Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Germany and Austria, Volume II

740.00119 Control (Germany)/11–448

Notes Prepared by the United States Political Adviser for Germany (Murphy) of a Meeting of the Military Governors of the Western Zones of Occupation of Germany, at Frankfurt, November 4, 1948¹

[Extracts]

top secret

[Undated.]

General Koenig opened the meeting by referring to the French preoccupation which he had expressed at the end of the last meeting of the Military Governors at Frankfurt on October 30² regarding the general trend manifested in the Bizone. General Koenig stated specifically that his views are supported by his Government. In referring to the general evolution of the work of the Military Governors since the London Agreements, General Koenig referred to:

(1) The inclusion of Berlin in Western Germany. Because of the deadlock in the Berlin situation and the ACC, the idea at London was to organize the three western zones. There then developed the blockade situation and now we find Western Germany drawn towards Berlin. Whether we like it or not, we permitted Berlin representatives, to come to Bonn. General Koenig said that he was told by Mr. Schuman that Reuter had proposed that Berlin should pay part of the Bonn expenses. It is clear, said General Koenig, that the Berlin representatives want to play a larger role at Bonn and draw Western Germany to Berlin. Berlin for the Germans is a symbol of nationalism and military traditions—it was the capital of Prussia. This evolution was not intended by the London Agreements.

(2) Regarding the Bonn Parliamentary Council, the text of the Constitutional Law has now been studied for more than a month. The first tendencies do not please us. General Koenig referred to the financial powers under consideration for allocation to the Central Government and the general tendency to give a higher degree of centralization and powers to the Federal Government than the French would like. General Koenig also referred to the distribution of powers between the lower and upper houses, emphasizing that the French preferred that both possess equal powers.

(3) General Koenig said that there is a matter which is even more disturbing and that is the present “climate” in Western Germany. Now Germany has its chance and one is looking forward to the reconstruction but, said General Koenig, that chance is really too beautiful. He mentioned concern on the subject of the ownership of the Ruhr mines and coal and steel industries; protection of allied interests in Germany; the prohibition and limitation of certain industries and reparations, merely indicating that he found the trend under these headings unsatisfactory. We know, said General Koenig, that a series of decisions are now in progress in the Bizone and as France is not a member, it is not consulted in the preparation of these decisions. Therefore, if later we participate in a Trizone, we will be faced with a whole series of decisions which may be contrary to our interests.

General Koenig stated in conclusion that if in the coming weeks things do not better reconcile themselves with French views, he probably will not be able to approve the Bonn text which may be presented.

General Clay then stated that having listened to General Koenig’s remarks, he felt that the Military Governors at this point should stop negotiations on trizonal matters and report General Koenig’s views to governments. General Koenig said that he had the right to state his preoccupations and General Clay of course the privilege of reporting to his government. General Koenig, however, wished to be frank.

General Clay said he stood by the London Agreements and that he would live up to them. General Koenig had brought up the question of reparations and said that he was aware of U.S. policy and Mr. Hoffman’s preoccupation. General Clay was not authorized to negotiate on question of German government if reparations are in question as the latter matter is now being handled on governmental level. General Clay found it necessary to remind General Koenig of the U.S. contribution of millions of dollars to support Germany and the desire of the U.S. to cease those payments as soon as possible. General Clay was not authorized to negotiate on this question. As far as Berlin is concerned, General Clay thought we stood for a unified Germany. He pointed out that it was noticeable in the recent Moscow–Berlin negotiations that the French were quite willing in the case of Berlin for the Soviet Zone Deutsche Notenbank to control the currency of Berlin but that in the discussions regarding the eventual control by the Bank Deutsche Laender of the currency of western Berlin, the French found objection. It could be inferred therefrom that the French were willing to see Berlin tied into eastern Germany but objected to its being [tied] into the West. General Clay said he would immediately report to his Government and request instructions.

General Robertson said that he had this in common with General Clay. He found it difficult, even impossible, to reply to Part (3) of General Koenig’s remarks which concerned major political issues. He recalled having said a long time ago in ACC that the only people who eventually would get anything out of this whole business would be the Germans, who would profit by Allied disaccord. Regarding (1) and (2), these matters would require discussion. He said that if General Koenig meant that Berlin should not be the capital of Germany, he believed that Koenig was tilting at windmills.

General Robertson felt that General Koenig was justified in bringing up the question of the Berlin representatives participating in the Bonn Parliamentary Council. It had been agreed to permit them to attend as observers only. Robertson said that he had not studied the question of Berlin pretentions to representation in a future German Parliament. This would be for discussion. Robertson felt that we should avoid a situation where a constitutional text would be presented by the Germans and disapproved by the Military Governors. If Military Governors have a strong objection to what the Germans are doing, we should advise them. Robertson felt that he is bound by the letter of instructions and guidance to the Military Governors in the London Agreements. He felt that some thinking at Bonn seems to go beyond the scope of the London Agreements. He referred to Paragraph (d) in the letter of guidance to the Military Governors. He said to Koenig that the latter undoubtedly believed that the powers demanded by the Central Government were large and that naturally the expenses would be in proportion. While Robertson would be willing to discuss this, he would not be prepared to go farther than the text of the London Agreements.

General Koenig emphasized that he had not meant to be threatening. He said that would be ridiculous as we were all friendly. He did, however, think the moment right to indicate to the Germans that the text as now proposed would have to be disapproved.

General Clay said that he was not prepared now to say whether it was the right moment to intervene but he felt that General Koenig’s statement goes way beyond the question and that if what Koenig had said represented the actual position no German Government could succeed. General Clay said he must report the situation to his Government.

General Koenig said he had no objection and General Robertson said he agreed with General Clay.

[Here follow Ambassador Murphy’s notes on those portions of the discussion dealing with the Berlin currency question, possible financial contributions by the Laender of Western Germany to the support of West Berlin, the proposal for a Combined Travel Board, and the question of the treatment of German prisoners held at Spandau Prison under quadripartite agreement.]

Occupation Statute and Trizone Fusion

General Clay inquired whether General Koenig would be willing to send his representative to Berlin to sit on these committees for a straight period of about thirty days without interruption for the purpose of bringing these matters to a conclusion.

General Koenig said that as everyone knew he preferred Frankfurt. However, he agreed to send his representatives to sit on the committee regarding the occupation statute. He thought, however, with respect to tripartite control that not much progress would be accomplished at the present. He agreed to send Mr. Sabatier to Berlin to sit on committee dealing with the occupation statute only.

Land Boundaries

There was a lengthy discussion of the question of Land Boundaries with particular reference to Wuerttemberg-Baden. General Koenig raised the question of Wuerttemberg-Baden and the three types of referendum included in the recommendations of the Ministers President. He wanted it understood that should the first referendum, which would propose the consolidation of the two states of Wuerttemberg and Baden, be disapproved by vote that the Military Governors would agree that a second referendum would be had in which the electorate would have an opportunity to say whether the former states of Wuerttemberg and Baden should be restored. General Clay said that he could not agree to this proposition as he felt that the second referendum would really not be necessary but that he and General Koenig could make this decision administratively. He had no doubt in his own mind that if the Germans did not want to consolidate the two states they would wish for the restoration of Wuerttemberg and Baden. It was the occupying powers who had disturbed this administrative outline in the first place and there could be no doubt that the Germans would want the consolidation [restoration?] if they did not want the two states consolidated. General Koenig said he would report this matter to Paris.

There was a discussion regarding the provision to be made in the German constitution for changes in Land Boundaries. The French delegate stated the apprehension that if the Germans were authorized by the Constitution to make changes in the Land Boundaries that there was a possibility that every two months some change would be suggested which the Allies could not accept. That the Land Boundaries should remain until the peace treaty had been concluded, the French position is that during the period between the German Constitution and the conclusion of the peace treaty, that the German Land Boundaries should remain unchanged.

General Robertson said that he could find no reason to be alarmed over the French apprehension because if the Germans did come forth with recommendations for changes in the Land Boundaries, it would be easy enough for the Military Governors to approve or disapprove.

Military Governors agreed to meet again at Frankfurt at 2:30 pm November 16, 1948.

Robert Murphy

1. The source text was transmitted to Washington under cover of a letter from Ambassador Murphy to Jacob Beam, dated November 4, which in the main read as follows:

   “I have written to Ambassador Caffery and Chip Bohlen in Paris saying that ‘I am in doubt whether the views expressed by General Koenig actually do represent Foreign Office and French Government thinking. We hear a number of stories regarding Mr. Schuman’s conversations with the Germans and of alleged differences of views between Mr. Schuman and others including General Koenig. We would like to be sure that General Koenig in stating these views really does represent French Government position. I have a feeling that Mr. Schuman has; opinions of his own and that they may not always coincide with General Koenig’s.’”

   In his telegram 5818, November 10, from Paris, repeated as 694 to Berlin, not printed, Ambassador Caffery reported that Premier Schuman had told him that the French Government had no intention of withdrawing its agreement to proceed with the carrying out of the London Agreements. Schuman did say that the French would be upset if German reconstruction developed “too rapidly” to the detriment of France. Schuman promised to communicate with General Koenig: (740.00119 Control (Germany)/11–1048).

   For General Clay’s report on this meeting of the Military Governors, see telegram 2686, November 5, from Berlin, infra.

2. For General Clay’s report on the October 30 meeting of the Military Governors, see message CC–6525, November 1, p. 625.