IO Files: US(P)/A/M(Chr)/14
Minutes of the Fourteenth Meeting of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly, Hotel d’léna, Paris, October 11, 1948, 9:15 a. m.
[Here follows a list of persons (28) present.]
As the first order of business, Ambassador Austin extended the congratulations of the Delegation to Mrs. Roosevelt on the occasion of her birthday.
1. Developments on Atomic Energy
Mr. Blaisdell recalled that the various proposals on Atomic Energy were now in the hands of the drafting sub-committee of Committee 1.1 [Page 460] He called upon Mr. Osborn to report on the work already accomplished by this sub-committee. Mr. Osborn explained that the sub-committee had begun its work Friday.2 By noon the next day he thought that Malik3 (USSR) and Manuilsky (Ukraine) had talked the other members of the sub-committee into a state of mind where they wanted to vote as quickly as possible in favor of the majority plan.
He explained that the sub-committee was now discussing the Canadian draft resolution which had been somewhat modified but which was still the agreed text of France, the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States. He thought this would require fairly lengthy consideration, particularly because the USSR would try very hard to break down the resolve on the part of the majority not to return to further negotiations in the Atomic Energy Commission. Mr. Osborn proposed that no changes be accepted, no matter how long the Committee might be deadlocked in discussion, because any further changes would weaken the present resolution.
There was also the question whether some way should be left open to the USSR to return to the Atomic Energy Commission without accepting its First and Second Reports. Mrs. Roosevelt pointed out that, if it did not accept the two reports, the USSR would not have agreed to the principle of inspection.
Mr. Osborn indicated that both Australia and Belgium might be difficult in the final Committee discussions. Evatt (Australia) was now claiming that the United States had named the sub-committee. Ambassador Austin recalled that Mr. Protitch4 of the Secretariat, had shown him a list of states, which Spaak intended to appoint to the subcommittee. After looking the list over and handing it to his advisers, he indicated that the United States had no objections. Mr. Osborn noted that Czechoslavakia had been on the original list but the Ukraine had apparently been substituted at the request of the USSR, showing that the subcommittee had been appointed after consultation with both the United States and the USSR. Ambassador Austin inquired whether Australia was simply charging that the sub-committee was subject to United States domination. Mr. Osborn said Evatt claimed that the United States had deliberately kept Australia off the subcommittee. Mr. Ross believed this misunderstanding should be corrected firmly and immediately. It was agreed that Mr. Ross should speak to Hodgson5 (Australia) and explain the actual events surrounding the appointment of the sub-committee.
[Page 461]Mr. Gross asked whether Australia actually had a legitimate grievance on the merits, since it had submitted a proposal, and asked whether they might not still be added to the sub-committee. Mr. Raynor noted that there were other states which had made proposals, who were not on the sub-committee, and he thought nothing more should be done than simply tell the Australians what had happened. Mr. Rusk Said he believed it was important not to deny that Spaak had actually consulted with the United States; otherwise he might be put in an embarrassing position.
[Here follows discussion of the language of the Canadian draft resolution, A/C.1/308.]
2. Developments on Soviet Disarmament Proposal
Mr. Blaisdell noted that the Soviet proposal on disarmament6 was now under discussion by Committee 1. There were in the Delegation documents today the Soviet resolution, a British resolution,7 a draft Belgian resolution,8 and a Syrian amendment9 to the Soviet proposal. Mr. Johnson commented that the Committee’s consideration of this item had begun by what was perhaps Vyshinsky’s most bitter attack on the United States.10 There had been two speeches by the United Kingdom, several strong speeches by the Soviet bloc, and Syria and the Netherlands had also spoken. It was planned that the British would introduce their proposal today, which they had been informed the United States will support. The United States had prepared and was planning to make a strong speech, but instructions had been received from the Department asking that its presentation be postponed pending its consideration by the Secretary.11 Mr. Raynor said the British had been informed that we were not ready to speak at this [Page 462] time and had agreed that the strategy was to play for additional time. Ambassador Austin indicated that Vyshinsky might himself ask for more time after the British resolution was introduced in order to study that proposal. Mr. Popper12 noted that Luxembourg was listed to speak this morning. Ambassador Austin noted that Haiti wished to speak and had a resolution to propose.
Mr. Ross thought the situation might be eased if the sub-committee on atomic energy completed its work today so that its report could come before Committee 1 Tuesday. Mr. Osborn said the chairman of the sub-committee had expressed a willingness to hold night meetings, and he was optimistic that the sub-committee might finish at least by this evening.
Ambassador Austin asked for the views of the Delegation on the substance of the position taken in the United Kingdom resolution. Mr. Blaisdell pointed out that it had been carefully examined by the staff and already approved by the Delegation. Moreover, the British had been informed of our approval. It also appeared likely that the United States could support the Syrian resolution. Ambassador Austin stated the agreement of the Delegation that it would support the British and Syrian drafts but would withhold comment until further instructions were received from Washington.
Mr. Gross referred to the language in the penultimate paragraph of the British draft resolution, “in particular the principle that such regulation and reduction can only be put into effect in an atmosphere of international confidence and security”. In his opinion this language implied a relation between the existence of armaments and the general political atmosphere. Ambassador Austin explained that the phrase was intended to refer to the completion of certain preliminary conditions, including the peace treaties, the establishment of a system of control of atomic energy, organization of the Article 43 forces, and agreement by the USSR to a system of international inspection. Mr. Blaisdell noted that the idea could be traced back to the debates on this matter in the Security Council and the Commission for Conventional Armaments.
Mr. Dulles noted that there were two theories on disarmament. The first was to the effect that there must be established an atmosphere of international confidence before disarmament could be undertaken, while the second suggested that the presence of armaments themselves created a lack of international confidence. In his opinion the correct theory was probably a combination of both ideas. Certainly the competitive arms race was a problem. He noted that there were large foodies of public opinion in the United States which would consider [Page 463] this expression a one-sided view. He pointed out that the resolution on atomic energy was utterly irreconcilable with the British draft in this regard. Each took an opposite thesis and overstated it.
[Here follows additional discussion of the language of the British, draft resolution, A/C.1/319.]
- For an account of the work of the subcommittee, see its report, document A/C.1/333, in GA (III/1), First Committee, Annexes, pp. 16–20; see also editorial note, p. 473.↩
- October 8.↩
- Jacob A. Malik, Member of the Soviet Delegation; Deputy Foreign Minister and Permanent Soviet Representative at the United Nations.↩
- Dragoslav Protitch, Principal Director of the Department of Security Council Affairs, United Nations Secretariat.↩
- William R. Hodgson, member of the Australian Delegation; Australian Ambassador in France.↩
- For text, see telegram Delga 117, September 25, p. 431.↩
- The British draft resolution, A/C.1/319, October 10, expressed concern at the lack of progress achieved by the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, the Commission for Conventional Armaments, and the Military Staff Committee. The resolution attributed this failure to the refusal of certain members “to accommodate themselves to the views of the majority and to co-operate or indeed to participate fully in the work of the Organization in the political freld,” thus contributing to the existing world-wide sense of insecurity. The resolution concluded by urging “all nations, and particularly those constituting the minority in the Commission for Conventional Armaments, to co-operate to the utmost of their power” in the attainment of the objectives of the UNAEC, the CCA, and the MSC. For text, see (III/1), First Committee, Annexes, pp. 8–9.↩
- The Belgian draft resolution, A/C.1/323, proposed in the form of an amendment to the British draft resolution, is printed in GA (III/1), First Committee, Annexes, p. 11.↩
- The Syrian draft resolution, A/C.1/318, October 9, recommended to the Security Council that it continue its study of regulation and reduction of armaments through the Commission for Conventional Armaments; for text, see ibid., p. 8.↩
- For the record of the remarks by Vyshinsky at the 153rd Meeting of the First Committee, October 7, 3 p. m., see GA (III/1), First Committee, pp. 96–101.↩
- Reference is to telegram Gadel 167, October 10, the text of which is printed in footnote 2, p. 459.↩
- David H. Popper, Adviser, United States Delegation.↩