the aide-mémoire were fundamental, it would be useless to go back to Berlin without agreement on these three principles.

7. Molotov argued that without such a joint report we might discuss for a week or more and remarked that the three points in our aide-mémoire were already familiar to him from the American, and British and French press. He could not work on a basis of accusations against the Soviet commander and needed the exact views of all four Military Governors.

8. We repeated that unless the three basic principles to which our governments attached fundamental importance could be decided, it would only waste time to go back to Berlin, although we personally saw no objection to asking the Military Governors for such a report provided Molotov was ready without delay to answer our three questions satisfactorily. These questions related to issues which had never been referred to Berlin and which emerged solely from our discussions here. They could therefore only be settled in Moscow, and we hoped by Molotov tonight. If Molotov was prepared now to answer them satisfactorily, then the Military Governors might proceed with their discussions in Berlin with reasonable hope of reaching an agreement.

9. Molotov admitted that he had full reports from Berlin but repeated his proposal, arguing that it would be an even greater waste of time if the Soviet Government now sat down to prepare a one-sided reply to our one-sided document. We replied that the Soviet Government should find no difficulty in dealing with the points at issue, as they were neither new nor one-sided but concerned matters already discussed (and we thought agreed) here.

10. Molotov then said that there were two possible alternative procedures and we could choose which we preferred. The first, and in his view the more correct and quicker, method was the one he had proposed. The second would be slower since the Soviet Government would have to study our document carefully, and Marshal Sokolovsky in Berlin would have to be consulted before they could reply. However, if we insisted, he would be compelled to accept this method.

11. We then drew Molotov’s attention yet again to the nature of the three fundamental questions asked, and repeated our suggestion for combining the two procedures.

12. Molotov said that he had read the whole of our document. He considered it a one-sided and incorrect statement of the Soviet Military Governor’s position and also an incorrect version of the directives agreed between us in Moscow. However, he must study it more carefully and would then give us the Soviet Government’s reply. But he warned us that this might take some time.

13. We said we could not see why there need be any consultation with Berlin on these points and that we simply had to know whether our interpretation of the directive in these three basic matters was in the Soviet Government’s view correct or incorrect. Apparently Molotov had already given us a partial answer in his previous statement. But there was no point whatever in asking the Military Governors to produce a joint report when it was well known that their disagreements in Berlin all stemmed from disagreement on three basic issues we believed had been discussed and settled in Moscow. We saw no reason why it should take Molotov much time to reply, and if he felt he could not reply then we could only report this fact to our governments.

14. Molotov took some pains to point out that he had not said it would take much time, and that he had not said our memorandum was substantially inaccurate, but only that it was not quite exact. As regards time, he only wished to remind us that much time had passed on previous occasions when we had exchanged documents. In reply to our explanation that we had to coordinate between three governments, he argued that he now had to coordinate between Moscow and Berlin, but he extended this argument beyond the point of saying that it might take more than two days although he would try to expedite matters.

15. We repeated that there was no point in wasting even two days by a further reference to Berlin since these three basic questions had to be answered and no progress could be made until they were. It was not so much a choice between two procedures as the simple fact that without an agreed interpretation of these three basic questions, no progress could be made in Berlin.

16. Molotov then said that it was unnecessary to become polemical tonight and that he would give us the Soviet Government’s reply as soon as possible.

17. We then summarized our position by telling Molotov that our three governments were convinced that these conversations could only be productive if the steps set out in our aide-mémoire were taken. The three principles on which our three governments requested clarification, and an answer from the Soviet Government, were matters discussed in Moscow and on which it had not previously been considered necessary to consult Berlin. We had consistently taken the line here that we were not competent to discuss details or technical questions which were better left to the four Military Governors. But we were now dealing with matters of basic principle which had, we thought, already been established either in the directive itself or by oral understandings among us. Our governments felt that these three questions must be dealt with in Moscow and could be answered one way or the other right here. This also explained why our three governments were convinced that in the absence of definitive and clarifying Soviet replies it would be useless to refer back to Berlin for reports on disagreements of detail. Until satisfactory answers were received from the Soviet Government, further talks in Berlin would be useless. We would accordingly leave our aide-mémoire with Molotov and ask him for the earliest possible reply.

18. We stated that we were at his disposal for any explanation or clarification which he might require. He said that the aide-mémoire seemed to him to set out the position of our three governments quite clearly enough. He would study it and then draw up the Soviet Government’s reply, which would throw further light on all the questions raised in it.

19. Our interview confirmed the pessimistic impression we reported last night.³ We believe there is now little prospect of agreement. It is my estimate that Molotov’s attitude tonight made it clear that (1) the Soviet Government is playing for time; (2) that to this end it is prepared to prolong the discussions in one form or another indefinitely, and (3) they want to place on us the onus of a break. Roberts agrees entirely. Chataigneau is not positive.

We will get a written reply. My guess is that this will take one day longer than the two days Molotov allowed for reference to the Military Governors—say Friday. It will probably be couched in apparently reasonable terms, neither accepting or rejecting our aide-mémoire but intended to provide a basis for further exchanges.

Sent Department 1976. Department pass Berlin for Clay and Murphy as 384, London for Douglas as 216, Paris for Caffery as 329.

Smith

1. Participating in this meeting, held at the Kremlin at 6 p. m., were Smith (U.S.), Roberts and Lunghi (U.K.), Chataigneau and Boyer de Fonscolombe (France), and Molotov, Smirnov, Troyanovsky, and Yerofeyev (U.S.S.R.). A detailed record of the meeting was transmitted to the Department in telegram 4171, September 18, from London, not printed (740.00119 Control (Germany)/9–1848). In his telegram 1964, September 14, from Moscow, not printed, Ambassador Smith reported that the original request by the three Western representatives for an interview with Stalin had been denied on the grounds that the Generalissimo was on vacation. Smith and his colleagues therefore decided to seek instead an early interview with Molotov. (740.00119 Control (Germany)/9–1448)
2. For the text of the aide-mémoire under reference, see telegram 1101, September 12, to Moscow, p. 1152, and footnote 3 thereto.
3. The report under reference was made in telegram 1964, September 14 (1 a. m.), from Moscow, not printed (740.00119 Control (Germany)/9–1448).