740.00119 Council/4–1047: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State
us urgent
1297. Delsec 1414. For the President, Vandenberg, Connally and Acheson from Marshall. 25th CFM meeting, April 10, Marshall presiding, continued discussion of the frontiers of Germany, including the future status of the Ruhr, the Rhineland and the Saar.
Bidault restated the French view that a special status for the Rhineland is essential to the security of France and the rest of Europe. In order to avoid mistakes made after the first World War, he insisted that the Rhineland be separated politically and economically from the rest of Germany and that military forces be stationed permanently in German territories on the left bank of the Rhine. He said that although France supported the draft Four Power treaty proposed by the US for the disarmament of Germany, the French plan for the Rhineland was necessary in addition, as a concrete guarantee against future German aggression.
Bidault said France demanded the internationalization of the Ruhr and opposed an increase in the level of Germany’s peacetime industry unless this condition is met. He said the international regime proposed for the Ruhr would issue general directives to the German managers of the coal mines and the steel plants. Ownership of the basic Ruhr industries would be transferred to the Allied states. The area would be separated economically and politically from Germany.36
Bevin reaffirmed his position that as long as Germany is not treated as an economic unit during the occupation period he opposes any special regime or arrangement for the Ruhr. He added that when it was decided not to “pastoralize” Germany, he concluded that German [Page 324] industry would contribute to the well-being of all Europe. He said that any dismemberment of Germany, including the creation of a special regime for the Ruhr, would create agitation for a United Germany which the Allies would find difficult to control. He insisted that during the occupation period the Ruhr must be treated the same as all other parts of Germany. He said he believed the proposed Four Power treaty would better protect the security of the Allies when the occupation ends than would the separation of the Ruhr from Germany as the French wished. No statement on the ultimate status of the Ruhr, he added, could be made now but he hoped Ruhr industries could be reoriented in such a way that they would become an asset for all Europe.
With reference to the Rhineland, Bevin opposed separation of this area from Germany adding that a preferable solution was long-term occupation by the Allies. He pointed out that the Saar was a special case, that the British supported French claims to this area. Regarding the territorial claims of other Allied states, Bevin said these merit consideration. He said the British Government, at the time that the Netherlands was flooded, had promised to support certain Dutch territorial claims. He pointed out that it was important in fixing Germany’s new frontiers to leave Germany in a position to develop eventually into a balanced democratic state able to make its contribution to the family of nations.
Marshall told the Council (full text cabled Department37) that the economic resources of the Ruhr raise two problems: (1) how to ensure against the militant use of these resources by a revived Germany; (2) how to assure that these resources will be equitably employed in the interests of European states, including Germany. He agreed with Bevin that during the occupation period no special regime for the Ruhr is necessary. He said that questions about the use of these resources should be settled on a European-wide basis and suggested that they be handled by the Economic Commission for Europe. He asked that agreement be reached to allocate essential commodities from the Ruhr and other areas on basis of two principles: (1) equitable distribution of commodities in short supply; and (2) access to commodities on non-discriminatory basis.
Marshall referred to his great interest in Germany’s boundaries which was based on the fact the US had twice been forced to send its military forces across the Atlantic in wars which started in Europe. He said the Council’s task was to make a peace settlement which as a whole the people of Europe will want to maintain and not to break. [Page 325] He expressed his hope that the new boundaries claim to permanency will be based on foundations other than force alone. With regard to the territorial claims of other Allied states, Marshall said he did not think these should be discussed by the Council now but that they merited consideration later.38
Marshall supported the claims of France to have the Saar detached politically from Germany and to have it integrated with the French economic and financial system (full text cabled Department). He suggested that the Saar be taken from the jurisdiction of the Allied Control Council immediately and placed under French jurisdiction subject to an adjustment of the French reparations claim.39
Bidault presented a detailed proposal on the regime for the Saar including a customs and monetary union with France, the withdrawal of the area from Germany and from ACC jurisdiction, a Saar constitution providing considerable local autonomy and a French high commissioner with limited powers. France would be responsible for foreign affairs and the defense of the area. Bidault asked immediate agreement on this question, and added that in principle France supported the territorial claims of other Allied states including Luxembourg, Belgium, the Netherlands and Czechoslovakia.40
The Council will hear Molotov on these questions tomorrow.
Department please pass to Vienna as 32, Rome as 29, and Paris as 127.
Sent Department 1297; repeated London 145, Berlin 249.
- For the texts of Foreign Minister Bidault’s statements on the Rhineland and the Ruhr, which were circulated to the Council as documents CFM(47) (M)118 and 119, April 10, 1947, see Déclarations de Bidault, pp. 36–40, or Documents on International Affairs 1947–1948, pp. 406–70.↩
- For the text of Secretary Marshall’s statement on the Ruhr, circulated to the Council as document CFM(47) (M)115, April 10, 1947, see Germany 1947–1949, pp. 329–330, or Department of State Bulletin, April 20, 1947, pp. 694–695.↩
- For the text of Secretary Marshall’s statement on the problem of boundaries summarized in this paragraph, see Department of State Bulletin, April 20, 1947, p. 696.↩
- For the text of Secretary Marshall’s statement on the Saar, circulated to the Council as document CFM(47) (M) 116, April 10, 1947, see Germany 1947–1949, p. 148, or Department of State Bulletin, April 20, 1947, pp. 695–696.↩
- For the text of Foreign Minister Bidault’s statement on the Saar, circulated to the Council as document CFM(47) (M)120, April 10, 1947, see Déclarations de Bidault, pp. 40–42, or Documents on International Affairs 1947–1948, pp. 470–471. For the text of the French proposal for a regime for the Saar, circulated to the Council as document CFM(47) (M)114, April 10, 1947, see Déclarations de Bidault, pp. 42–43.↩