Department of State Atomic Energy Files
Minutes of a Meeting of the American Members of the Combined Policy Committee, Washington, November 5, 1947
| Present: | Secretary of State, Mr. Marshall |
| Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Mr. Kennan | |
| Mr. Gullion, American Executive Secretary | |
| Secretary of Defense, Mr. Forrestal | |
| Dr. Vannevar Bush, Chairman, Research and Development Board | |
| Chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Mr. Lilienthal | |
| Mr. Carroll Wilson, General Manager, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission | |
| Mr. Herbert S. Marks, General Counsel, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission |
Subject: A program of negotiations with the British and Canadians designed to remove present misunderstandings and to increase the amount of uranium ore available to the United States.
Decision:
That negotiations with the British and Canadians ought to be undertaken.
Implementing Action:
The Committee considered recommendations proposed by the Department of State.* As a result of the discussion it was agreed that State Department (Mr. Kennan and Mr. Gullion) would revise the State Department recommendations, in consultation with AEC and the Department of National Defense, and that a further meeting would then be held.
Discussion:
Secretary Marshall opened the meeting referring to the fact that there had been a number of issues outstanding between ourselves and the British and Canadians with respect to atomic energy policy for well over a year; that the United States Government had not yet been able to give answers to the British to specific representations made by them, and that we were aware of some antagonism which had developed as a consequence. There was a feeling that the United States record in the matters at issue displayed some lack of frankness. We had based our argument on our unwillingness to do anything which might prejudice the chances of success of the negotiations of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, whereas our principal reasons for not exchanging information with the British arose from different considerations. Our policy with respect to exchange of information also had to be considered in relation to the Belgian supply situation. He had had a talk recently with the Belgian Prime Minister which clearly indicated that we should come to some decision on this policy.1 Moreover, it would be highly undesirable if relations among the United States, United Kingdom and Canada in atomic energy matters [Page 854] become so strained that the Belgians might come under pressure from other powers for concessions in the way of raw materials.
The uranium situation in this country was reported to be highly unsatisfactory and the meeting had been convened to consider it. This was the first time that the American Members of the Committee had met as a body, and he would begin by asking those present to express their general views before considering the specific recommendations prepared by the State Department.
Dr. Bush stated that we had not during the war, and for some time after, offered the British opportunities to develop post-war uses, or the large-scale operations which might contribute to post-war uses, of atomic energy. In retrospect, this was wise in reference to the strategic situation; it had been considered unwise to have a plant developed in Britain close to the reach of any potential aggressor. Moreover, the development of the project for war-like purposes clearly indicated concentration in this country and the British had understood this. Also, we had told the British that any substantial modification of the war-time agreements, or any new agreement, would raise questions with respect to the applicability of Article 102 of the United Nations Charter, requiring that agreements between states be notified to the Secretariat. Dr. Bush then emphasized that today we were in many ways confronted with a new situation. The British were actively going ahead on their own and the Canadians also, particularly at Chalk River. In the scientific field particularly, both had done distinguished work. We in this country needed to know what the British and Canadians were doing and to get the benefits of their discoveries. He hoped, therefore, that it would be possible to renew some form of cooperation to this end. If an interchange of information could be brought about, this would contribute to an improvement in our raw materials situation.
Mr. Kennan believed that it was not feasible to expect to continue a form of cooperation which brought us raw materials while we were unprepared to offer anything in return. It was possible that the British did not actually want much technical information at this time, especially since they had not pressed their requests in recent months. In the present situation it was possible that what they really wanted was to engage in discussions with us, and to have some reaffirmation of the special relationships which had previously existed among the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada in the field of atomic energy. An effective understanding with the British and Canadians would bring up the question of what was possible under the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, or of what should be done to modify it. As to this, he was offering no firm opinion. He did believe that it was probably desirable that Congress should be asked to relax the law to make interchange of information possible. In any case, he did not like the fact [Page 855] that at the same time that we had in hand a letter from the Prime Minister to the President, the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 was in preparation, in a form which contained restrictions cutting across the very subject which was the heart of the correspondence between the heads of State. Moreover, we had not given any real answer to the British and had made no effort to accquaint the British or the Canadians with the exact status of any opportunities for cooperation that might exist under the Act.
Mr. Gullion referred to two facts which were obvious, but which had not thus far been emphasized. These facts had not been predominant at the time we had initially considered the questions at issue with the British, in November of 1945. They were: First, relations between the Soviet Union and the Western world had seriously deteriorated and we had, therefore, to reconsider atomic energy policy in that light. Secondly, the effort to obtain multilateral control of atomic energy in the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission had all but officially and overtly been adjudged a failure. As late as December 1946, the President was telling the Prime Minister that public opinion in this country would not permit this Government to build additional atomic energy plants, much less assist the British in building one, before the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission could report. Now it had become increasingly apparent that there was no hope of any constructive result from the deliberation of the UNAEC.
Mr. Forrestal said that two things seemed clear to him as a result of his consideration of the State Department’s papers and the entire problem: (1) The U.S. wanted to get raw materials; (2) we did not want to see a large-scale atomic energy plant located in the British Isles. If in negotiations with the British we could secure these two objectives, and if, as indicated by Dr. Bush earlier, there was substantial useful information which we could obtain from the British, then we should be prepared to give the British information.
Secretary Marshall said that he recalled that during the war, there was considerably less objection to having a plant in Canada than in the U.K. He assumed that this was still the case, and would be a possibility worth investigating in connection with the projected conversations. He also referred to the fact that both the British and the Canadians were actually going ahead with their studies and the building of plants.
Dr. Bush referred to the British view that they could not, for political reasons and reasons of national prestige surrender to another state the right to say where a British plant might be located and what kind of a plant it might be. This feeling was a factor to be taken into account in relations with the British.
The Secretary agreed there were reasons for having some kind of a plant in the United Kingdom. Mr. Gullion referred to the Joint [Page 856] Chiefs of Staff opinion of last March which stated that although the existence of an atomic energy plant in the British Isles was disadvantageous to the military security of the United States, the disadvantage of such a plant might be minimized by the earliest possible conversion to a form useable for atomic weapons of those raw materials now accumulating in England.2 In other words, our principal objection on strategic grounds would now appear to be not so much to the presence of the physical installations themselves, as to the accumulation of stocks. We should take as a “base” line in our negotiations with the British, that they would have some kind of a plant, and concentrate our efforts on reducing the size of any plant the British might have and holding down its consumption of available raw materials. This would be good policy on our part since (a) the British were probably going to have a plant any way, although we had no precise information as to size or present rate of progress, (b) the British could not very easily forego atomic energy development altogether, especially since their people were looking desperately toward realization of the industrial potential, and (c) the military situation was more static than when the Manhattan Project was being brought to fruition, that is, the Red Army was not right on the Channel as was the Wehrmacht. Dr. Bush agreed with this. However, he observed that the British, commencing as long ago as last spring and increasingly since that time, were taking a more realistic view of the prospects for industrial development, and he thought they now realized that such developments would be in the remote rather than the near future.
Mr. Lilienthal pointed out that his position at the current meeting was somewhat different than that of the other conferees, who were Secretaries and the heads of their departments. He was one of five Commissioners, and there was no provision, in the Act under which they operated, allocating to him as Chairman sole responsibility in such meetings. Therefore, while he appreciated the difficulties which might arise from enlarging the meeting considerably, he regretted that his fellow Commissioners were not asked to attend. In the circumstances, he would report the line of the Commission as he understood it, and report back to his fellow Commissioners the sense of the meeting.
In his view there were two kinds of issues involved in this discussion, and in the deliberations of the Combined Policy Committee. One set had to do with the very broad questions of United States foreign policy, of which our atomic energy policy was only part. Although the Atomic Energy Commission was a member of this Committee, it approached these issues primarily from the standpoint of its responsibility [Page 857] for the operation of the United States atomic energy program.
Then there was the other set of problems coming directly within the purview of the Combined Policy Committee which related more particularly to the work of the Commission and its program. In connection with the latter, it was extremely urgent that something be done to remedy our present raw material position. Even if we were to secure all of the production of the Belgian Congo in sight, our situation would still be bad; if we failed to obtain some amelioration within the relatively near future it would become apparent through the necessary curtailment of some of the operations of the Commission.
With respect to the issues under discussion, the Commission saw them somewhat differently from the way they appeared to be envisaged in the State Department recommendations. First, he did not believe, at least at the outset, that we should consider asking for new legislation or an amendment to the existing legislation. Second, we should not link the supplying of information to the British by us with the supplying of raw materials to us by the British.
The prospects of getting action by Congress on new legislation was attended with so much uncertainty and risk to security that it would be undesirable, and also might delay matters more than our present position permitted. Moreover a request for legislation, no matter how limited, might appear broader than was necessary since any request would expand the executive’s authority to disclose information and this would cause anxiety and controversy in Congress. It was the opinion of counsel for the Commission that even under the present law a good case could be made out justifying some exchange of information with the British and Canadians.
Mr. Marks explained that he thought the authority to take such action could be based on the Commission’s power to control dissemination of information in such a way as to assure the common defense and security. He thought this authority was also reinforced, in this connection, by other provisions of the law. He referred to Dr. Bush’s statement that the British and Canadian work in this field was developing information that it would be of advantage to the United States to get. He also observed that there were existing relations with the British and Canadians in this field which were being carried on in the common interest of the three nations. He said that if it was established that their continuance was in the interest of our own national defense and required for their effectiveness arrangements with Canada and Great Britain involving exchange of information, he thought a sound argument could be made that such arrangements were permitted by present law. He pointed out that the question of whether or not the facts would support such an argument depended upon a careful investigation of the facts.
[Page 858]Mr. Lilienthal mentioned specific existing relations with the British which needed to be examined in determining such facts, such as those at Chalk River and Trail, and the problems growing out of the effort that the three countries were making together to maintain effective security while at the same time declassifying appropriate information. We needed to make an effort to find out what the British and Canadians wanted to know and what advantages to U.S. security could be secured by discussions in the areas that would elicit information from them of interest to us.
When we go before the Congressional committees, it should be with a positive approach in which the advantages to us of continuing an established pattern of cooperation would be clear as well as any advantages to be gained and things to be learned by us if consideration was given to an arrangement with the British for exchange of information. But to link raw materials with information would not be a sound approach. It should not be assumed that a raw materials solution desirable to us could only be secured by particular concessions. The disposition of raw materials which we proposed could be approached on its own merits as being in the interests of the common security of all three nations.
He envisaged that the negotiations might take somewhat the following line: (a) we would tell the British and Canadians that we wanted to discuss an allocation of raw materials more in keeping with the security of all three countries, (b) The British would then probably bring up the question of information. We would say we were prepared to discuss information but not as a counter for raw materials. We would ask the British to tell us precisely what they wanted and what information we would get from them.
If a satisfactory agreement on information could be reached advantageous to our security as well as British and Canadian, that should facilitate agreement on raw materials, but the two items should not be otherwise linked.
Dr. Bush suggested that the formula which might apply to exchange of information was the one which had been used during the war. Information was discussed freely only on those specific lines of investigation which the British and the Canadians were engaged, not in the whole atomic energy project. In this way, Dr. Bush said the British had made substantial contributions to the success of the projetc. He thought on the purely scientific side, as distinguished from the industrial, the British had contributed equally with ourselves.
Mr. Kennan stated that the State Department would modify the recommendation about seeking new legislation if what was necessary could be accomplished under the existing legislation.
Mr. Gullion suggested that it was also possible that the logic of [Page 859] events since November 1945 might have caused the British to be less anxious to link raw materials with information. The situation had deteriorated to point where they might believe that the considerations applying in 1942 were once more applicable. However, (a) in the last analysis there was a link between the two and although we should avoid making it explicit or starting off our talks in that relation, it had to underlie our negotiations with the British. The British had certainly not recognized the “logic of events” by dispersing the stockpile they now maintained, (b) It would not be practicable to avoid discussing the broad picture of our position vis-à-vis the British, both as to raw materials and information with the Congressional committees. We should, however, try to initiate negotiations as proposed by Mr. Lilienthal but we should be prepared to recognize that we might have to use information as a lever to get raw materials.
Mr. Lilienthal and Mr. Marks pointed out that if a satisfactory agreement on information could be reached, one that was advantageous to our own security, that should also have the effect of creating an atmosphere favorable to agreement on raw materials. But they emphasized that the two items should not be otherwise linked. Mr. Lilienthal also pointed out as bearing on the change in conditions since November 1945 that the passage of time had created a somewhat different situation as to security in that the British and Canadians were going ahead on their own with atomic energy work and were developing information which it was important for us to keep out of unfriendly hands, just as it was important to keep our own information secure. There had been some intimations that the British were being pressed by the French to exchange information with them, a possibility which it was in our interest to guard against.
Mr. Lilienthal suggested that in undertaking negotiations, it would, of course, have to be recognized that in the background of any discussions about raw materials, the British would be thinking about information. Similarly, whether or not brought out into the open, the atmosphere of the negotiations would necessarily be affected by any current relations between the British and ourselves in regard to general assistance from this country in the economic field; he thought that if such factors began to enter directly into the negotiations, then the agencies of the Government primarily concerned would have to play a part.
Mr. Kennan pointed out that the Congressional committees were already acquainted with the broad situation through the testimony of Mr. Dean Acheson on March [May] 12, 1947.3 However, in this testimony Mr. Acheson had said that we were still studying how much of the wartime arrangements should be continued in effect in order to [Page 860] assure the development of atomic energy in such a way as to contribute to our own national security. We could now put the matter up to the Congressional committee saying that the proposed talks with the British were a move to continue the study somewhat further. Mr. Gullion pointed out that the individual committee members were pretty well informed of all the issues at stake and would certainly want to go into all angles more widely. This was clear from the questions which had followed Mr. Acheson’s testimony.
Secretary Marshall referred to Senator Vandenberg’s objection to continuing that clause of the Quebec Agreement with reference to mutual consultation as to any further use of atomic weapons. He indicated that Senator Vandenberg was probably unaware that the reason for including this provision was as a protection against an extension of atomic warfare. He pointed out the parallel to the discussions, during the war, of gas warfare, explaining that gas used in any remote corner of the world in an isolated field emergency might, in the British view, have provoked large-scale gas warfare with the British Isles as the battle ground.
Mr. Forrestal inquired what response would be made to an inquiry from the Congressional Committee as to the present status of these wartime agreements.
Mr. Kennan said that the British would be asked to regard them as expired, that we would wish to make a completely new start and that we would advise the Congressional Committee that this was our view.
The Secretary also referred to the question of timing of any announcement of our negotiations with the British. While it would be obviously advantageous to make our disclosure at the time the report of the Atomic Energy Commission was presented to the Security Council, it might also be undesirable to make such a declaration now in view of the tenseness of the world situation. Mr. Kennan suggested that any declaration or disclosure which was made need not be particularly drastic or alarming; it would merely be in the pattern of similar pronouncements which were made with some frequency at the time that the Anglo-British-American cooperation was in course.
The Secretary directed that the State Department representatives should revise their recommendations in consultation with the AEC and the Department of National Defense and that a further meeting would then be held.
- Annexed to these Minutes as Tab A. [Footnote in the source text. The document under reference, PPS/11, October 24, is printed p. 844.]↩
- For the memorandum of the Marshall-Spaak conversation of October 3, see p. 841.↩
- See undated letter from the Secretaries of War and Navy to the Secretary of State, p. 798.↩
- Ante, p. 806.↩