711.60C/3–748: Telegram
The Ambassador in Poland (Griffis) to the Secretary of State
343. In a meeting with the Foreign Minister1 yesterday, he referred with great bitterness to the reply of the Department to the statement of the Governments of Czechoslovakia, Poland and Yugoslavia emanating from the Prague Conference and released on the evening of February 18. He stated that contrary to American reports, no suggestion of such a meeting had been made by the USSR and both the calling of the conference and the form of the proclamation was his own personal brain child. The second part of this statement I am inclined to believe. He stated that the only reply that the State Department had seen fit to make was in insulting Bruvhoff [apparent garble]. I stated that I felt unofficially that both the timing, form, and geographic emanation of the declaration was unfortunate. It was timed almost in conjunction with the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia, it was formulated as a long series of statements constantly disproved by the US Government and was forming no new basis of negotiation, and that with some changes if it had emanated in conjunction with the [Page 355] ministers of [at?] Moscow containing some recognition of the deep desire of the US to solve the European problems it might have had some validity as it was increasingly obvious that in the last analysis negotiations must be with Moscow. I stated that, in any event, the entire pronouncement was answered to the Polish Government in our answer to its note of Sept 30, 1947 which stated inter alia the following: “In this connection, the Polish Government is undoubtedly aware that the US Government has made repeated proposals for negotiation of a treaty with the UK, France and the USSR, which would guarantee the security of Europe against the revival of militarism in Germany for a period of 40 years. The US proposal, which was accepted as a basis for agreements by the UK and by France but not by the USSR. This proposal is indisputable evidence of the determination of the people and the Government of the US that Germany shall never again be dominant military power in Europe.”2
The Minister then asked if I had any further suggestions re our last discussion, described at length in my wire to the Secretary No. 272, February 23.3 I stated that this, too, was entirely answered by the quotation described above in our note of September 30, 1947, and that, quoting Deptel No. 128, February 28,4 he “must be fully aware of the issues involved and he should need no guidance in determining what steps should be taken on the Soviet side to overcome the present impasse.” He again expressed the desire that I should put the general plan on paper as a suggestion for his use in Moscow. I then presented him a Polish translation of the above paragraph with the statement, “I have it right here.” The Foreign Minister stated that this was the last question to be discussed and many others came first. I told him we could not accept that view and reiterated my belief that most of the problems of Europe would iron out if the basic question of German militarization could once be settled. I suggest informally and unofficially that perhaps he might want to put his ideas on paper.
I stated to the Foreign Minister that I had called a press conference for tomorrow afternoon to make a full exposition to the Polish press of the intent and purposes of the European Recovery Program, that I was furnishing him with a full translation of my proposed statement in Polish, and was also furnishing a copy to General Groz, Director of the Press and Information Office of the Foreign Office.5 I told him that during the eight months of my stay here no statements of mine in explanation of US policy in Europe had been permitted to reach [Page 356] the Polish press and that I especially requested that in connection with the momentous decisions of the European Recovery Program, the American viewpoint might at least be permitted to reach the Polish press for consideration by the Polish nation. The Foreign Minister stated that the Polish Government regarded the Marshall Plan as greatly more political than economic and in view of the fact it had been repeatedly stated in the American press and the Congress that aid under the Plan should be withdrawn from any country with a Communist government, it was apparent that should Poland have joined or now join in the Plan, the entire present Polish Government would be invited by the US to resign.
Later at luncheon with Winiewicz, it was apparent that he had talked with Modzelewski re the substance of my telegram to the Secretary No. 272, February 23, and astonishingly in his discussion quoted the exact words used in your cable answer, No. 128, February 28, that any suggestions by [to?] Russia looking toward renewal of negotiations “would be interpreted as a sign of weakness.” It is difficult for me to accept fully this phrase either from the Department or from the Poles.