Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Germany and Austria, Volume II

740.00119 Council/3–648

The Soviet Ambassador ( Panyushkin ) to the Secretary of State ¹

[Translation]

Washington , March 6, 1948.

No. 50

Sir: In reply to the Department of State’s memorandum of February 21² of this year concerning the conference in London between the Governments of the U.S.A., Great Britain and France on the German question, upon instructions from the Soviet Government I have the honor to state the following:

In the statement of the Soviet Government transmitted to you on February 13,³ the fact was pointed out that the London Conference of the representatives of the U.S.A., Great Britain and France on the German question is a violation of the agreement made by Great Britain, the U.S.S.R., the U.S.A. and France on a Control Council in Germany, as well as a violation of the Potsdam Agreement on the establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers, one of whose basic tasks was the preparation of a peaceful settlement for Germany. In reply, the Governments of the U.S.A., Great Britain and France stated that the agreement on control machinery in Germany and the Potsdam Agreement do not contain any prohibition of the arrangement of consultations of the Powers among themselves. However, such statements cannot be recognized as convincing.

It is known that, as a result of such a type of unilateral consultations held by the Governments of the U.S.A. and Great Britain, as well as France, there have already been committed more than one violation of earlier Agreements concluded between the four Powers. It is clear to everyone that the so-called consultations at the London Conference constitute the preparation of a new arrangement on the German question between the U.S.A., Great Britain and France, although it is absolutely obvious that arrangements of this kind between the governments of the three Powers are incompatible with a loyal attitude toward the above-mentioned Agreements signed by the four Powers.

From the very reply of the French Government⁴ it is clear that the Conference in London between the representatives of the U.S.A., Great Britain and France was convened for the consideration of a number of important problems pertaining to Germany. From the published agenda of the London Conference it is seen that in the said agenda were included such matters as the role of the German economy in Europe and the question of the Ruhr District, measures of security with respect to Germany, territorial changes, reparations and other matters directly related to the competence either of the Control Council or of the Council of Foreign Ministers and which consequently are subject to settlement in no other manner than by agreement between all four Powers occupying Germany.

Thus it follows that the reply of the French Government not only does not refute the assertion contained in the Soviet statement of February 13 to the effect that the Conference in London between the representatives of the three governments is a violation of the Agreement on control machinery in Germany as well as of the Potsdam Agreement on the establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers, but also confirms the fact of such violation with full clarity.

The Soviet Government considers it necessary to invite special attention, first of all, to the position (terms of reference) of the Control Council in Germany.

In the Agreement between Great Britain, the U.S.S.R., the U.S.A. and France on the establishment of control machinery in Germany, published on June 6, 1945,⁵ it was stated that the Control Council in Germany was created to ensure coordination of the actions of the four Powers in the corresponding occupation zones “on the chief military, political, economic and other questions affecting Germany as a whole”.

In the Declaration on the defeat of Germany, likewise published on June 6, 1945,⁶ the Governments of Great Britain, the U.S.S.R., the U.S.A. and France jointly obligated themselves to determine “the status of Germany or of any area at present being part of German territory”.

Thus in these agreements the four powers—Great Britain, the U.S.S.R., the U.S.A. and France—assumed the obligation to carry out an agreed policy both with respect to Germany as a whole and with respect to determining the status of any area in Germany during the period of occupation. Therefore, separate conferences and decisions on the German question, pertaining either to Germany as a whole or to any of its parts, are in contradiction with the obligations assumed by the four Powers.

The implementation of an agreed policy by the four Powers with respect to occupied Germany was considered by the governments of the said Powers as the most important condition for ensuring a lasting peace and security for the peoples of Europe, and it was one of the bases of the decisions of the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences on the demilitarization and democratization of Germany. Furthermore, this policy was expected to prevent the possibility of the restoration of Germany as an aggressive power and to ensure Germany’s transformation into a peaceful, democratic state.

Throughout the entire period that has elapsed, the Soviet Union has consistently acted in accordance with this policy established by the four Powers. Moreover, the Soviet representatives have steadfastly insisted that, with respect to all the zones of Germany, the Control Council should adopt the appropriate agreed measures, which, however, even on very important questions, have not found support on the part of the British, American and French representatives.

In the meantime, the other occupying powers had already in 1946 started along the road of direct rejection of this policy established by the four Powers.

This first found expression in the separate Agreement between Great Britain and the United States of America on the unification of the British and American zones of occupation in Germany, and then in a series of other separate actions on the part of the British and American authorities, as well as of the French authorities, in their occupation zones. It is well known that the question of creating a unified Anglo-American zone was not even submitted for the consideration of the Control Council. The matter reached the point where, at the Anglo-American Conference in Frankfurt am Main in January 1948, decisions were taken which gave the two zonal agencies a governmental character, although scarcely a month before that the representatives of Great Britain and the United States of America had denied that they were preparing the formation of a separate West German state. Nor is it a secret that at the present time consideration is being given to the matter of France’s joining in this Anglo-American separate policy of forming a West German state vis-à-vis the rest of Germany.

The consequences to the Treaty of Peace of such a policy and of such an attitude are well known. The said actions of the British, American and French representatives have paralyzed the Control Council in Germany and have undermined its importance.

All this means that the Governments of the U.S.A., Great Britain and France have taken upon themselves the responsibility for the collapse of the Agreement on the Control Council in Germany.

The London Conference of the representatives of the U.S.A., Great Britain and France on the German question bears witness to the fact that now it is a matter not only of the collapse of the agreement on the Control Council in Germany but also of the collapse of the Potsdam Agreement on the Council of Foreign Ministers. Disregarding the fact that in the Agreement of the four Powers provision was made for questions connected with a peace settlement for Germany to fall within the competence of the Council of Foreign Ministers, the Governments of the U.S.A., Great Britain and France organized the said separate conference on the German question without the participation of the representatives of the U.S.S.R. and in violation of the Agreement on the Council of Foreign Ministers.

The Soviet Government considers that the fact of the organization of the three-Power London Conference constitutes a fuller development of the policy of the U.S.A., Great Britain and France which is directed toward the liquidation of the Council of Foreign Ministers representing all four occupying powers.

During 1947, sessions of the Council of Foreign Ministers on the German question were held in Moscow and London. In both cases the Soviet Government made efforts to bring about agreement between the four Powers with respect to Germany, meeting halfway the proposals of the other powers on a number of questions, so far as this was compatible with the basic principles of previous agreements on the demilitarization and democratization of Germany.

The Soviet Government was guided, first of all, by the desire to expedite the preparation of a peace treaty with Germany and to ensure the restoration of complete peace in Europe, in which all peace-loving peoples are interested. This government also tried to carry out the decisions of the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences concerning satisfaction of the lawful demands of Allied States which suffered from German aggression. In addition to this, the Soviet Government championed the necessity of promoting the restoration of Germany as a democratic and peaceful state, which is also in full accord with the Yalta and Potsdam decisions.

However, the Council of Foreign Ministers was unable to arrive at general agreements on the German question in view of the position taken by the United States of America, Great Britain and France.

The Governments of the U.S.A., Great Britain and France turned down the Soviet Union’s proposal presented to the Council of Foreign Ministers in London for the preparation of a peace-treaty with Germany. The Governments of the said three Powers also turned down the proposal of the Soviet Union concerning the establishment of central German economic departments, which was directly provided for by the Potsdam Agreement. The Governments of the three Powers likewise turned down the proposals of the Soviet Union on the organization of an all-German government, which is necessary for the restoration of the political and economic unity of Germany.

If the Governments of the U.S.A., Great Britain and France had agreed to begin the preparation of a treaty of peace with Germany and had agreed to measures aimed at the restoration of Germany’s unity, important progress would have been made in solving the entire German problem and in strengthening the peace of Europe. An agreement on all these questions was not achieved because of the negative attitude of the said three Powers.

If the Governments of the U.S.A., Great Britain and France had maintained the positions which found expression in the decisions of the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences, there can be no doubt that the Council of Foreign Ministers would have successfully coped with its problems upon considering the German question.

The failure of the Moscow and London Conferences of the four Foreign Ministers is explained by the fact that Great Britain, the United States of America and France deviated from the Yalta and Potsdam decisions on the German question and tried to impose upon the Council of Foreign Ministers a policy which contradicts these decisions and is incompatible with them.

Every kind of attempt is now being made to justify the present separate actions by the failure of the work and by the collapse of the Moscow and London Conferences of the four Ministers. The purpose of these attempts is to remove the blame for this collapse from the three Powers and ascribe it to the Soviet Union, although it is quite obvious that the responsibility for the failure of the Council of Foreign Ministers rests entirely on the Governments of the United States of America, Great Britain and France, which disrupted these Conferences.

The real significance of these separate actions is now fully apparent to all those who follow the policy of the said powers with respect to Germany. The significance of these actions, which are directed toward the liquidation of the Council of Foreign Ministers, is to throw off all restrictions which might interfere with the promotion of that policy respecting Germany on which the Council of Foreign Ministers was unable to agree, since such a policy is radically at variance with the policy previously agreed upon by the four Powers.

The facts indicate that the so-called “American Plan” with respect to Europe, including Germany, has become the basis of that policy pursued by aggressive circles in the United States of America, England and France, which policy is at the present time being carried out by those powers in disregard of the problem of demilitarization and democratization of Germany, instead of the one which was agreed upon by the powers of the anti-Hitlerite coalition when they established the conditions for the capitulation of Germany and adopted decisions at the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences. Furthermore, everything is being done for the purpose of converting the western part of Germany, as if it were a colony, into a simple object and tool for plans of this kind.

When in 1946 there was created in Germany a united Anglo-American zone, Bizonia, which was set up vis-à-vis all the rest of Germany, economic considerations were given as the explanation. It was said that such unification of the two zones would facilitate the restoration of the German economy and would at the same time reduce the expenditures of the occupying powers. These explanations and promises have not been justified.

In reality, the creation of Bizonia can in no way be explained by economic considerations. This step, which led to the splitting up of Germany, was dictated by the desire to obtain a free hand in the western part of Germany for carrying out the same one-sided policy of the Anglo-American authorities which they failed to impose upon the Control Council with respect to Germany as a whole. Since the departure from the Yalta and Potsdam policy met with resistance in the Control Council, the Governments of Great Britain and the U.S.A. created Anglo-American Bizonia, together with their bilateral agencies, in which, by-passing the Control Council, they began to carry out their separate political and economic plans.

While in the Control Council the Anglo-American representatives were constantly confronted with the demand of the Soviet Union that they faithfully carry out demilitarization in all occupation zones, in Bizonia they got a free hand, and the liquidation of the military potential in that part of Germany was reduced to zero. Thus, steps for the liquidation of the war enterprises of Germany, even those which were intended for delivery on account of reparations, also remained untaken.

If in the Control Council they demanded a report on the application of measures for democratization in all zones, in Bizonia the Anglo-American authorities were able to act without control and without observing previously agreed decisions of the four Powers on the policy of democratization of Germany. Moreover, they began all the more to rely upon aggressive German circles and German monopolies, which in the past had served as a prop of Hitlerism and German aggression and were always ready to come forth as militant German avengers. Plans for land reform and the transfer to small peasants of the land of big landowners and junkers, who have always served as a prop to German militarism, remained only on paper.

To this it must be added that in the French occupation zone there has been pursued and still is being pursued a policy which does not differ from that being followed in the Anglo-American zone.

Now everyone sees that the creation of a unified Anglo-American zone has served as preparation for carrying out the so-called “American Plan” with respect to Europe.

They likewise explained the appearance of the “Marshall Plan” chiefly on the basis of economic reasons. They attempted to prove that the purpose of this “plan” is to furnish aid to the states of Europe that suffered from the war. It is now evident that these explanations have absolutely no force.

In reality the European countries that suffered most from the war found themselves outside the American “plan”, in as much as these countries could not agree to the terms set forth by the said “plan”, for such terms were incompatible with their national sovereignty and state independence. It is entirely understandable that the democratic states, which defended with their blood their national sovereignty in the struggle against Fascism, did not accept such terms of so-called American “aid” as would mean the interference of a foreign state in their internal affairs, economic life and national development. On the other hand, not only was Italy included in the “Marshall Plan”, but also the western part of Germany, although to date the obligations of Germany in respect to making reparation for the enormous damage inflicted upon the Allied states have not even been determined.

Since the Anglo-American policy deprives Germany of the possibility of having its own central democratic government which can defend the interests of the nation, and since the Anglo-American occupation zone lies outside the control of the four powers, Bizonia is a convenient field for the uncontrolled economic manipulations of American and British monopolies. Here in Bizonia Anglo-American monopolists, banks and cartels are penetrating into all branches of economic life, subordinating them to themselves and to their expansionist aims.

The facts show that up to the present time nothing has been done toward the real restoration of a highly-developed industry in the western part of Germany and that, on the contrary, the development of such industry has been and is being constantly retarded because of fears of competition. Together with this, in the American “aid” plan there are included Bizonia and the Ruhr district, with its heavy industry, which has always been a powerful center of armament production, and this indicates the aspiration of certain American circles to restore the military and economic potential of Germany and to use it for the purposes mentioned above.

In view of the foregoing, there is no need to wonder at the fact that attempts to ensure joint control by all four occupying Powers over the Ruhr industrial region have met with active resistance on the part of the United States of America and Great Britain.

Such a policy of the Anglo-American authorities in the field of economic measures in Germany is designed to obtain the support of the magnates of German heavy industry, but it clearly contradicts the aims of a peaceful and democratic transformation of Germany. This policy does not lead to the restoration of a peaceful economy in Germany but involves the danger of converting the western part of Germany into a strategic base for future aggression in Europe.

At present the Government of Great Britain is advancing a plan for the creation of the so-called “Western Union”. Into this political bloc are drawn France, Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg, and also Italy and the western part of Germany; at the same time, the participation of the United States of America is also provided for. The inclusion of some other western European states is also in view.

It is not difficult to discern that this British plan is closely connected with “the Marshall Plan”, complementing it and disclosing the political aims of the American plan in respect to Europe. Both the American plan of economic “aid” and the British political plan of “Western Union” set up a Western Europe as against an Eastern Europe and, consequently, lead to a political cleavage of Europe. It follows from this that the American economic plan and its complement—the British political plan, have nothing in common with measures for strengthening the peace and security of the peoples of Europe.

Remembering the hard lessons of the First and Second World Wars, the peace-loving states of Europe have yearned for the conclusion of agreements to prevent the possibility of new German aggression. This has been the basis of all known treaties—like the Anglo-Soviet and the Franco-Soviet 20-year Treaties of Reciprocal Assistance, the treaties of the Soviet Union with other European states and also the Anglo-French Treaty of 1947. This aspiration to prevent new German aggression corresponds to the interests of all peace-loving peoples and can not lead to the setting up of some European states as against other European states. The conclusion of such agreements has promoted and still promotes the security of the peoples of Europe and the strengthening of universal peace.

The plan of creating a “Western Union” is of an entirely different character and has no such aim as the prevention of German aggression or the rendering of mutual assistance in case of such aggression. The British political plan could not even have such an object in view, in as much as it not only is not directed against the repetition of German aggression but includes in the Western bloc that part of Germany where is still preserved the dominant position of aggressive German monopolies which only yesterday were the very foundation for Hitler’s aggression. On the other hand, the character of the British political plan is sufficiently revealed by the fact that it sets up the European states united by the bloc as against the other states of Europe which have consistently maintained their position of strengthening universal peace and of not permitting new German aggression.

It follows from this that the creation of Anglo-American Bizonia and the cleavage of Germany resulting therefrom was not an accident. By placing the western part of Germany outside the joint control of the four Powers, an attempt is being made to use it for the purpose of setting up a special group of western European states as against the rest of the states of Europe, which leads to the political cleavage of Europe and the formation of two camps of European countries.

Thus neither the American economic plan nor the British political plan serves the purpose of strengthening peace, economic restoration and progress, but rather entirely opposite aims. All this explains the attitude of the Soviet Union toward these plans.

It follows from all this that the policy of the United States of America and Great Britain, as well as that of France, led to the collapse of the agreement of the Four Powers on the Control Council in Germany and to the collapse of the Potsdam Agreement on the Council of Foreign Ministers, which was charged with all preparatory work toward the peaceful settlement of Europe. This policy of the three Powers not only fails to promote the establishment of an enduring democratic peace in Europe but is pregnant with such consequences as can suit only all kinds of instigators of a new war.

The secret meetings in London on the German question, between the representatives of the United States of America, Great Britain and France, designed to by-pass the Council of Foreign Ministers, in which the Soviet Union would also have participated, bear testimony to the fact that the Governments of the three Powers do not balk at complete disregard of obligations undertaken by them.

The fact that the representatives of only a small group of states were included in these conferences while a majority of the states which suffered most from German aggression were left outside this conference testifies to the fact that the London Conference was pursuing the goal of a narrow group of creators of the Western bloc, which is placed vis-à-vis all the rest of the states of Europe.

In view of the foregoing, the Soviet Government deems it necessary to reaffirm the declaration made by it to the effect that the decisions prepared by this Conference can have neither legal force nor international authority.

Accept [etc.]

A. Panyushkin

1. For the text of an identic note handed to Foreign Secretary Bevin by the Soviet Ambassador in London, see The Soviet Union and the Berlin Question, p. 7.
2. Ante, p. 340.
3. Ante, p. 338.
4. See Carlyle, Documents on International Affairs, p. 556.
5. The reference here is presumably to the Four-Power Statement on Control Machinery in Germany, issued on June 5, 1945; for text, see Department of State Bulletin, June 10, 1945, p. 1052 or A Decade of American Foreign Policy, 1941–49 (Washington, Government-Printing Office, 1950), p. 512.
6. For text, see Department of State, Treaties and Other International Acts Series (TIAS) No. 1520, or 60 Stat. (pt. 2) 1649.