811.24553B/10–847

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Hickerson)

top secret
Participants: The Portuguese Ambassador,
Mr. Hickerson,
Mr. Reber.

The Portuguese Ambassador called this afternoon at my request to continue the conversation which he had had with Mr. Armour1 on September 27. I explained that I wanted to take this occasion to give him some of the background of our thinking and policy with respect to base and transit rights in the Azores as I had been closely associated with the formulation of the U.S. position in this matter. There are two separate aspects of the problem which had become confused and thereby might be creating some misunderstanding in his mind and possibly that of his government. I explained that I wanted to talk to him as frankly as he had talked to Mr. Armour and, as it were, off the record.

[Page 1041]

The matter which was now under discussion in Lisbon related only to our requirements for transit facilities for the period of occupation of Germany and Japan. We have suggested that the agreement last ten years in order to be sure that we could justify necessary expenditure in maintaining the facilities for which we were asking the Portuguese Government. No one at the time knew how long the occupation of Germany would last but these transit rights were required only in that connection.

The other aspect of the problem was the long-term base rights which we would like to obtain in the Azores and eventually in the Cape Verde Islands. These rights would in all likelihood provide joint operation by Portuguese and U.S. Governments. The facilities we would require might be similar to those which we had obtained from the British Government in some of the islands and which in no sense were considered a derogation of British sovereignty there. We fully understood the Portuguese preoccupation in this respect and had every intention of working out an arrangement with them fully safeguarding their sovereign rights.

In 1946 Mr. Byrnes had decided in connection with the long-term problem to send Mr. Russell, who was then Assistant Secretary of State, to Lisbon in order to explore this question with Dr. Salazar and the members of the Portuguese Government. Recognizing the Portuguese difficulties in respect to any such matter but also their interest in Atlantic security arrangements, we proposed at that time to give an assurance to the Portuguese Government to the effect that any threat to the territorial security of Portugal would contribute a threat to the security of the Atlantic. Should Portugal be the victim of aggression the U.S. by reason of the commitments under the United Nations is obliged to use force against any aggressor. Should the United Nations fail for any reason to act the U.S. would be prepared immediately to consult with Portugal in regard to the solution.

Dr. Salazar seemed profundly interested in this offer but the definite response of the Portuguese Government was disappointing. The Portuguese Government at that time had replied that any agreement on this subject should be limited to five years and that the desired base rights could only be granted in time of war and even then only if the United Kingdom were actually in the war on the same side as the United States. I explained briefly to the Ambassador why these conditions were not acceptable. It had then been decided in the light of this reply and of conditions existing at that time that it would be preferable to postpone further discussions with the Portuguese Government on this subject until a more appropriate time. We felt that both in our own interests and in the interests of the Portuguese Government such [Page 1042] delay would be advantageous but that we still believed that some such arrangement was important and would be glad to talk to the Portuguese Government at some later date which both governments considered opportune.

I then referred to the suggestion which the Ambassador had made to Mr. Armour concerning possibility of an arrangement with Portugal in line with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter.2 As the Ambassador was aware, there has been discussion in the press of this country as to agreements which might be reached probably on a multilateral basis to carry out the provisions of this article and that the matter was under study by the U.S. Government. We do not yet know what the result of this study would be. Personally it seemed to me to offer the best chance of providing the security which we had originally hoped the Charter itself would give when it was not expected that the veto would be used to nullify it. When this government had reached a decision on the matter I could state that Portugal’s suggestion in this matter would be given most sympathetic consideration.

The Ambassador said that he welcomed this frank explanation of U.S. position which would be most helpful indeed to him. He recognized that with regard to the long-term security problem which would involve the base rights this must now await the results of this year’s General Assembly. He was frankly concerned by its trend and feared that it might mark a very crucial point. He was worried that the American position had not been sufficiently understood in certain countries and that its leadership which was so important to the safety and security of the smaller countries was not being given the full recognition which it merited.

John Hickerson
  1. Norman Armour, Assistant Secretary of State for Political Affairs.
  2. Charter of the United Nations, June 26, 1945; for text, see Department of State Treaty Series No. 993, or 59 Stat. (pt. 2) 1031.