Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, General; The United Nations, Volume I

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Lovett) to the Secretary of State

top secret

[Washington,] July 28, 1947.

The attached memorandum, dated July 24, 1947, requires no action on our part, unless Mr. Lilienthal has personally indicated to you that he desires the support of the Department of State.

If the Department should be consulted, I believe we should back the Commission for the following reasons:

1. The State Department shares with the “War and Navy Departments responsibility for the national security. In the Department’s opinion it is essential that we know as soon as possible when the Russians have succeeded in developing atomic explosives.

2. We are at present gambling in continuing UN negotiations. The Soviet Union is very probably merely filibustering while it develops its own bomb. It is imperative, therefore, that we have the knowledge of the Soviet Union’s intentions and progress in atomic science afforded by a system of long range detection of atomic explosions.

3. In the likely event of failure of United Nations atomic energy discussions, the country must reconsider its diplomacy. For example we shall have to consider the possibilities of combining with other nations in a United Nations without Russia; or a limited alliance with other countries which cooperated closely with us during the war; or a series of movements in the UN serving to isolate the Soviet Union and show up its intransigence and its aggressive intentions on several points; e.g., subversion of civil liberties in satellite states and indirect aggression against member countries. The Soviet’s role in the atomic energy negotiations would be shown to be a part of its over-all strategy. In order to set the time table for such a campaign and to plan ahead, we must have the kind of intelligence about the Soviet indicated in the attachment.

[Annex]

Memorandum by the Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission (Lilienthal) to the Director of the Central Intelligence Group (Vandenberg)

Washington, 24 July 1947.

Subject: Long Range Detection of Atomic Explosions.

1. Your memorandum of June 30th¹ on this subject has been studied with great interest.

2. Paragraph 7 states that, “A rough estimate indicates that approximately two years will be required to locate, install and operate the complete network of stations and facilities, capable of feeding data into the Control Central”. In the light of the prevailing situation, the A.E.C. regards it as essential to the national defense and security that a working arrangement, even though less than “complete”, for the detection of atomic explosions in other parts of the world be established without such delay. We cannot regard a two-year period as realistic and believe it necessary that means be found, as should be done in time of national emergency, to devise a practical solution as a matter of utmost urgency. It is understood that the technical issues have already been essentially solved and that the problem is now one of organization and coordination.

3. Consequently, the A.E.C. is and has been fully in accord with your basic judgments that a long range detection system be established and that responsibility for organization and direction be assigned to a single agency. We would like to discuss this and other subjects of mutual responsibility with you and hope that an early appointment can be arranged.

David E. Lilienthal

1. Not found in Department of State files.