740.00119 Council/4–847
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State21
I called on Mr. Bevin today at the British Embassy at 12:30 and remained until 2 p.m., lunching with him, just the two of us.
I requested the interview in order to discuss with him the procedure we had best follow from now on in the meetings of the Foreign Ministers. It became apparent to me yesterday, and also to him, I found, that if we continued the present process, our time would run out before we even reached the Austrian treaty. We therefore agreed that so far as was within our control we would follow the policy of shortening discussions, making no comments other than were absolutely necessary, and insisting on passing over the items thus covered and leaving them [Page 316] for future decision, the Conference going on to the next item on the agenda. I stipulated two exceptions to this procedure: one would be the four-power pact on the agenda and the other the Austrian treaty. These we would discuss at length in the hope of reaching an agreement and concluding these matters.
Mr. Bevin stated that he felt that unless we followed some such course as that above indicated, there would be no hope of completing the Austrian treaty, which we both regarded as a very important issue to be completed at this meeting.
Mr. Bevin then, on his own initiative, discussed several issues.
He generalized on what might be the best procedure in the event, as now seemed practically certain, that we had to fall back for the time being on a bi-zonal procedure. He thought we should immediately endeavor to determine a new level of industry and suggested again ten million tons of steel as the basis of departure for the investigation. He thought it very important that the German people should have a clear indication that we were endeavoring to clear up this matter in as short a time as possible. Mr. Bevin also stated that we should determine, following this information of the level of industry, what plants could be dismantled and released for reparations payments. He thought it important that this be done without further delay, both to the West and to the East.
He then turned to the question of prisoners, outlining the importance of having definite data on which to base the development of arrangements for their reception in our zones in Germany. Accepting the necessity for the prompt determination of this data, I questioned Mr. Bevin as to the British attitude regarding the return of prisoners, stating the American position that an early return was earnestly desired by the American people and explaining that we were bringing pressure on the French for the prompt return of those prisoners that we had turned over to them. I explained that I was desirous, in an informal way, of getting the real attitude of the British Government and the British people in this matter and their views of the American position, we not having sustained any family [sic] or structural losses during the war.
Mr. Bevin stated the British felt that it was very important to hold these prisoners for several reasons. In the first place, so long as Great Britain maintained over a million men in the service, the shortage of manpower was a serious matter and the German situation was responsible in a large measure for this shortage; therefore, it was only just that these German male prisoners be utilized to meet the dilemma. He stated that they were being treated well, that a normal wage was being paid by the employer to the Government, so that the employer derived [Page 317] no profit from the employment of prison labor greater than that from the employment of ordinary British labor. He also stated that their figure for the return of 20,000 a month was also, in addition to the fare-going considerations, based on the fact that there were not accommodations for these men in the British zone and the construction of accommodations did not admit of a more rapid return.
Mr. Bevin then turned to the questions of reparations and stated that he would send me a paper on this shortly in relation to that aspect that we had discussed previously in the Conference, based on recompensing the Allies concerned for the loss of such allocated plants as were held in Germany in order to raise the level of industry. He stated that personally he was not bound down to a fixed thing in this matter, that he was becoming of the opinion, particularly through the statements of a Canadian adviser, that reparations out of capital goods or equipment had not proved a profitable procedure, that the expenditures required to transfer the plant equipment and to set it up were prohibitive, that much of the machinery was rapidly deteriorating though the Soviets were trying to grease and box a portion of this, but that altogether the transfer of capital equipment had proved a failure. At the same time he felt that we could not any longer delay the resumption of these transfers, particularly the Western Allies.
We discussed the cost of the military forces which Great Britain and the United States would have to maintain in Germany in the absence of quadripartite agreements, and certainly during the period of bi-zonal procedure, compared with the expenditures in which we might become involved if any procedure on the basis of reparations out of current production were admitted. It seemed to both of us that it was very important to reach some understanding which would permit the prompt reduction of military forces; otherwise, these expenditures would dwarf the obligations for direct appropriations to meet the deficiency in the standard of living of the German people.
Mr. Bevin said he would send me a paper, at my request, regarding the point introduced at our previous meeting22 regarding a British setup at Singapore, for which an American liaison representative was desired.
- In telegram 1308, Kosmos 30, April 11, from Moscow, not printed, Secretary Marshall asked Acting Secretary Acheson to see that President Truman had an opportunity to read the memoranda of conversations which the Secretary periodically forwarded to Washington, particularly the memorandum printed here.↩
- See ante, p. 309.↩