Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, General; The United Nations, Volume I

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Minutes of a Meeting of the Combined Policy Committee at the Department of State, December 10, 1947, 4 p.m.

December 10, 1947, 4 p.m.

top secret

Present:	Members
	The Acting Secretary of State (in the Chair) as alternate for the Secretary of State
	The Secretary of Defense
	The Chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission
	The British Ambassador, Lord Inverchapel
	Sir Gordon Munro
	The Canadian Ambassador, Mr. Plume Wrong, as alternate for Mr. C. D. Howe
	By Invitation
	Dr. Bush
	Mr. Kennan
	Mr. Wilson
	Mr. Volpe
	Admiral Sir Henry Moore
	Mr. Rickett
	Dr. Woodward1
	Mr. Mackenzie2
	Mr. Bateman3
	Mr. Ignatieff4
	Secretariat
	Mr. Maclean
	Mr. Stone
	Mr. Gullion

I. Minutes of Meeting of February 3, 1947⁵

The Minutes were approved.

II. Resignations and New Appointments.

The Committee had before it a paper by the Joint Secretaries on this subject, the text of which is annexed to these Minutes (see Tab A).⁶ The Committee accepted and approved the resignations and new appointments described therein.

III. Cooperation Among the Three Governments.

Mr. Lovett explained that the Committee had been convened at the request of the American Members to consider outstanding questions which had accumulated since the close of the war. The American Members regretted as much as anyone the long interruption in the discussions of the Committee. The former Under Secretary of State, Mr. Acheson, had, he believed, indicated to the British and Canadians that an appropriate time to tackle the points of difference among our three countries would be at the time of the submission of the Second Report of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission.⁷ This time had now arrived. The Report had been written and it was to be submitted very shortly. The U.S. Government had for several months past been preparing to initiate a review of their problems with the U.K. and Canada, but the time table had recently been accelerated because of a desire to keep the matter from being injected in the Congressional discussions of European Recovery legislation.

Since our last meeting there had been a tautening of the world political situation which made these conversations among the group which originally pioneered the development of atomic energy, and who had first launched the appeal for international control, all the more appropriate. In present circumstances the three governments should approach their problems in the atomic energy field afresh, each in the interests of its own national security and in the interest of the common security. This was especially true since there seemed to be little, if any, hope that United Nations Atomic Energy Commission would make any progress in resolving the differences between the majority members on one hand, and the Soviet Union and Poland, on the other.

The United States members hoped that these talks would not be a “one-time affair” devoted only to clearing away an accumulation of problems. The conversations should mark the resumption of regular friendly and informal contact among the three governments on all matters of interest to the Committee. From now on the meetings of the Committee should be frequent and informal; members should feel free to bring matters before the Committee if and when they arose, and questions should be handled on a day-to-day basis. The American side aimed at a resumption and reaffirmation of the close association we had in the past in matters of concern to the Committee.

In the talks projected for the immediate future, and in the parallel conferences of the ancillary working groups, it was especially important that each man present should be able to discuss the matters in hand informally without the sense that he was in any way obligating his government.

Mr. Lovett reiterated that there was a certain hump of accumulated problems to be got over at the beginning in order to lead the discussions of the Committee out onto a regular and normal basis. Mr. Lovett then proceeded to outline the three principal topics with which the American side believed the current talks ought to be concerned:

A. Information. The first of these was the question of cooperation in matters of scientific and technical information. An approach to these problems had hitherto been inhibited by certain difficulties. For example, as the British and Canadian Members were aware, the United States Atomic Energy Act (Public Law 585) contained certain provisions regarding international cooperation. At the last meeting of the CPC Mr. Acheson had acquainted the Committee with the provisions of that law with respect to interchange of information. Mr. Lilienthal was under a special obligation under the Act and had very carefully considered what the U.S. might be able to do under its provisions. All the U.S. Departments represented on the CPC, with the help of advisers, such as Dr. Bush, could now say that they were beginning the talks on the assumption that there were considerable areas in which there could be cooperation to the mutual benefit. This was, of course, outstandingly a technical matter, and for this reason the U.S. would suggest the establishment of a special small working group in order that these questions could first be discussed on an exploratory basis among persons who were technically qualified. The U.S. group would consist of Dr. James Fisk, Director of Research of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, and Dr. Vannevar Bush, of the National Research and Development Board.

Lord Inverchapel agreed to the establishment of this group. He was gratified to learn that the forthcoming talks were to be informal, that individuals could speak without obligating their governments, and that the cooperation proposed by the U.S. was not to be a “one-shot affair.”

The Canadian Ambassador also agreed to the setting up of the group.

Dr. Bush wished more particulars concerning the frame of reference of the group, and examples of the fields it was to discuss.

Mr. Lilienthal said that the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission was prepared to aid in discussions of areas of experience, as well as of information in which an interchange would help each of the three governments. As an example of questions which might be discussed, he cited procedures for radiological safety and chemical extraction processes.

It was the sense of the meeting that the information sub-group would not be expected to report back to the CPC a definitive statement of all areas in which cooperation should prevail, but should report back likely possibilities, with the probability that, as their studies developed, or as the art progressed, more such areas would be revealed.

The British Ambassador said that the British technical advisers, who were expected to arrive on December 11, 1947, would include Mr. Peirson of the Ministry of Supply,⁸ Dr. Cockroft, and Mr. Roger Makins, and that British representation on the information group would probably be drawn from this team.

The Canadian Ambassador named Dr. Mackenzie and Mr. Ignatieff.

B. Raw Materials. Mr. Lovett explained that the raw material situation was, as the British and Canadians were aware, of extremely great interest to the United States. It was of real and urgent importance to the U.S. to arrive at agreement on the means of acceleration of a program of research and development, and on some sort of arrangement in which materials not required for the immediate needs of existing projects should be disposed of in a manner as favorable as possible from the standpoint of our common security. It was hoped that detailed arrangements could be worked out satisfactory to all. For this matter, also, a sub-group should be appointed. The U.S. spokesman would be Dr. Carroll Wilson, General Manager of the Atomic Energy Commission. It was important that too much restriction not be placed upon the working group as to what it could, or could not do. It would explore the situation without commitment on anyone’s part. If they found they were in agreement as individuals on possible solutions, and wished to suggest solutions to the CPC, so much the better. If not, they might at least be able to come together on a stipulation as to fact which would be helpful to the central group. The British Ambassador indicated that the British spokesman would be named in the next day. He believed that the U.S. would find the British prepared to discuss raw materials. He then described the security “cover stories” planned by the British to account for the presence in the U.S. of so many British persons intimately and responsibly connected with atomic energy developments.

The Canadian Ambassador named Mr. Bateman and Mr. Stone.

C. Public Announcement. Mr. Lovett explained that if the current conversations were successful the U.S. members had in mind that some public joint communiqué would be issued. Here the impact on the deliberations of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission would have to be considered. This was, of course, a matter for the respective governments and the U.N. delegations to consider, rather than for the CPC. Tentatively the State Department had in mind that the resumption of U.S.-U.K.-Canadian talks ought to be related publicly to the stalemate in the UNAEC in a significant but not too alarming way. It was hoped that this would have a desirable effect, both at home and abroad, by demonstrating that our countries could not fail to take account in their defense plans, and in the conduct of foreign policy, that the UNAEC deliberations were deadlocked after 15 months. It was not, of course, the U.S. intention that these current talks should herald any breaking off of negotiations in the UNAEC. Any communiqué would stress the fact that negotiations would continue.

D. Procedure in case of premature publicity. The Committee had to reckon with the possibility of a news “leak.” The U.S. side had no firm suggestion to offer, but thought that, if publicity should occur, the official reaction should be that the current meetings were merely the continuation of long-standing cooperative arrangements in the Combined Policy Committee which had been made public long ago in official press releases and had many times been referred to in public statements by the President and other important public figures.

Sir Gordon Munro asked whether it was contemplated to amend or terminate the war-time agreements, or just what disposition would be made of them. Mr. Lovett answered that here again the whole answer could not lie in the CPC but that he was tentatively of the opinion that, as governments, we should try to get these out of the way, except insofar as they provided something useful for the future, as, for example, with respect to procurement, or continuing a joint organ in which matters of common concern could be discussed. The U.S. believed that something like the Trust Agreement should be retained and modified. Sir Gordon asked how any meeting of minds in the current talks would be evidenced, and whether there would be some instrument, or paper, setting forth the heads of agreement. Mr. Lovett said that it was important that all know what had been agreed upon. It was best, for reasons which the Committee was aware, that this be done in an informal manner, and he had in mind perhaps an agreed minute of the CPC meetings. Most of the U.S. side in these talks were relatively new to the subject, and had experienced great difficulties arising from the absence of agreement on just what was the basis of the atomic energy relations among our three countries. The U.S. side would want the matter cleared up, and thought that the anomalous war-time arrangements had been productive of needless disagreements and irritations among our three countries. It was best, in the present situation to start afresh and not to get bogged down in the interpretation of out-of-date and controversial texts.

Edmund A. Gullion
Donald D. Maclean
Thomas A. Stone

1. Dr. F. Neville Woodward, Director of the British Scientific Mission in the United States; Scientific Attaché, British Embassy.
2. Dean C. J. Mackenzie, President of the National Research Council of Canada.
3. George Bateman, mining expert; former Joint Canadian Secretary of the Combined Policy Committee.
4. George Ignatieff of the Canadian Department of External Affairs.
5. Ante, p. 789.
6. Not printed.
7. United Nations, Official Records of the Atomic Energy Commission, Second Year, Special Supplement, Second Report to the Security Council, 11 September 1947.
8. David E. H. Peirson, Assistant Secretary in the Headquarters Division of the British Ministry of Supply.