740.00119 Council/4–1147: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State
urgent
1320. Delsec 1416. For the President, Vandenberg, Connally and Acheson from Marshall. Twenty-sixth CFM Meeting, April 11, Bidault presiding, continued discussion of the future status of the Saar, [Page 326] the Ruhr and the Rhineland. Molotov said a decision on the French claim to the Saar must be taken and that Bidault’s proposal merited study. He added that the Soviet Union could not approve any action aimed at separating the Ruhr and the Rhineland from Germany because the German people cannot be deprived of their state by dismemberment.
Referring to Marshall’s proposal on the resources of the Ruhr, Molotov said the USSR agreed that this question should be approached from the points of view of (1) International security, and (2) The future use of these resources. He disagreed with Marshall’s statement that a special quadripartite regime for the Ruhr was not necessary during the occupation period. He recalled that at Potsdam it was agreed that the Council of Foreign Ministers would discuss later, when a representative of France was present, the Soviet proposal to create a special quadripartite regime for the Ruhr. He said this discussion had not yet taken place and asked that the Soviet plan for this area be accepted now. He added that it was wrong for this area to remain under exclusive British control and that the fusion of the US-UK zones had resulted in placing the Ruhr under the control of two powers without the consent of France and the USSR. He accused the US and UK of having separated western Germany from the rest of Germany and of having unilaterally initiated a policy of dismembering Germany. He said this situation was unsatisfactory to the Soviet Union. He alleged that the equitable distribution among all allied states, including Germany, of coal and steel from the Ruhr cannot be insured under the fusion agreement but must be done by the Allied Control Council on which the four occupying powers are represented. He charged that the US and UK are now using the resources of the Ruhr to advance their own interests to the detriment of the other allies.
Concerning Marshall’s reference to the future use of the resources of Upper Silesia, Molotov said this subject could not be discussed by the Council because to do so would be to interfere in the internal affairs of Poland. He said he would not comment now on the territorial claims of the other allies but that these claims merited study.41
Marshall said the US favored quadripartite control for all Germany, including the Ruhr, but opposed a separate regime for the Ruhr. He said the effective block to quadripartite control of all Germany was the failure to achieve economic unity in Germany. He added that he could not accept the logic of Molotov’s conclusion regarding the bizonal agreement which was forced on the US and UK by the economic dislocation growing out of the failure to treat Germany as an economic [Page 327] unit. He said the US desires the early realization of economic unity which would automatically bring about four power control of the Ruhr.
Bevin said the British had tried to carry out Potsdam but that the Control Council for Germany had been prevented from functioning properly, thereby forcing the UK to join with the US in uniting their zones. He said the US and UK did not take the first step in creating this situation and blamed the Soviet Union for causing the breakdown in the quadripartite allocation of German commodities. He said no state could make a monopoly of its zone and then demand specific rights in other zones. He said the British wanted to return to the original aims of the Control Council which would end present Allied difficulties in Germany.
Bidault demanded that a decision on the Saar be taken now and asked the Council to appoint a committee of experts to work out the details of the economic incorporation of the Saar into France. Molotov said he would study Bidault’s proposal which appeared justified. Marshall said he agreed insofar as Bidault’s plan conformed with the US proposal presented yesterday, and Bevin said British position in general was clear but that the decision on the exact frontier should be referred to the boundary commission to be established.
Bidault stated the French position on the territorial claims of Luxemburg, The Netherlands, Belgium and Czechoslovakia and then discussed the Franco-German boundary. He proposed that all territorial claims be referred to the deputies who would set up special frontier committees. Bevin agreed as long as all frontiers of Germany, east and west, be considered.42 Molotov objected to referring the Polish-German frontier to a committee since he said this was settled at Potsdam but agreed that the other territorial claims should be referred for study. Marshall accepted in principle the procedure proposed by Bevin. Bidault said agreement had not been reached on this subject since the the competence of the boundary committees to study the eastern frontier of Germany was in dispute. The Council then discussed the Coordination Committee report on central administrative agencies, the German advisory council and the future provisional German government.43 Disagreement arose over whether the German central agencies should be managed by German state secretaries, as agreed at Potsdam and insisted on by the Soviet Union, or by German executive committees, as suggested by the French as supported by the US and [Page 328] UK. Molotov refused to accept the change because he claimed it involved a departure from a decision taken at Potsdam. He rejected Bevin’s attempt to compromise the difference. Marshall said that in the light of the facts, Molotov’s allegation that the US and UK apparently want to walk away from the Potsdam decision hardly seems a serious argument. He rejected Molotov’s comparison between the power of the US Secretary and that of the proposed German state secretaries by pointing out that the US was not under an Allied Control Council nor has it ever been considered an enemy of democracy or a menace to civilization. The Council then adjourned.
Department please pass to Vienna as 34, Rome as 30 and Paris as 129.
Repeated London 146, Berlin 252.
- For the text of Molotov’s statement on the Ruhr, the Rhineland, and the Saar, circulated to the Council as document CFM(47) (M)123, April 11, 1947, see Molotov, Problems of Foreign Policy, pp. 425–433.↩
- For the text of Bidault’s statement on frontier rectifications claimed by several Allied countries, circulated to the Council as document CFM (47) (M) 124, April 11, 1947, see Déclarations de Bidault, pp. 43–45.↩
- For the text of the Coordinating Committee document CFM (47) (M) 121, April 11, 1947, see p. 436.↩