Department of State Atomic Energy Files
The Ambassador in Belgium (Kirk) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)
Dear Bob: Before the arrival of Spaak and Sengier in the United States,1 I should like to send you an informal summary of atomic energy matters, to supplement my official cables and despatches. Also, I should like to say that the informal letter from Dean of 27 June, 1947,2 was most helpful to me and has of course guided my action here.
Spaak’s hand was forced in the Senate on July 3rd, to the extent that he was obliged to make the statement we all concerted and accepted. He was not obliged to extend his remarks, and no reference has ever been made publicly to supplemental clauses of the Agreement, such as 9–A. I say “publicly”, for you will recall that Andre De Staercke (Private Secretary to the Prince Regent) emphasized that the Prince Regent relied upon our good faith in performing our obligations under that clause (my 1290 of August 223). And I would remind you that Sengier also was at some pains to say, very positively, that while the price we paid for ore concentrate was “dirt cheap”, the real recompense to Belgium was the knowledge we were bound to give, under 9–A. My reassurances on this point have been reported, and are in accord with Dean’s letter (page 3). Our position was carefully explained to Spaak in my conversation with him immediately after my return (see my tel. 1067, July 3, 8 p.m.).
This preparation of the minds of the Prince Regent, Spaak and Sengier has, I think, stood us in good stead, for it has enabled them to hold fast against the Communist maneuvers. The line taken in their important French-language paper Le Drapeau Rouge and supplemented by articles elsewhere, has been to attack the price, which has been called dérisoire; to pretend that a proper price would pay for all war damages to Belgium; to claim that coal shortages would be overcome were Belgium able to use her own resources of uranium to develop atomic energy for commercial use; and to hint at other advantages, in science, medicine, etc., which would accrue to Belgium were she really master of her own fate.
[Page 836]Spaak has maintained his stony silence to all such attempts to draw him out. But his Parliament is in recess until late October or early November, and he has not had to face any hostile questioning from members of either House. I think he will be under fire when the recess is over, and will need some help and guidance.
Perlman’s leak (see my tel. 1206 of August 64) was bad, for it resulted in reasonably accurate figures on weights and prices becoming publicly available. I suspect the Communists had these data some time ago, and it is just possible the New York Herald Tribune article may do us good by blowing the top at a time inconvenient to the Communists. Nevertheless it is regrettable that the orders of Godding were not checked as to performance, and that subordinates continued to compile and make available routine reports. I gather the Russians can now deduce pretty closely how much active stuff we got from the Congo deliveries.
You will have noted the Communists now never mention English deliveries, and that all their wrath is directed against the United States. You have noted the effect of Errera’s talk about the British “pile” upon the Prince Regent. It is likely the British themselves are hopeful such a source of energy may augment their own power shortages. While I have always kept Hugessen fully in the picture, he is leaving this month. His successor is Sir George Rendel—a man I do not know and upon whom I should like advice as to how much he is in the picture. I realize some slight divergence in interests may be in the making, and would like to be assured just how far it is desired I take the new man into my confidence.
It seems to me it would be wise for you to see Spaak when he is in New York, and to go over with him our problems with the Russians in the UNAEC; to have him brought up-to-date on commercial uses of atomic energy, including medical and scientific phases; and to feel him out upon Congo deliveries to the United States in case we find ourselves, unhappily, in a state of war with the Russians—initially perhaps in a distant area, such as Korea, or even Greece. In connection with this last suggestion, you will appreciate Spaak has no knowledge of Sengier’s plan to deposit in New York all necessary authority to act with us.
I think I should add that Spaak has never indicated in any way whatever that he now felt the contract terms of our agreement to be [Page 837] unfavorable to Belgium. In my view he will abide by such agreement; but, as head of his political party, of the coalition government, and as a Belgian, it is not inconceivable he might find himself obliged to yield to heavy internal pressure in order to remain in power. What would be the position were Spaak to be elected to high place in the United Nations, forcing him to give up his political life in Belgium, is a possibility I am not able to forecast.
I do not think it advisable to see Spaak and Sengier together, since they are not politically close; and since Sengier always maintains he is the commercial agent and that Spaak is the political leader.
Sengier will of course see Lilienthal and others of his Commission; he would be flattered to see you, even briefly. From Sengier the AEC will get full particulars of the tax burdens now imposed upon his company. There is an uneasy suspicion in my mind that Wigny (Minister of Colonies) is antagonistic to Sengier, as to all big business-men; and that Wigny contemplates something more in the Congo; perhaps along nationalization lines. While not hostile to the United States, I sense he reflects the concern often felt by Belgians with Congo interests, lest Yankee dollars disturb their position. In this connection, it might be wise policy to be sure Export-Import and International Bank (if we can quietly do so) would clear any prospective loans to Belgium, or Belgian Congo, with you, in order that we might assess the situation as it would affect our interests. We might thus be able to brake M. Wigny a little, if he gets too active.
Sengier is far-sighted enough to foresee the possibility we may be in a mess with the Russians. That is why he is activating his New York set-up; and why he asked me to insure his exit was arranged. He is a little jittery, and you, or Lilienthal, might well reassure him we will take care of him. He is a very fine man, and devoted to American ideals, hating Russia like poison.
May I suggest how helpful it would be to me if you could insure I receive copies of any notes of conversation with Spaak, or with Sengier? Without such, I could be a little off-base.
With kindest regards,
Sincerely yours,
- Prime Minister Spaak planned to serve as Chairman of the Belgian Delegation to the 2nd Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly which convened in New York on September 16. Sengier was to visit the United States on behalf of the Union Minière for the purpose of discussing a new uranium purchase agreement.↩
- For Acheson’s letter to Kirk, June 27, see p. 822.↩
- Not printed.↩
- Telegram 1206 reported the appearance in the Paris edition of the New York Herald Tribune on August 6 of an article by David Perlman which purported to reveal the amount of uranium from the Belgian Congo purchased by the United States Government in the first quarter of 1947 (855A.6359/8–647).↩