Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The British Commonwealth; Europe, Volume III

853B.7962/8–2547: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Portugal

secret

Washington, September 5, 1947—6 p. m.

648. Urtel 671 Aug 25. In connection with US commitments under May 30 Agreement and Kissner-Cintra Agreement following comments from War Dept may be useful to you in future conversations with FonOff:

A. The US has generously and conscientiously fulfilled spirit Kissner-Cintra Agreement as cordial relations prevailing at Lagens indicates.

B. In July 1945 US military complement in Azores was 2600. At time Kissner-Cintra Agreement concluded US detachment at Lagens was 440 military and 661 civilians (latter preponderantly Portuguese nationals). By Jan 1947 US military personnel had been reduced to 345 military and 590 civilians. Experience demonstrated this number inadequate to handle normal base functions, aircraft maintenance, technical facilities and creditably discharge training commitments. By July 1947 number was therefore necessarily increased to 550 military and 780 civilians.

C. Para 1 of Kissner-Cintra Agreement accomplished according to schedule; para 2, sale of supplies and equipment concluded to great financial benefit of Portuguese; para 3, assistance of US technical personnel at Santa Maria upon initial occupancy by Portuguese after US withdrawal was made freely despite critical US personnel shortages; paras 4 and 5, terms scrupulously observed including removal US flag from pole in soil to building at Portuguese request; paras 6 and 7, wholehearted cooperation between US and Portuguese authorities and mechanical training continues; para 8, US has submitted to over-all Portuguese control and yet bears major burden for operation of technical facilities; para 9a and b, operations conducted and training obligations being fulfilled; by June 1 it was recognized by all that training of weather reconnaissance personnel was insufficiently advanced to justify assumption of this responsibility by Portuguese military; para 9c, fully and generously fulfilled over and beyond letter of commitment, including better model aircraft than specified, and one-year supply spare parts; paras 10 and 11, scrupulously observed; para 12, full cooperation including assistance to Portuguese Navy in sea-rescue not specified; para 13, recognized by all that Portuguese training insufficiently advanced to adopt substitution for US personnel on scale envisaged this para; para 14, minor technical modification by local agreement; para 15, no comment; para 16, full cooperation.

Question of large-scale substitution of Portuguese for Americans is dependent upon continuous active training and cooperative effort over long period of time. As training for various functions completed gradual substitution of Portuguese for American personnel can of course take place. Estimated however some years will be required to complete training of sufficient number Portuguese up to required standards and to build up reserve pool adequate to guarantee sustained operation of field by Portuguese. Hence realistic approach to duration new agreement must take this into account and not contemplate a temporary expedient of 12–18 months.

Particular reference paras 8 and 9a and b USAF has spent three decades perfecting techniques and training personnel in highly technical matters but is willing to be placed under Portuguese control as long as ultimate responsibility for strictly technical functions rest with US personnel. Is further anxious to make available its skill and knowledge to Portuguese Air Force to indoctrinate its personnel over period of years until adequate number Portuguese reach general level of efficiency and experience to insure uninterrupted airport operation under all circumstances at standard comparable to those required by CAA.

Col Warren estimates 600 US military and civilians are required to guarantee sustained operations with current average work load and to continue to conduct present training. This figure is minimum consistent with our obligations. Since Lagens is vital link US air transport chain supporting occupation forces, it must be maintained at reasonably safe, efficient level. USAF must daily and hourly be prepared to reinforce occupational units, both in personnel and supplies. This may result in abnormal traffic loads. Peak loads can also arise from contingencies of weather and maintenance. Personnel, supplies and facilities must be predicated on anticipated maximum work load rather than average. If US capability cut due to unwise personnel reductions to point where unable to handle peak loads, such conditions would constitute direct and heavy financial and manpower burden on Portuguese.

Capabilities of present operation and servicing personnel means maximum of only six to eight modern four-engined aircraft can be handled in any twenty-four hour period. These are normally scheduled transports, weather reconnaissance and locally based aircraft. In event diversions are made from Santa Maria by commercial aircraft due to weather or USAF special missions by squadrons or groups are required to be handled in same twenty-four hour period, capability this personnel will be exceeded and backlog will develop.

Present stockpiles of US matériel and supplies, many of which are in critical shortage category, cannot be adequately preserved and safeguarded without sufficient personnel.… Health of community as well as aircraft maintenance and cooperation of technical services dependent upon regular measures to prevent deterioration of food, water and supplies.

US desires Port Govt be under no financial burden as result of use of transit privileges at Lagens by USAF or of imminent necessity rebuild housing and technical edifices in restricted area now used by US personnel. Only by continued US participation in operation of Lagens can assumption of financial burden by Portuguese be avoided.

Lovett