Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, Council of Foreign Ministers; Germany and Austria, Volume II

740.00119 Council/4–847: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

confidential
us urgent

Moscow, April 8, 1947—midnight.

1263. Delsec 1405. For the President, Vandenberg, Connally and Acheson, from Marshall: Twenty-third CFM meeting, April 8, Bevin presiding, discussed the division of powers between the proposed German Provisional Government and the State (Laender) Government.²³ The US, UK and French delegations agreed that all powers should be vested in the States except such as are expressly delegated to the Central Government. Molotov insisted that the Central Government have authority to assume responsibility for fulfilling Germany’s obligations to the Allied states.²⁴ Marshall and Bevin attempted without success to get Molotov to agree that the Allied Control Council for Germany would be responsible for seeing that Germany fulfilled its obligations during the provisional period of the Central German Government.

Marshall stated that the US delegation believes the division of powers should be left to a German constitutional convention, and that the framers of this constitution should be given only the most general instructions. He said the Council should do no more on this subject than agree on the general requirement that such powers as police, internal security, culture, education, and religious affairs should not be delegated to the Central Government. He added that he did not think a detailed enumeration of the powers to be granted to the Central Government merited consideration of the Council. The other Ministers then discussed this subject at some length.

Agreement in principle was reached by Bevin, Bidault and Molotov that the Central Government should be competent to adopt legislative and executive measures in order to ensure the unity necessary in the political, legal, economic and financial fields. During this discussion Molotov met British and French objections to several Soviet proposals by making three concessions. The only important one dealt with the power of the Central Government to establish “security police”, which Molotov agreed to delete. A discussion of whether the Central Government is to have an all-German budget resulted in a compromise which will strictly limit the items included. All the clauses were sent back to committee for redrafting and in an attempt to overcome French reservations on parts of several phrases.

Bevin suggested that the Council refrain from discussing the powers to be reserved to the State Governments since the positions of the delegations (see report on 22 CFM meeting²⁵) were so divergent that no agreement could now be reached.

The Council then considered the report of the deputies on the statement made to them by representatives of the Inter-Allied Reparations Agency.²⁶ The deputies had decided that it was not necessary for the Council to hear additional statements of the agency. Bidault proposed and Molotov agreed:

1. That the Council should decide that the removals of plants from Germany should be resumed immediately, whether or not the level of German industry was raised.

2. That the process of evaluating and allocating removals should be simplified and expedited and an office of reparations created to work under the Allied Control Council, and

3. That the Council should revive the Allied Reparations Commission.²⁷

Marshall stated that the IARA report indicated an early agreement should be reached on the level of industry. He said the US was prepared to expedite reparation deliveries but that practical difficulties stood in the way of the quick resumption of removals. He said he opposed reviving the Reparations Commission, but would study Bidault’s proposal. Bevin urged that the Council note the IARA report and deal with it when the Council again discusses the entire problem of reparations, “if it does”.

Molotov accused the US and UK of not carrying out the Potsdam decision regarding the Reparations Commission. Bevin replied that Soviet obligations to the Western Powers contained in the Potsdam protocol had not been fulfilled and joined with Marshall in denying that the US and UK were responsible for the failure of the Reparations Commission to do any work.

Discussion of tomorrow’s agenda was so confused by Molotov that Bevin asked him if his tactics were an attempt to keep the Council from reaching the end of the agenda agreed on for this session. Marshall stated that it is of first importance to get on with the agenda and to pass over disagreements. He said that if time affords, the Council can return to discuss the disagreements. He urged the Council to exchange general views on all subjects on its agenda which would be valuable for the deputies or for the next Council meeting, adding that to continue discussing disagreements leads the Council nowhere.

Repeated London 140, Berlin 236.

Department please pass to Vienna as 30, Rome as 26 and Paris as 122.

[

Marshall

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23. Under consideration by the Council at this point was the Report of the Coordinating Committee, document CFM(47) (M)105 (Revised), April 8, 1947, not printed. For the subsequent redraft of the Report, see Section E of document CFM(47) (M)121, April 11, 1947, p. 436.
24. For the texts of the statements made by Foreign Minister Molotov at this and other points of the Council meeting, see Molotov, Speeches and Statements at Moscow, pp. 74–77.
25. Ante, p. 313.
26. For the text of the Report, document CFM(47) (M)98, April 3, 1947, see p. 434.
27. For the text of Bidault’s proposals, see Déclarations de Bidault, pp. 27–28.