Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, General; The United Nations, Volume I

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Edmund A. Gullion, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson)

top secret

[Washington,] June 9, 1947.

Subject: Memorandum of a meeting between the Atomic Energy Commission and Ambassador Kirk, June 4, 1947

Participants:	Ambassador Kirk
	The Members of the Commission: Messrs. Lilienthal, Pike, Strauss, Waymack and Bacher
	Mr. Wilson—General Manager
	Mr. Marks—General Counsel
	Mr. Volpe—Deputy Counsel
	Mr. Belsley—Secretary
	Mr. Gullion—Department of State

Mr. Lilienthal expressed to Ambassador Kirk the Commission’s appreciation of the Ambassador’s handling of atomic energy matters and said that his reports from Belgium had been most useful.

Ambassador Kirk discussed briefly the political situation in Belgium as it affected atomic energy matters. He named the few Belgian officials at the highest level who were informed concerning the existing United States-Anglo-Belgian accords with respect to raw materials. Although the actual agreements were known to so few, nevertheless the fact that most of the Congo ore was going to the United States and the United Kingdom was rather widely known and approved by all except the Communists.

Key executives in business and industrial fields had a good grasp of the situation through inference based on their knowledge of Belgian economy and realized that the arrangements were probably the best to be made in terms of security for Belgium. They did not at any time attempt to discuss them or elicit details from the Ambassador.

The Union Minière and the Belgian Government could be counted upon to stand by the contract; they would not sabotage it by any indirect means, through price changes or interference with deliveries. Although the Belgians were always very careful to consider the agreements as commercial understandings, nevertheless in their view the faith and responsibility of the United States Government was directly engaged in them. In this sense they thought of the agreements, and sometimes referred to them in conversation as “treaties” (traités). Those who were aware of the existence of the Trust approved of its commercial character, although the word “Trust” was considered by Sengier to be an unfortunate choice.

In spite of Spaak’s good will and the Belgian Government’s good faith, it was always to be realized that Spaak was subject to considerable pressure by the Communists for publicity on the arrangements. Furthermore, his tenure at the head of the government was, of course, subject to political fortunes; many of the other key men in the picture were also in politics. Some of them were old men and consequently we had to take into account the human factor in envisaging the future of our cooperation.

The Belgians, as practical people, wanted a quid pro quo from the agreements and that to which they would attach the greatest value would be an assurance, based on Section 9–A of the Agreement, that Belgium would eventually share in any commercial uses to which it might be discovered that atomic energy could be put. Here the Ambassador referred to his conversations with Spaak and Spaak’s desire, for reassurance on this point. The Ambassador had assured him, of course, of American good faith and our desire to do anything which could be done under the McMahon Act, but Spaak’s reaction to the difficulty presented by the Act should be clearly understood: He said, in effect, that “after all, it was unfortunate that the Act was drafted in such a way that it came into conflict with the ‘treaty’.” The desire of Spaak, and Belgians generally, to share in the benefit of atomic industrial energy was heightened by reports reaching the country of the imminence of development of industrial power plants using atomic fuel. Such possibilities were, of course, easily over-estimated in the press and elsewhere. Nevertheless interest in such development ran high in Belgium and Spaak had suggested sending a mission to the United States to check on the development. What was needed was a clear statement to the Belgians: (a) that they would share in the benefits of atomic industrial energy; and (b) that industrial use of atomic energy was not going to be possible as soon as the Belgians believed. In this connection the Ambassador pointed out that some of the Belgian authorities felt some misgivings about Errera,¹ who seemed curious about the provisions of the contract and, apparently, wanted to push up the prices. It would not, therefore, be a good idea for Errera to be taken on a tour of installations in this country, which had been thought of as a gesture to the Belgians.

The Belgians would keep quiet on the agreement both in Belgium and in the United Nations but we must realize that their hands could be forced at any time.

In general discussion following the Ambassador’s introduction the following points were made:

1. The Belgian Government does not appear to be aware that our reluctance to reveal anything about contracts arises from the fact that we do not want the Russians to make use of the information in a propaganda drive in the UN. Mr. Lilienthal and others referred to the fact that at least until the AEC should make its report to the Security Council in September, we should refrain from making any statements which might give ammunition to the Russians for a charge that we were acting unilaterally, or in bad faith. The Ambassador said that this connection had not been altogether clear to the Embassy. He did not believe the Belgians were aware of it either, but, in his future conversations with Spaak, he could make sure that the latter saw the point. The Russian’s present line appeared to be to filibuster in the UN, while they tried to divide opinion in other countries on the subject of international control, and tried to break down existing arrangements in raw materials supplier countries by tactics such as they were pursuing in Belgium. At the same time they were trying to infiltrate into research and other programs in other countries.

Mr. Lilienthal pointed out that in this country knowledge of the Belgian agreements and of our great use of Belgian ore was not as general as it probably was in Belgium and that there was nothing to be gained by uncalled for publicity in this country.

2. The Ambassador did not believe that atomic energy objectives had necessarily much to do with the Communists recent withdrawal from the Cabinet, precipitating the government crisis. He pointed out that this might have seemed to be the case if subsequent events had not proved that the Communist action was in line with a pattern dictated from Moscow, according to which Communists were withdrawing from coalition governments in several European countries.

3. The Ambassador did not think that the nationalization and research programs were a serious threat to our procurement program. He referred to Sengier’s thesis that in fact the Congo was already nationalized since the government owned the land. Commissioner Pike pointed out that this was the usual subsoil mineral law of Latin countries in which title inhered in the government. The Ambassador agreed, and mentioned Sengier’s willingness to deal with uranium ores just as diamonds were handled.

4. The Ambassador explained the entrée which Joliot-Curie enjoyed in atomic energy matters in Belgium and the prestige he had because of his supposed prime contribution to the research program. The Ambassador did not think that the research program in Belgium was particularly important, nor that Communist infiltration was directly menacing to our interests. He agreed that the Belgian Government did not seem as worried about Communist infiltration as it might be.

5. Chairman Lilienthal and Commissioner Bacher pointed out that the industrial use of atomic energy was still distant, in spite of the tendency of “Sunday Supplement” journalism to play up an aspect which coincided with the aspirations of the people. As far as the Commission knew there was no industrial plant in actual operation, nor could not be [sic] except on a “stunt basis” for a long time to come. It was, however, misleading to speak in terms of years since at any time discoveries might upset the evaluation of prospects. At this point there was some discussion of sending a scientist to Belgium who might in his discussions set the Belgians right. Dr. Bacher suggested that one of the scientists attending a projected conference in Europe might be asked to take on this task. Commissioner Strauss felt that a difficulty connected with any such visit was in handling any proposal for a reciprocal visit in this country. Ambassador Kirk believed that this, however, need not be considered too great a difficulty. It seemed to be the sense of the meeting that a scientific visit to Belgium might be useful.

6. Chairman Lilienthal referred to the studies being made of our raw materials situation in general and said that we were considering whether we might make more effective use of the exchange of information, and interpret the McMahon Act to make it possible. The answer would of course depend on consultation with the Army, Navy and the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy. The decision, together with the result of deliberations in the UN, would have a lot to do with the degree to which we could implement Section 9–A. He pointed out, however, that on the basis of present development, processes and installations for the development of industrial uses of atomic energy were in many respects identical with those needed for the development of atomic bombs. Therefore, any policy on facilitating plant construction in Belgium would have to be considered in the light of over-all policy with respect to placing such installations in Europe. He did not believe that this aspect of the matter ought to be developed for Mr. Spaak but felt that the Ambassador should keep it in mind. Mr. Marks pointed out that it would be unwise to dwell on this consideration, especially since time might reveal some way of keeping the two uses distinct. For example, at one time it appeared that the use of denaturents might be very effective in this regard.

7. Commissioner Pike asked whether the Belgians were making an effort to explore and exploit any possible further deposits of uranium in the Congo. The Ambassador said he assumed they were but that he might talk further to Sengier about it.

8. It was suggested that the early despatch of radio-active isotopes to Belgium might be a beneficial public relations move.

1. Prof. Jacques Errera, member of the Belgian Delegation to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission; a leading Belgian specialist on atomic energy.