Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, General; the United Nations, Volume I, Part 1

IO Files: US (P)/A/C.1/102

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. G. Hayden Raynor, Adviser, United States Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly

secret

[Paris,] October 11, 1948.

Subject: Disarmament

Participants:	Members of the United Kingdom and Canadian Delegations
	Captain Smith, Mr. Hayden Raynor, and Mr. Howard; Johnson, of the United States Delegation

United Kingdom

At our request Messrs. Jebb and Allen, of the United Kingdom Delegation, called at the Crillon¹ at 11 o’clock Sunday morning² to discuss this question. We explained the situation in the Committee as we saw it. We said we were prepared to make a very strong statement, a part of which we reviewed with them, and that we felt the best possible time to make it would be after Vyshinsky replies to McNeil and Shawcross.³ We said, however, that we wanted to have some counter resolution on the table which we could speak for, as well as speaking for the demolition of the Vyshinsky proposal. We said, therefore, we must know what the British intend to do with their resolution.⁴ We reaffirmed our informal promise to support it, but said we were not certain it was good enough. We said that, in addition to supporting the British resolution, we would also favor supporting something along the line of the Syrian resolution,⁵ perhaps after it was merged with the British proposal. We made it clear that supporting continuation of the work of the Conventional Armaments Commission was United States Government policy.

The British took the view that, although they realize this is our policy, pursuing it would weaken our position for suspension of the work of the Atomic Energy Commission. We took the view that, on the other hand, it might well have the opposite effect. We said that it was a pretty big dose of medicine for the Assembly to agree to suspend either, and if there was agreement on the Conventional Armaments Commission, there might be some likelihood for the New Zealand consultation proposal on atomic energy⁶ to succeed. Incidentally the British, while they have not given up hope, are doubtful that the New Zealand proposal will succeed.

During the conversation we stated that we were worried about the emphasis in Shawcross’ speech on a census and verification of armaments, as we had been in 1946. We said we were quite concerned over the Belgian resolution for the same reason. Captain Smith explained our reasons in this respect in some detail.

We also pointed out clearly to the British Representatives present that we did not think the present British resolution was in any too salable a form, and that we felt something like the Syrian resolution would need to be merged with it in order to make it salable. In this connection, we showed them our shortform resolution,⁷ which we said might be more readily acceptable to the Assembly than their resolution. We asked them to consider our resolution from this angle. We made it clear, however, that if after consideration they still desired to table their own resolution, it would have our support. We pointed out that there had to be something on the table and that we would have to know by nightfall whether the British were tabling theirs, because if they did not, when we spoke we would probably table ours, or at a minimum, announce support for the Syrian proposal. The British promised to let us know after discussing the question with Messrs. Shawcross and Cadogan.

Early in the evening the British informed us they had decided to table their resolution and that it would be before the Committee this morning.

Following the receipt of a telegram from Washington this morning,⁸ I sent a message to Jebb, telling him we were forced to be silent today. He took this information with good grace but did say he hoped this did not mean we would not be able to support the British resolution which they were tabling. I also informed him we couldn’t tell until the new situation was clarified during the day.

Mr. Jebb immediately suggested that the strategy, in the light of this new development, should be today to stall for time. He said Sir Hartley Shawcross would undoubtedly, in the light of the new situation, take such a line when he spoke. It was also indicated that if Vyshinsky comes into the Debate today, Sir Hartley might also speak again in rebuttal (which would be the third rebuttal speech by the British as contrasted with none on our part.)

Canada

During the day we kept Mr. Riddell⁹ informed of developments, and around five thirty called at the Canadian Delegation and went over the several resolutions with them. They are in general agreement with our position, and do not like the British resolution too well but will be prepared to support it. They think that, after it goes to the subcommittee, there will be ample opportunity to improve it.

Hayden Raynor

1. The Crillon was one of several residence hotels of the United States Delegation and staff.
2. October 10.
3. Sir Hartley Shawcross, member of the British Delegation; Attorney General of the united Kingdom.
4. For information on the British draft resolution, see footnote 7, p. 461.
5. For information on the Syrian draft resolution on disarmament, A/C.1/318, see footnote 9, p. 461.
6. For text, see footnote 8, p. 454.
7. Reference is presumably to draft resolution US(P)/A/C.1/68, October 6, which read as follows:

   The General Assembly considering that it is of urgent importance that the peoples of the world should be relieved of the burden of competitive armaments,

   Endorses the General Principles considered by the majority of the Commission for Conventional Armaments as necessary to the regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces, in particular the principle that such a system must include an adequate system of safeguards,

   Recognizes that the establishment of such safeguards would bring about in every country an opening up of its territory to effective international inspection in this field,

   Calls Upon all members of the Commission for Conventional Armaments to accept the principles set forth above, and to proceed with the formulation of plans based upon such principles.

   The United States Delegation had also prepared an alternative draft of greater length, US(P)/A/C.1/67, October 6, the operative portion of which read as follows: “[The General Assembly] calls upon the members of the Security Council, and particularly those constituting the minority, to accept as a basis for further negotiations the principle of safeguards endorsed by the majority of the Commission for Conventional Armaments which will provide such an openness of information between nations in this field as will create conditions of confidence necessary to establish practical steps towards the reduction of armaments.”

   Neither draft resolution was ever submitted. For the proposal introduced by the United States in Subcommittee 12 of the First Committee, A/C.1/SC.12/1, October 21, see p. 492.

8. Reference is to telegram Gadel 167, the text of which appears in footnote 2, p. 459.
9. R. G. Riddell, Alternate Member of the Canadian Delegation; Head of the United Nations Division of the Canadian Ministry of External Affairs.