740.00119 Council/4–847: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State
urgent
1236. Delsec 1398. For the President, Vandenberg, Connally and Acheson, from Marshall: Twenty-second CFM meeting, April 7, Bidault presiding, continued discussion of the functions of the German Advisory Council.18 The only agreement reached, and that subject to redrafting, was that the Advisory Council should advise the Control Council for Germany on the general aspects of the work of the central administrative agencies. When the discussion turned to other functions of the Advisory Council, Marshall stated that the US delegation agreed to the preparation of a provisional constitution on the understanding that the constitution would be general in nature and would contain no more than the minimum required to operate the provisional government for the short time needed for the preparation of a permanent constitution.
[Page 314]Molotov proposed that “the rights and powers of both the German provisional government and of the Laender governments should be defined in the constitution”.19 Bevin objected on the ground that the powers of the German central government should be clearly limited and that the remainder of the powers should be left to the German states in order to prevent the creation of a centralized government such as existed under Hitler. Marshall stated that the US delegation desired to avoid setting up a central government of a nature that might be converted readily into an autocratic government. He said the central government should be built on the structure of the Laender rather than the reverse. (See report on eleventh CFM meeting March 2120)
Molotov repeated his view that the Allies should not decide whether Germany should be a federal or a centralized state but that this choice should be made by the German people in a plebiscite. He proposed for the first time that a date for the plebiscite be fixed as soon as possible.
Bevin firmly opposed Molotov’s proposal which he said he could not accept. He recalled that the German people had twice in the recent past backed a centralized Germany and that for security reasons he would not agree to permitting the Germans to decide a question which it was the Allies’ responsibility to settle. Bidault agreed, adding that the holding of a plebiscite throughout Germany would mean that Germany was unified, not for the voting period but for good. Marshall stated that we cannot assume at the present time or in the immediate future that the German people are prepared to act intelligently on this question. He cited the difficulties involved in drafting a provisional constitution, such as (1) playing politics with the German people as the tool, and (2) permitting the German people to take the lead in organizing a government along a line which we regard as highly dangerous to the peace of the world. He referred to the original US proposal which provided for (1) a German charter to be adopted by the Allied Control Council, (2) the drafting of a permanent constitution by the Advisory Council to be approved by ACC, and (3) a plebiscite on the permanent constitution. He said this plan avoids difficulties already encountered in introducing the proposal to draft a provisional constitution. Molotov said he had no apprehensions about a plebiscite since it dealt with a question involving German internal affairs, adding that it would be wrong for the Allies to impose a system of government on the Germans.
Since no agreement on this section appeared possible, the Council turned to consideration of the establishment of the provisional German [Page 315] government. The question of holding elections after the approval of the provisional constitution by ACC was referred back to the Coordination Committee after an exchange of widely different views and after Bevin had suggested that the CFM postpone a decision on this question until its next session rather than hold up the creation of the German Advisory Council because of the disagreement over elections.
A discussion of the functions of the provisional government and the relationship between the provisional government and the Allied Control Council was passed over after a preliminary exchange of views indicated that agreement was not now possible. Bevin opposed sending this subject back to the Coordination Committee since he said the views of the Ministers were too far apart to attempt to reconcile them.
In order to give the Coordination Committee more time on its report concerning the division of powers between the central German government and the Laender, Marshall proposed that the Council go on to the next item on its agenda. Molotov opposed this suggestion. Bevin said he had been in Moscow for four weeks and done nothing so he didn’t care what the Council discussed next. He added that there are fourteen items left on the CFM agenda. Bidault, as chairman, ruled that the Council would take up tomorrow the committee report on division of powers.
Repeated London 133, Berlin 277.
Department please pass to Vienna as 27, to Rome as 24, and to Paris as 114.
- At this meeting the Council continued its consideration, begun at its previous meeting, of the Report of the Coordinating Committee to the Council, document CFM(47) (M)101, April 4, not printed. For the subsequent redraft of the Committees Report, see document CFM(47) (M)121, April 11, 1947, p. 436.↩
- For the Soviet account of this Council meeting, including long quotations from the statements made by Foreign Minister Molotov, see Molotov, Speeches and Statements at Moscow, pp. 69–74.↩
- For the report under reference, see telegram 927, Delsec 1330, March 21, from Moscow, p. 270.↩