Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, General; the United Nations, Volume I, Part 1

IO Files: US(P)/A/M(Chr)/17

Minutes of the Seventeenth Meeting of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly, Hotel d’Iéna, Paris, October 18, 1948, 9:15 a. m.

Paris, October 18, 1948, 9:15 a.m.

secret

[Here follows a list of persons (28) present.]

1. Atomic Energy

Mr. Osborn explained that the next two days would be crucial ones as regarded action on atomic energy. During this period, Committee 1 would have to vote on the Soviet resolution, the Canadian resolution (which was completely consistent with US policy), and the Indian resolution.¹ He noted that a substantial majority of the Members favored consultation among the sponsoring powers on atomic energy, though there was some question in his own mind as to whether a two-thirds majority was agreed on this point. He had found that the most useful and convincing argument in support of the US position for consultation was to the effect that, until the basic problem of what the Soviets really desire, and what their security requirements are, is solved, it will be quite impossible to solve any individual problems arising between the USSR and the United States. The Canadian resolution asked the sponsoring Powers to consult as to the factors in this situation which had brought about the present impasse. This question afforded, he felt, an opportunity for natural discussion. In his view this sort of broad consultation was the only kind which might accomplish results. Ambassador Austin called attention to the interpretation given by General McNaughton of the phrase “higher level” in connection with the consultations. Such consultation appeared to mean Foreign Ministers although he noted that the resolution, since it requested a report back to the United Nations, indicated that such consultation should go on within the framework of the United Nations. Mr. Dulles asked whether the Canadian resolution would exclude consultation on less than the “higher level.” Mr. Osborn explained that it would not prevent informal conversations with the U.S.S.R. but these would not be official since the resolution required consultation with all six sponsoring powers. Mr. Dulles expressed some doubt as to whether such talks on a six-power basis would be effective.

2. Disarmament

Mr. Osborn explained that the Assembly had before it the Soviet proposal² (which the United States opposed) and a substitute British resolution³ (which the United States favored). In addition, there were unacceptable French and Belgian amendments to the Soviet proposal.⁴ He said that the French and Belgian Delegations had announced that they could not vote against the Soviet resolution and were instead trying to kill that proposal by submitting amendments which would be unacceptable to the USSR. He did not believe the United States should view these proposals in such a petty way and recommended that it should make clear its opposition to the Soviet proposal by voting against it. He recognized, however, that the French domestic situation made the French position very difficult⁵ and noted that for somewhat related reasons it might also be necessary for the United Kingdom to abstain on the vote on the Soviet resolution. He thought it was desirable to put the question of this approach directly before the Delegation.

Mr. Ross asked why the United Kingdom would abstain. Mr. Osborn explained that presumably because of British public opinion, the British representative was recommending that the British resolution itself be submitted as an amendment to the Soviet proposal. Mr. Ross commented that he understood that Mr. Bevin felt very strongly that it was essential not “to kid people along” on disarmament. If this were true, a British abstention would not be in line. Ambassador Austin noted that the British position, like our own, was tied to the establishment of an effective control system for atomic energy and conventional armaments, and the organization of Article 43 Forces. He pointed out, however, that the British, along with many other Delegations were somewhat upset when they learned that the United States would not join in an amendment to the Soviet resolution.

Mr. Dulles said it seemed to him that the international situation was such that it would be very dangerous to keep alive the belief that there could be any reduction of armaments. The practical situation should be remembered. In the present political situation the one thing which most of these countries wished and which made them feel safe was armaments. The Soviet Union had so frightened people all over the world that the only reassuring policy was an increase in their armaments. He thought that to keep alive the idea that there could be anything constructive done on disarmament at this time was simply playing the Soviet game. Mr. Ross agreed and said he understood that the basis for Mr. Bevin’s position was his profound conviction that the United Kingdom must rearm. Mr. Osborn pointed out that the United Kingdom and the United States both felt that there could be no disarmament without basic agreement on various political issues.

Mrs. Roosevelt did not think that it was possible to get this idea across to the people. In her opinion it was foolish to believe that the people, either in the United Kingdom, the United States, or any other country, are not affected by a suggestion for disarmament. She pointed out that unless they could be made to understand the willingness of the United States to disarm under certain conditions, there would be tremendous opposition to the present United States position. She commented that she had already received resolutions adopted by women’s groups and church groups supporting a reduction in armaments. She thought this program must be clarified for the people in very simple terms because on the surface, it looked as if the United States wanted to keep countries armed and was refusing every conciliatory gesture. The United States position was clear to her, but it was evident from her correspondence that it was not understood by most people.

Ambassador Austin pointed out that the United States had tried to work out a common approach with the British immediately after Vishinsky proposed this item for the agenda. We had tried to urge an approach which would treat Vishinsky’s speech as a dud by refusing to debate it and simply letting it be voted down. Ambassador Austin said he had talked with Messrs. McNeil and Jebb of the United Kingdom Delegation who disagreed entirely, arguing it was necessary to introduce a counter resolution. Since the other Great Powers took a similar position, the United States could do nothing alone. He said various Latin American Delegates however, had come to him personally and indicated that they would have supported a course of no discussion and no action on the Vishinsky proposal. The ensuing debate in Committee 1 had simply confused the Members. The United States had submitted no resolution and no amendments, and was simply going to support the United Kingdom proposal.

Ambassador Corrigan wondered if it might not be a good idea, at least from a propaganda point of view, for the United States simply to propose a 50 percent reduction of armaments since it was certain that that would never be accepted. It was noted that this was the same argument as that of the French whose particular domestic political problems it reflected accurately. The United States certainly had no similar reasons for this approach. Mrs. Roosevelt commented that the menace of the Communist Party in such states as France was responsible for this equivocal position. Mr. Dulles pointed out that the Communists were saying that they would not fight if these states were invaded by the Red Army, and since the domestic Communists would be put in power by a Soviet invasion, the present leaders were interested in providing future protection for themselves in the event of a Communist coup. Actually, this approach played directly into the hands of the Communists.

Mr. Cohen said he believed that what was lacking was an affirmative proposal which met some of the more real issues of the times so that the United States would not seem to be opposing something, the very distant, long-run objectives of which it favored. He said he did not know whether it was too late to prepare a resolution deploring the bi-polar nature of power in the world, recognizing the desirability of greater interdependence and getting agreement on the Western European Union and European Recovery Program all of which would lead to progressive disarmament and peace. He believed that so long as this Government was on the defensive it would suffer great difficulties because no matter how it was dealt with, there was such wide favor for disarmament as an ideal. He was doubtful whether anything constructive was done simply by rejecting amendments.

Mr. Rusk said that the United States position on disarmament had been based upon several related ideas. First, the Security Council had the primary responsibility in the field of disarmament—not the General Assembly. Second, the United States should not favor discontinuing the Commission for Conventional Armaments, and thus appear to close the door to agreement. Third, it was felt that the Commission on Conventional Armaments could continue to do useful work, particularly, study the problem of safeguards in the field of conventional armaments, as the Atomic Energy Commission had done for atomic energy. It was obviously undesirable to suspend the work of the Commission.

Mr. Osborn, replying to Mr. Cohen’s remarks, said that he had tried to draft a resolution along the lines suggested by Mr. Cohen which would make the basic issues clear and put the Soviet intransigeant position in proper perspective. Because this idea had not obtained much support, the United States had dropped back to the United Kingdom resolution even though it lacked desired simplicity. Ambassador Austin read the British resolution for the information of the Delegation. Asked by Mr. Dulles whether it was supported by the other Great Powers, Mr. Osborn said it was supported only by the United Kingdom and Canada. He noted that it obviously lacked appeal and simplicity. Mr. Cohen said he thought the resolution did little more than blame the Soviet Union for the present situation. Mr. Dulles thought the resolution had intrinsic merit but considerable background was required for anyone to understand what it meant. Mr. Osborn believed the text reflected the fact that this subject had been handled at too low a level in the United Kingdom. Mr. Cohen pointed out that this was such a short summary of the situation that it would not have any appeal comparable to that of the Vyshinsky proposal. Mr. Rusk suggested it might be desirable to attach to the British resolution, as an annex, the CCA agreed statement of principles.⁶ Mr. Cohen thought it was important to find some way of dramatizing the resolution. Mrs. Roosevelt said she could not help feeling that the United States should make a dramatic speech in favor of disarmament which would show that the Soviet offer to disarm, however, meant nothing unless it was implemented by certain definite things, and indicating that the USSR has not been willing to take even the first step preliminary to agreement on disarmament. The British resolution was a statement of the facts and was understandable only if one knew everything that had gone before. Mr. Rusk suggested that it might be appropriate to ask Mr. Cohen to draft some additional clauses which the United States could suggest to the British for inclusion in their resolution.

Mrs. Roosevelt called the attention of the Delegation to the recent book on atomic energy published by a notable British scientist.⁷ She had talked with Madame Pandit⁸ yesterday who had apparently been very much convinced by the arguments in the book, that there was some merit in the Soviet atomic energy position. The author apparently argued that the USSR should not accept the control system because opposition from other countries would prevent it from developing its own atomic energy program to meet its needs.

Ambassador Austin said that Messrs. Cohen, Rusk, Osborn and Johnson would meet in an attempt to work out additional clauses which might be added to the British resolution on conventional armaments. The purpose of the amendments would be to bring out the fact that the Soviet proposal is pure propaganda, that the program mapped out by the Commission for Conventional Armaments has been stopped by the USSR and that in the present condition of the world today, projects for peace like disarmament cannot be worked out until other issues are first settled. Ambassador Austin also stated the agreement of the Delegation to the present United States position of firm opposition to the French and Belgian amendments to the Soviet proposal.

1. The resolutions under reference are identified in editorial note, supra.
2. For text, see telegram 117, September 25, p. 431.
3. For information on the British resolution, A/C.1/319, see footnote 7, p. 461.
4. Reference is to French draft resolution A/C.1/325 and Belgian amendment thereto A/C.1/SC.12/2 which are described and quoted in footnote 1, p. 469.
5. For documentation on the French internal situation, see vol. iii, pp. 592 ff.
6. For text, see GA (IV), Suppl. No. 2, or Department of State Bulletin, August 29, 1948, pp. 267–268.
7. P. M. S. Blackett, Military and Political Consequences of Atomic Energy (London, Turnstile Press, 1948).
8. Mrs. Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, Chairman of the Indian Delegation; Indian Ambassador in the Soviet Union; sister of Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru.