IO Files: US/A/M(Chr)757
Minutes of the Thirteenth Meeting of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly, New York, October 1, 1947, 9:15 a.m.
[Here follow the list of persons (33) present and a discussion of the voting for Security Council membership in the General Assembly on September 30.]
Ambassador Austin said that late in the previous day’s meeting he had talked with Faris Bey El-Khouri of Syria1 who said in effect that there were twelve votes for India and inquired whether it was possible to move ten. If not, would the United States stick with India? Was the United States willing to run the risk of making the United Nations look ridiculous? The Ambassador said that he had replied that the United States position would not be known until the next day. Thus the matter stood. He calculated that if India had the Arabs, the Dominions, the United Kingdom, and the United States, it conservatively had a solid nineteen votes. If all the Latins went the other way and did not shift in the next one or two ballots then no matter what was said they were strongly for the Ukraine.
Mr. Dulles said the Latin Americans were voting as a bloc in their own interests. Ambassador Austin observed that the Ukraine would win on the next ballot if the Arabs made up their minds to change. He would not be surprised to see them shift. It was difficult for a great country to shift at this stage, however, and he was sorry we had taken the position we did. He thought it was bringing nothing but harm to the United States and that it was going to be accused of blocking the Soviets. He noted that the question had been decided two weeks ago and said that he personally could not change with a good conscience, although he had first taken a position in favor of the Ukraine. He thought that the United States should stand firm and, if asked, should say it was going to stay with the Indian candidacy.
Mr. Stevenson inquired whether India could be persuaded to withdraw and thus prevent an aggravation of the situation. Mr. Raynor reported that the United Kingdom discovered yesterday afternoon that [Page 150] India was going to stand firm. Mr. Kopper reported that the Middle East and Far East Offices of the Department desired that the present slate be supported.
Mr. Sandifer said that the press had a statement from Mrs. Pandit saying that India would have to stand firm because otherwise a whole area of the world would be unrepresented.
Secretary Marshall turned to Senator Vandenberg2 and remarked that he had sat in on the Rio discussions3 and asked his opinion on the present matter. Senator Vandenberg replied that he had no comment, for he was not sufficiently familiar with the question. He said that he would be inclined to look for a candidate upon which all could unite and asked about the possibility of Czechoslovakia. Mr. Sandifer replied that it was not possible to vote for Czechoslovakia because under the rules only the two top runners-up could be voted for to elect the last Member of the Council.
The Secretary said that the decision involved whether or not the United States should use its influence to try to break the Latin American bloc. He did not think that should be done. He thought there was a limited chance for such a move to succeed. He did not think the Delegation should try to persuade India to drop out. That would be a very complicated maneuver with dangerous possibilities. He thought a vote should be cast for India and nothing be said about it.
Mr. Ross observed that the Delegation needed flexibility in case of a deadlock. The Secretary replied that he expected a deadlock. Mr. Stinebower inquired if a deadlock arose whether about seven of those who were voting for India might be induced to abstain. Mr. Dulles said that he did not think the situation could be met by devious methods. He observed wryly that it seemed that United States support was the kiss of death in the General Assembly, for there were twenty votes against the United States.
The Secretary said that better preparation on the slates was needed for the next Assembly. He thought it would be most unfortunate if we entered a situation in which there was a small chance of succeeding as in the present one which painted the United States very badly.
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Mr. Stevenson thought that the situation had been made difficult because the United States had pushed Czechoslovakia for the Security [Page 151] Council against its will. Ambassador Austin said that that was the real trouble.
The Secretary inquired what was suggested if on two ballots the deadlock were not broken. Mr. Dulles said that he would stay with India until further developments made it necessary to reconsider. He said he did not feel that after going so far he would desert India.
The Secretary said that as matters now stood the United States would vote for India and, if asked, it must say that it is voting for India.4
[Here follows brief discussion of another subject.]
- Chairman of the Syrian Delegation to the General Assembly.↩
- Senator Arthur H. Vanderiberg, Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate, was present apparently as a guest Senator Vandenberg had been a Representative of the United States to the General Assembly at the London and New York meetings of the First Session of the General Assembly in 1946.↩
- The reference is to that Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Continental Peace and Security which met at Rio de Janiero August 15–September 2, 1947. Senator Vandenberg was a United States delegate to the conference. For documentation on this conference, see vol. viii, pp. 1 ff.↩
- The October 1 balloting in the General Assembly continued the deadlock between the Ukraine and India; see GA (II), Plenary, pp. 328 and 329.↩