Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, Council of Foreign Ministers; Germany and Austria, Volume II

740.00119 Council/4–947: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

confidential
us urgent

Moscow, April 9, 1947—11 p.m.

1274. Delsec 1408. For the President, Vandenberg, Connally and Acheson, from Marshall: Twenty-fourth CFM, 9th April, Molotov presiding, first heard Murphy present report of deputies on views of Allied States, as developed in London, on preparation of a peace treaty with Germany.²⁸ It was agreed that report be noted with understanding that pertinent portions thereof would be considered in subsequent discussions of related agenda items.

Marshall then delivered statement on the Polish-German frontier (full text cabled in clear),²⁹ pointing out importance to peace of dealing with problem in interest of Europe as a whole. He recognized that some long-German territory must be ceded to Poland, and pointed out economic and political factors that must affect final decision. He stated that southern East Prussia and German upper Silesia (including its industrial complex) should become Polish, but with adequate safeguards to assure availability of its coal and other resources to help sustain economy of Europe. The division of remaining territory, he felt, being largely agricultural land, requires consideration of needs of Polish and German peoples and Europe as a whole. Marshall then proposed establishment of special boundary commission to function under direction of deputies, composed of representatives of four Council nations, Poland, and a convenient number from other Allied States to be designated by CFM. The commission, he said, should recommend to CFM:

1. A revision of pre-war Polish-German boundaries which will compensate Poland for cession of territory east of Curzon Line to Soviet Union; and

2. The economic arrangements appropriate to assure that those raw materials and heavy industrial resources vital to European economy shall fairly serve that need, including particularly need of Poland.

Bidault pointed out that if a logical approach to problems of Germany had been pursued by CFM, the Council would have discussed German boundaries before attempting to agree on political or economic considerations affecting territory within such boundaries. He said that provisional agreements at Potsdam, which he was not prepared to interpret, appeared to be already permanently accepted as to boundaries, and he would not attempt to thwart those Allies (Poland and Soviet Union) who had suffered so much in the war. We cannot expect, Bidault continued, that any German Government will accept the present de facto boundaries willingly without a twinge of revenge or chauvinism; nor can we tolerate in the center of Europe an over-populated Germany confined in too narrow bounds. From a security viewpoint, Bidault said, the French proposals on Ruhr and Rhineland should be seriously considered. We should therefore proceed to avoid an opportunity for Germans to take advantage of Allied dissension on boundaries. Bidault then proposed that we consider the overall boundary principles at CFM, then arrange for deputies to consider views of all those countries bounding on Germany, and report to CFM at their next session, whenever that may be. Bevin said he had given much thought to problem, and was convinced that all Allied nations were greatly concerned, from a long range world security view, in any final settlement of German frontiers. He pointed out that problem was strategic, racial, and political, and any historian would sympathize with Poland’s troubles through the past 150 years. Is it logical, he queried, to reduce Germany’s territory to point where she can do nothing but revert to an industrial economy? We must find a way to make available to Germany a greater agricultural potential for preliminary resurgence of her war potential. He suggested, purely for preliminary study, a somewhat confused idea on the area between the western and eastern Niesse, without making clear just what he proposed to do with it. Finally, he could not associate himself with Marshall’s proposal because it would solve only one part of the German frontier problem. He then proposed that the deputies be directed to prepare a complete study on the entire German boundary question, with due regard to views of all concerned, and that until a decision was reached, no further population transfers be made.³⁰

Molotov said that at both Crimea and Potsdam we had made obligations and taken decisions on western boundaries of Poland the force of which could not be doubted. Poland readily agreed, he stated, to transfer to Soviets of Eastern portions of Poland because the inhabitants wanted to join their Byelo-Russian and Ukrainian brothers. There was no question at Potsdam of recompense to Poland on her western frontier because of losses on her eastern border. Molotov then quoted figures and made statements which proved irrefutably (to his satisfaction only) that the existing western boundary of Poland was an agreed permanent frontier, and that any change therein would be a failure to respect the obligations made by our heads of government at Potsdam. He flatly rejected Marshall’s proposal for a commission, and said that Poland would diligently provide proper economic arrangements.³¹

Marshall said Molotov’s statement as to finality of Potsdam was in complete disagreement with meaning of English language and statements made by President of United States. Furthermore, he said, on July 21, 1945, according to US minutes, Generalissimo Stalin himself had made a statement to the effect “until the Polish boundaries are finally set”.³² He again quoted Stalin to show that the mixed population along German-Polish frontier was a condition of the moment caused by war movements at that time and that it was on this clear understanding, in plain English that President Truman accepted as a fact that Potsdam was not a final settlement of Polish boundary.

Bevin then quoted Stalin on 31 July 1945 as clearly stating that the Polish boundary was not to be considered final, but that this was a matter for the peace settlement.³³ Bevin then said he was not prepared to go back on Potsdam, and associated himself with Marshall’s proposal as amended by Bevin, that a study of the frontiers be made.

Molotov then quoted the President’s radio address of 9 August 1945,³⁴ to show that there was no doubt that the United States accepted the Polish boundary as permanent.

Marshall pointed out that President was referring to general considerations of Poland’s eventual western boundaries, but that actual whereabouts was for peace settlement. He then quoted Bevin, Byrnes and Stalin in conversation of 31 July 1945 to clinch the then agreed understanding.³⁵

Bidault said it was unfortunate a French representative had not been present at Potsdam so that a disinterested, unbiased, and correct interpretation would be available. He then quoted official French statements to prove his understanding that German boundaries are provisional only. He felt boundary problems should not be referred to committee until further discussion on principles had occurred.

Molotov said Stalin’s quotes actually proved the Soviet position as stated by Molotov.

The meeting then adjourned.

Repeated London as 142, Berlin as 241.

Department please pass to Vienna as 31, Rome as 28 and Paris as 125.

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Marshall

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28. For the text of the Report of the Deputies, document CFM(D) (47) (G)70, February 25, 1947, see p. 40.
29. For the text of Secretary Marshall’s statement, circulated to the Council as document CFM(47) (M)110, April 9, 1947, see Germany 1947–1949, pp. 146–148, or Department of State Bulletin, April 20, 1947, pp. 693–694.
30. For the text of Foreign Minister Bidault’s statement, circulated to the Council as document CFM(47) (M)112, April 9, 1947, see Déclarations de Bidault, pp. 34–36.
31. For the details of Foreign Minister Molotov’s statement, see Molotov, Problems of Foreign Policy, pp. 418–424.
32. At this point in the discussion, Secretary Marshall was quoting from the Department of State Minutes of the Fifth Plenary Meeting of the Berlin Conference, July 21, 1945; see Foreign Relations, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945, vol. ii, p. 209.
33. Regarding the Stalin statement cited by Bevin, see the Cohen Notes of the 11th Plenary Meeting of the Berlin Conference, July 31, 1945, ibid., p. 534.
34. For the text of the President’s radio address on the Berlin Conference, see Department of State Bulletin, August 12, 1945, p. 208.
35. At this point Secretary Marshall quoted from the Department of State Minutes of the 11th Plenary Meeting of the Berlin Conference, Foreign Relations, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945, vol. ii, p. 519. Marshall quoted the first four paragraphs of the page cited.