Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, General; the United Nations, Volume I, Part 1

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Memorandum of Paris–Washington Teleconference¹

top secret

[Paris,] October 18, 1948.

Conferees Present Paris

• Charles Bohlen²
• Admiral K. Hewitt
• Frederick Osborn
• Capt. H. S. [P.] Smith
• Dean Rusk

Herewith Pre-Conference Transmission:

SS–1. You should have before you draft Canadian Resolution dated 12 October which was passed by subcommittee A of Committee 1.³

SS–2. Today, on specific instructions Evatt, Australians introduced amendment in Committee 1⁴ which would make the following changes:

First, to insert as paragraph 3 the following (which was taken from the Indian draft resolution):⁵

“Calls upon the Commission to resume and continue its work, to proceed with the study of all the matters within its terms of reference, and to prepare for submission to the Security Council, as early as possible, a draft treaty or convention incorporating the Commission’s ultimate proposals”

Second, to renumber third paragraph of Canadian Resolution “4”, to delete “when” in third line and substitute “if”, and to delete everything from word “thereupon” in sixth line through word “shall” in twelfth line, inserting word “to” before word “report” in twelfth line.

SS–3. Spaak believes that temper of Committee 1 is such that the Australian proposal will have strong support and, while it may not get a majority, will almost certainly result in our failure to get a two thirds majority for the straight Canadian resolution and may even result in abstentions to extent that we might fail to get two thirds for approval of proposals.

SS–4. MacNaughton concurs with Spaak’s views but says Australian amendment in its present form is of course impossible of acceptance and we would have to fight it even at risk of losing our two thirds or even losing majority. MacNaughton has therefore proposed to Evatt, without our concurrence, that they accept instead the following final paragraph to be added to the Canadian resolution; which would become a complete substitute for the new third paragraph proposed by the Australians:

“Meanwhile the General Assembly calls upon the Commission to resume its sessions, to review its program of work, and to proceed to the further study of such of the subjects remaining in the program of work which it considers to be practical and useful.”

SS–5. MacNaughton has just this minute seen Hodgson of Australia. MacNaughton reports that Australia will accept Canadian compromise given in paragraph 4 above. He also tells us that Canadian delegation must go ahead in any event on that basis, on instructions from their highest level, which we assume means MacKenzie King; MacNaughton says he is convinced that this is a very wise thing to do and that it will mean a difference of 20 votes. He urges us to accept on ground that other members of Assembly need more time to think over the basic issues involved. He says in spite of our best efforts other members do not yet understand the basic issue, that Russians have played very skillfully upon natural desire of other delegations to keep something going on this subject. He says the resulting resolution would provide six sponsoring powers with opportunity to seek political basis for eventual control system through consultations, in meantime Atomic Energy Commission could review its program. Determine if there “are any odd subjects” which it could take up, and thereby afford members of AEC a further opportunity to give more information to the world about what is really involved.

Add Conferee Present Paris: Howard Johnson

SS–6. Problem is our position Tuesday afternoon⁶ when resolution and amendments will come to vote. We are entirely clear that our basic position means that we must oppose Australian amendment by every possible effort, regardless of voting situation or any political repercussions therefrom. Big problem is posed by Canadian compromise which has now been accepted by Australians. Osborn’s estimate is that great majority of States who have served on AEC will support Canadian compromise and he is confident only of Brazilian support from that group. Big risk in our making an isolated last-ditch stand on this point is that we would appear to lend substance to Soviet charge that we are in fact trying to withdraw our offer and that we have not meant what we said in our proposals anyhow. Since this is first major item to come to head in this Assembly, political effect on other important questions is most serious. An immediate adverse effect will be felt in Security Council on Berlin issue where our entire effort has been to stiffen timorous members, including French, who are particularly responsive to propaganda suggestions that the United States is forcing issue to showdown on every question at issue with Soviet Union. UP despatch concerning alleged “GO-Political military plan” of Secretary Marshall for intensification of cold war versus Russia has been widely featured in French afternoon press.

SS–7. Foregoing is brief estimate of UN attitude political mood at this time. We are also informed that Latin American support for our position will be very doubtful if we fail to accept Canadian compromise. These considerations do not of course weigh conclusively against any real possibility that Canadian compromise would endanger any security interest in atomic matters. We see no such danger from here but would like urgently your opinion on this aspect. Bohlen, Osborn, Rusk, and Hewitt concur in foregoing. Admiral Hewitt desires that Secretary Defense be immediately informed this situation.

SS–8. Matter was discussed briefly with Dulles today who expressed opinion he had always been in favor of completion of treaty—which of course we could not support. Senator Austin believes we should accept Canadian compromise.

SS–9. This must be settled tonight Washington time. We shall stand by for reaction.

SS–10. MacNaughton assures us that under his compromise resolution Atomic Energy Commission would find after relatively few meetings that Russian position made further studies on the program of work to be neither practical nor useful and would again cease its activities leaving to sponsoring powers to find if any basis of agreement exists. Osborn concurs this view and believes Soviet propaganda position would be poor. Believe Hodgson has in mind completing staffing and organization but would be willing to quit after that.

SS–11. General Crittenberger is also present at conference and concurs in foregoing.

For Arneson:

Paige [Page] Smith and Howard Johnson, Navy and State members of RAC, are here and concur that we should accept Canadian compromise, in light of fact that Australia is committed to withdraw dangerous amendment and Canada is resolved to go ahead in any event.

Operators note to Operator:

In no uncertain terms we were instructed to have an answer regarding the above by morning and to immediately call Rusk on the reply no matter what time. Please inform Arneson of the above.

1. Rusk summarized this exchange in a memorandum to the Secretary of State, October 19, not printed (501.BC Atomic/10–1948).
2. Adviser, United States Delegation; Counselor, Department of State.
3. The draft resolution under reference, A/C.1/A.III/1/Rev. 3, is described in editorial note, p. 473. The First Committee commenced consideration of the Subcommittee’s report (A/C.1/333) on October 18.
4. Reference is to document A/C.1/336 (GA (III/1), First Committee, Annexes, pp. 21–22). For the record of the 163rd Meeting of the First Committee, at which A/C.1/336 was introduced, see GA (III/1), First Committee, pp. 181–191.
5. For information on the Indian draft resolution, A/C.1/A.III/4/Rev. 2, see editorial note, p. 473.
6. October 19.