740.00119 Control (Germany)/11–548: Telegram
The United States Political Adviser for Germany (Murphy) to the Secretary of State
2686. Personal for Saltzman and Hickerson. As result of meeting I attended at Frankfurt yesterday of three Western military governors, Clay has sent following message to Department of Army which I repeated for your information. I am forwarding by air pouch more complete notes1 which I made of the discussions. Clay would be glad to have Paris’s confidential comment re the question whether General Koenig’s remarks reflect view of French Government.
“Yesterday I attended conference with Koenig and Robertson which had been called by Koenig to discuss the general situation, particularly progress within Parliamentary Council at Bonn. The conference was very disturbing to me because it plainly indicated state of mind of French representative in Germany which does not seem consistent with agreements and statements of French Government. Koenig expressed his apprehension with respect to tendency of Parliamentary Council to give too much financial responsibility to the central government and also to a tentative provision for partial participation by Berlin in Western German Government. Obviously his apprehensions with respect to these provisions of the constitution have validity and are certainly open to discussion within the terms of London agreement. However Koenig did not stop at this point, but continued to say that the ‘climate’ in Germany was becoming such that he had grave doubts as to whether he would be able to approve a constitution and the subsequent formation of Western German Government.
He then elaborated to say that the proposed change in reparations program was an example of what he meant by ‘climate’. He also stated that Germany, and particularly the Ruhr, was being allowed to come [Page 439] back too rapidly. In this connection, he expressed himself particularly as dissatisfied with the too lenient policies of US and UK with respect to prohibited and restricted industries. He raised again questions of international ownership of Ruhr mines and special protection for foreign interests. He further expressed himself as dissatisfied with the Land boundary proposals of the Minister Presidents although done within framework of the London agreement. Finally he expressed himself as bitterly opposed to any drawing of Berlin to the West, not only through its limited inclusion in Western German Government but also to its inclusion in Western German financial system. He clearly indicated that he did not desire Berlin to be considered as a part of the West and thereby tacitly admitted that loss of Berlin by the West to the East would be of no concern. Concluded by stating that all of these conditions forced him to express doubt now as to his willingness to sign any constitution which might be submitted by the German officials.
In reply I stated that our position with respect to the constitution was clearly defined in London agreement and that we would join quickly in disapproving any German proposal which went beyond the London agreement. However we could not consider disapproving proposals which did not violate the London agreement.
I stated further that Koenig had brought up matters that were beyond our purview as military governors; that he knew full well that question of reparations was being determined at governmental level and that likewise Mr. Hoffman’s decisions in this respect would influence materially our determinations on prohibited and restricted industries. I further stated that I was not prepared to further discuss the constitutional questions if in fact Koenig’s actions with respect to the constitution and Western German Government were to be influenced by these other matters not within our purview. Moreover, I stated that I was unwilling to consider these constitutional questions under such an implied threat. Koenig then somewhat withdrew from his initial position, stating that he did not mean to imply that satisfactory solutions to these other proposals were basic to a satisfactory solution of the constitutional proposal, but that he did feel that the ‘climate’ was not good. I reminded Koenig that our rebuilding of Germany was essential for it to become self-sustaining and to relieve as soon as possible an intolerable burden upon the American people. General Robertson proposed that the two constitutional questions be referred immediately to a working party. I demurred to this proposal, stating that in view of General Koenig’s overall statement, I desired to report to my government and to receive further instructions before proceeding.
Obviously I do not expect further instructions, but I did not wish to rush into an agreed study of the constitutional questions as I felt that a delay might impress upon Koenig the seriousness with which we regard his overall attitude.
I do not believe that Koenig’s remarks reflect view of present French Government. Mr. Schuman has publicly expressed his willingness to reconsider question of reparations and has also acknowledged necessity for rebuilding German economy in interests of Europe. Nevertheless Koenig’s position will make it difficult to reconcile our views with respect to the constitution, the occupation statute, and trizonal fusion.
[Here follows General Clay’s report on the discussion regarding the Berlin currency question. For documentation on this topic see index entry “Berlin Blockade: Currency question”.]
Subsequently Koenig insisted that work on occupation statute be completed prior to further work on trizonal fusion, to which I consented, subject however to other studies such as prohibited and restricted industries likewise being deferred. In the discussion which followed Koenig finally agreed to concurrent studies on all questions.
I am reporting this conference in detail because it has indicated clearly what I have suspected for some time, and that is that Koenig is giving lukewarm support at best to London agreements and may be expected in next several months to try every possible way to delay and obstruct progress in their accomplishment.
At this conference we all agreed that treatment of Nuremberg prisoners at Spandau jail under quadripartite government was inhumane. We further agreed to advise our governments that we proposed to inform Soviet military administration that since the ACC was not functioning due to Soviet action, we considered that quadripartite control of Spandau under the ACC could not be sustained until ACC started functioning again. Thus, tripartitely, we would arrange for better prison management.” End Clay’s message.
Sent Department 2686, repeated Paris for Caffery and Bohlen 887.
- The notes under reference are printed supra.↩