Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, General; The United Nations, Volume I

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Acheson)¹

secret

[ Washington ,] February 1, 1947.

Mr. Makins called on me at my house at his request. He outlined for me what he termed as his personal suggestion as to the solution of the problem raised by the Attlee-Truman correspondence on atomic energy. He said that he had discussed this matter with the Ambassador and with Field Marshal Wilson;² that he was making this suggestion with their approval, but that it had not been cleared in any way with London. Therefore, he asked me to regard it as a personal suggestion. If something along these lines could be worked out, he would be in London at the time it matured and would do his best to further it there.

Mr. Makins stated that the difficulty in London was in some part practical, but in large part psychological. The practical difficulties arose over irritating obstacles which had arisen in the course of the British program, which could be quickly solved by comparatively minor help from the United States. The psychological difficulties came from the fact that London had the belief that we were ready and willing to cooperate in the field of raw materials, where there were substantial benefits accruing to us, but that we were not ready to cooperate in other fields in which the benefit might flow from us to the British. While Mr. Makins did not take this view, he thought the tone of the reply and some of his suggestions would go a long way toward eliminating the latter difficulty.

Mr. Makins has had several talks with Mr. Lilienthal and the full membership of the Atomic Energy Commission, with Mr. Carroll Wilson,³ and with Dr. Bush. These suggestions evolve out of those talks.

His view as to our reply would have it contain the following:

1. An expression of our desire to cooperate fully and effectively with the British, subject to the limitations of existing legislation.

When I asked him to be as specific as possible as to exactly what “full and effective cooperation, subject to existing legislation” meant to him, he said that, first, the British would like us to agree to an exchange of personnel; that is, that they might send representatives who could examine all that we were doing and be fully informed about it and that we could send representatives who could examine all that they were doing and be fully informed about that. This, he frankly stated, he did not believe to be possible under our existing legislation and, therefore, he did not believe that we could agree to this. Therefore, dropping back to what he thought was possible, he believed that for the present the British could furnish us with a list of some twelve or fourteen points, all of which related to specific obstacles which they or the Canadians had encountered. These obstacles would not in the long run interfere with the main course of British or Canadian work, but might delay specific operations six months or more. They would like to know how these specific obstacles had been overcome by us. He thought most of these difficulties were present in the Chalk River operation and that we might by specific answers at that plant give them the cooperation which they asked. He admitted that most of these points related to know-how rather than to basic scientific information and also admitted that these questions would have to be examined by the Atomic Energy Commission in the light of the existing restrictions of their law.

2. He asked that the reply should also affirm that we wish to maintain the existing arrangements for consultation. By that he meant the Combined Policy Committee⁴ and the Combined Development Trust.

3. He asked that the reply continue that we would look to closer cooperation as soon as conditions permitted. By this he referred to his conversation with Mr. Lilienthal and Mr. Wilson, who, he stated, had told him that from time to time the Commission might find it necessary to request amendments to the Atomic Energy Act. These amendments, while requested for the purpose of domestic operation, might make possible closer cooperation.

4. Mr. Makins suggested that we might agree in the reply to provide the information on developments which had taken place prior to the passage of the Atomic Energy Act. When I asked him to explain this further, he said that we might take the view that under existing commitments we would be under an obligation to exchange information with the British until Congress had placed limitations upon our doing so by the passage of the Act. We had not exchanged information during the period when we were enabled to do so, and, therefore, we might regard the Act as applying only to information on developments occurring since the passage of the Act. I told Mr. Makins that quite frankly I could see no possible legal basis for such a position on our part and did not believe that this suggestion provided a fruitful field for exploration.

5. He would like some statement in the reply to the effect that we raised no objection to the development by the United Kingdom of its atomic energy program, which had been communicated to us, and, if possible, we should give it our blessing. He said that in accordance with existing commitments (he did not explain what commitments) the British had communicated to the Combined Policy Committee, and Mr. Makins had also communicated to General Groves,⁵ British plans for development of atomic energy under Lord Portal’s organization in England.⁶ The impression was abroad that we were cool, if not hostile, to these plans, and he thought it most important that this belief should be dissipated.

6. He would like us to confirm the fact that arrangements for exchange of information in the defense field applied to military applications of atomic energy. He said that there were arrangements in existence by which information on various military developments were freely exchanged between our armies. To some extent this applied to atomic energy, as, for instance, the results of the Bikini tests. He gave me the impression that in his conversations with Mr. Lilienthal and Dr. Bush he found them favorable to the extension and development of exchange in this defense field.

Here again, I asked him to be specific as to what he meant, inquiring whether it covered the entire field of the construction, dropping, and detonation of the atomic bombs. He said that this was the case, and. he said he thought that in this field the British already knew as much as we did, and that, therefore, the exchange of information would be of mutual benefit.

I then asked him whether in his judgment this particular item might be construed to be even broader than this and cover the whole field of preparing the ingredients which went into the bomb. He said that this was quite definitely a possibility. I pointed out that by following this road we might get by another path into another field of uncertainty and difficulty such as that in which we now found ourselves. He did not deny this, but urged that there was no reason and logic why, if we were exchanging full information on all other types of weapons, we did not do so on this one. I asked him whether he had considered the possible international, as well as United States domestic, complications if such a program became a matter of public knowledge. He said that he recognized that it would have complications.

7. He hoped further that our reply would suggest a visit from Lord Portal to Mr. Lilienthal to discuss common problems of administration, etc. Such a visit, he thought, while not a medium for the exchange of information, would give further reassurance of our sympathy with the United Kingdom program and of our desire to cooperate.

8. Finally, he suggested that our reply propose the interchange of information and personnel on declassified material (basic scientific information) on nuclear physics. Explaining this suggestion, he said that certain work was being done, for instance, at the University of California on the development of cyclotrons. This in itself was not classified material, but British participation in it has been precluded because at the same institution work of a classified nature was in progress, and it was felt that security required exclusion from both fields of work. He thought that ways could be worked out to permit a less harsh result.

When Mr. Makins finished his exposition, I asked him what his attitude was toward the existing arrangements, pointing out that we should have accomplished little if we did not find some way of terminating those agreements and putting our relations solely on some basis which could be made public without embarrassment.

He asked whether by terminating existing arrangements I meant terminating the Combined Policy Committee and the Combined Development Trust. I replied that I did not include these two institutions, the provisions as to which could be kept in existence or repeated in some suitable way.

He said that from his point of view he saw no reason why, if the other ideas were worked out satisfactorily, the pre-existing arrangements should not be terminated.

Mr. Makins is leaving on Tuesday.⁷ I told him that we would not have any reply for him before he left, but after consulting within the Government, we would take the matter up with the Ambassador.

Dean Acheson

1. In a memorandum of February 3 transmitting this document to George C. Marshall, who had succeeded James F. Byrnes as Secretary of State on January 21, Acheson stated the following:

   “It is important in the near future for me to review with you the negotiations which have led up to the conversation reported in the attached document. Some action is urgently required.

   “When our own views are clear, we should consult with the War and Navy Departments, Dr. Bush [Vannevar Bush, Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development; United States Member, Combined Policy Committee], and the Atomic Energy Commission.”

   Marshall’s initials and “OK” appear as a marginal notation on the source text.

2. Field Marshal Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, British member, Combined Policy Committee.
3. Carroll L. Wilson, General Manager of the United States Atomic Energy Commission; United States member, Combined Policy Committee.
4. The Combined Policy Committee was established under the terms of the Roosevelt-Churchill “Articles of Agreement governing collaboration between the authorities of the U.S.A. and the U.K. in the matter of Tube Alloys [atomic energy research and development]” signed at Quebec, August 19, 1943 (Department of State Treaties and Other International Acts Series (TIAS) No. 2993; United States Treaties and Other International Agreements (UST), vol. 5 (pt. 1), p. 1114). The text of the Quebec Agreement and related documentation are presented in Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Washington and Quebec. 1943.
5. Maj. Gen. Leslie R. Groves, Commanding General, Armed Forces Special Weapons Project; member of the Military Liaison Committee, United States Atomic Energy Commission; Commanding General, Manhattan Engineer District, the atomic bomb development program, 1942–1946.
6. Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Charles F. A. Portal, Lord Portal of Hungerford, head of the department in the British Ministry of Supply charged with the organization for production of materials for atomic energy research; Air Chief of Staff, 1940–1945.
7. February 4.