SWNCC Flies

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee 1

top secret
SWNCC 360/1, Enclosure “B”

Subject: Policies, Procedures and Costs of Assistance by the United States to Foreign Countries

Enclosure: J.C.S. 1769/1 (Copy No. 39).

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered an interim report by a Special Ad Hoc Committee of the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee on the subject of “Policies, Procedures, and Costs of Assistance by the United States to Foreign Countries” (SWNCC 360). They note that the subject matter of this report parallels in many respects a study undertaken by them for the purpose of determining, from the [Page 735]standpoint of national security, the countries of the world, in order of their urgency and their importance to which the United States should, if possible, give current assistance (J.C.S. 1769/1) (Appendix).

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that the conclusions in their study provide a sound broad basis for study from the viewpoint of national security and should be considered in connection with the political basis set forth in the foreign policy assumptions in Section II of Appendix “A” of the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee report.2 In this connection, they would point out that strategic implications, together with the facts that our national security is paramount and our powers of assistance are not without limitation, make it necessary to apply more specific consideration to individual cases than that set forth in the foreign policy assumptions referred to above.

The study of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this matter, based upon the strategic implications and national security, is presented in J.C.S. 1769/1 (Appendix).

Referring to the listing of countries as set forth in J.C.S. 1769/1 as needing assistance, this differs from the listing in the subject paper (SWNCC 360) in that China has been inserted after Austria and Turkey has been moved to the position next below China. Also, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland have been removed from the list. It will also be noted that application of the criterion of importance to the national security to [of] the United States results in a priority listing of countries that differs considerably from the priority listing of those that should be assisted based on need alone.

[Page 736]

The three major points of variance between the subject paper and J.C.S. 1769/1 are:

a.
The subject report proposes certain measures of aid to countries which very probably cannot in the foreseeable future be removed from predominant Soviet influence—Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia—while the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that exclusion from current assistance of every region under Soviet control is desirable from the point of view of national security.
b.
The subject report gives no particular consideration to the relationship between the future security of the United States and the positions of Germany and Japan in the postwar world.
c.
Specific application of national security considerations changes the priority listing made in the subject paper as to the countries that should be assisted.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff would suggest that in the interest of national security, consideration be given to their views as set forth above in the revision of the subject paper and in the more comprehensive report which it is understood the Special Ad Hoc Committee is to undertake. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are enclosing J.C.S. 1769/1 on which their opinions, set out above, were based. This study (J.C.S. 1769/1) does not represent the final views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff since certain changes and additions are now being considered. However, it may be of value in its present form to the Special Ad Hoc Committee as background material for its further study. The further views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be furnished when available.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
W. G. Lalor

Captain, U.S. Navy Secretary

Appendix

United States Assistance to Other Countries From the Standpoint of National Security

Report by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee

the problem

1. On the assumption that the next war will be ideological, to prepare a study, from the standpoint of national security, to determine the countries of the world, in the order of their urgency and their importance, to which the United States should, if possible, give current assistance.

[Page 737]

discussion

2. See Enclosure.

conclusions

3. a. A sound program of United States assistance to other countries along the line indicated in the remainder of these conclusions will greatly assist in the realization of the major objectives currently supported by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the interest of strengthening the national security of the United States.

b. The area of primary strategic importance to the United States in the event of ideological warfare is Western Europe, including Great Britain.

c. Other areas of major strategic importance to the United States (North America including Greenland and Alaska) in the event of ideological warfare, arranged in order of importance are:

  • The Middle East
  • Northwest Africa
  • Latin America
  • The Far East

d. No current assistance should be granted the USSR.

e. Every region under Soviet control should be excluded from current assistance, except in those rare instances which present an opportunity for the United States to gain worldwide approbation by an act strikingly humanitarian; for example, the recent provision of food for the famine areas of Roumania.

f. If assistance is given it should, in each instance, be sufficient to positively assist the nation aided to achieve, or retain, a sound economy, to maintain the armed forces necessary for its continued independence and to be of real assistance to the United States in case of ideological warfare.

g. Conclusion f may prevent the United States giving assistance to all nations which it is desirable to aid, but adherence to conclusion f is necessary if the national security of the United States is to receive maximum strengthening from a United States program of current assistance to other nations.

h. The nations it is desirable to aid because of their need, listed in order of the urgency of current need, are as follows:

  • Greece
  • Italy
  • Iran
  • Korea
  • France
  • Austria
  • China
  • Turkey
  • Great Britain
  • Belgium and Luxembourg
  • Netherlands—N.E.I.
  • The Philippines
  • Portugal
  • The Latin American Republics
  • Canada

[Page 738]

i. The nations it is desirable to aid because of their importance to the national security of the United States, arranged in order of importance are:

  • Great Britain
  • France
  • Germany
  • Belgium
  • Netherlands
  • Austria
  • Italy
  • Canada
  • Turkey
  • Greece
  • Latin America
  • Spain
  • Japan
  • China
  • Korea
  • The Philippines

j. The nations it is desirable to aid listed in an order of importance arrived at by consideration of their importance to the national security of the United States and the urgency of their need, in combination, are as follows:

  • Great Britain
  • France
  • Germany
  • Italy
  • Greece
  • Turkey
  • Austria (assuming conclusion of peace treaty)
  • Japan
  • Belgium
  • Netherlands
  • Latin America
  • Spain
  • Korea
  • China
  • The Philippines
  • Canada

recommendation

4. It is recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff approve the foregoing conclusions.

[Enclosure]

discussion

1.
At the outset, it should be firmly fixed in mind that the mere giving of assistance to other countries will not necessarily enhance the national security of the United States. The results obtained by such assistance will determine whether our national security is strengthened thereby. What, then, are the desired results? These are firm friends located in areas which will be of strategic importance to the United States in the event of war with our ideological enemies, and with economies strong enough to support the military establishments necessary for the maintenance of their own independence and national security.
2.
The problem envisages aid for two reasons; namely, urgency of need and importance to the national security of the United States. The past months have proved that United States assistance to some countries whose inhabitants urgently needed aid did not increase the military security of the United States, but that, on the contrary, it was [Page 739]used by governments ideologically opposed to the United States and representing a minority of the people, to strengthen their control of suppressed majorities. For this reason, it is believed that the question of which countries to exclude from receipt of United States aid is as important as the question of which countries should receive assistance. Keeping in mind that the United States cannot give substantial aid to all countries of the world, it is evident that, if we spread our available resources for aid over too large an area, no country is likely to receive assistance sufficient to be of major importance in the resurgence of its economy and military potential. The primary rule governing assistance by the United States should be that the USSR and every country now under her control should be specifically excluded from assistance. No country under Soviet control should receive assistance from the United States until every vestige of Soviet control has been removed therefrom.
3.
The first step in determining the countries which should receive assistance because of their importance to our national security is to establish the areas of primary strategic importance to the United States in the event of ideological warfare.
4.
The area of United States defense commitments includes, roughly, the lands and waters from Alaska to the Philippines and Australia in the Pacific and from Greenland to Brazil and Patagonia in the Atlantic. This area contains 40% of the land surface of the earth but only 25% of the population. The Old World (Europe, Asia and Africa) contains only 60% of the land surface of the earth but 75% of the population. The potential military strength of the Old World in terms of manpower and in terms of war-making capacity is enormously greater than that of our area of defense commitments, in which the United States is the only arsenal nation. It is obvious, therefore, that in case of an ideological war we must have the support of some of the countries of the Old World unless our military strength is to be overshadowed by that of our enemies.
5.
In the case of an ideological war the most vulnerable side of our defense area will be in the Atlantic. Also, unless we can retain allies on the eastern side of the Atlantic strong enough, in the event of an ideological war, to hold the Soviets away from the eastern shores of the Atlantic, the shortest and most direct avenue of attack against our enemies will almost certainly be denied to us. Further, almost all potentially strong nations who can reasonably be expected to ally themselves with the United States in such a war are situated in western Europe. Moreover, two world wars in the past thirty years have demonstrated the interdependence of France, Great Britain and the United States in case of war with central or eastern European powers. In war these nations not only need one another but are in mortal peril if [Page 740]they do not combine their forces. In the past war it was demonstrated that France could not stand without Great Britain and that when France fell the British Isles were in mortal peril. If Britain had fallen, the Western Hemisphere would have been completely exposed, and the United States would have had to defend itself in the Atlantic before it could have thought of resisting the Japanese conquest of China, the East Indies, the Philippines and the Far Pacific. That the defense of the United States and Canada in North America and of Great Britain and France in western Europe is inseparable from the combined defense of them all is not a question of what men think now, but is something that has been demonstrated by what we have had to do, though tardily, and therefore at greater risk and cost, in actual warfare in the past. In the light of this past experience the burden of proof is upon anyone who opposes the thesis of the interdependence of these four countries. The opponent would have to show that an assault by our ideological opponents on any one of these nations would not be of vital consequence to the other three nations. No one can show this, nor how Britain could live in security if France were not independent and her friend, nor how Canada and the United States could live safely if France and/or Great Britain were under Soviet domination either by reason of military conquest or for the reason that communists had taken over control of their governments. While the conquest or communization of other countries would adversely affect the security of the United States, the conquest or communization of no other country or area would be so detrimental as that of France and/or Great Britain. The maintenance of these two countries in a state of independence, friendly to the United States and with economies able to support the armed forces necessary for the continued maintenance of their independence, is still of first importance to the national security of the United States as well as to the security of the entire Western Hemisphere. This means that the entire area of western Europe is in first place as an area of strategic importance to the United States in the event of ideological warfare.
6.
Potentially, the strongest military power in this area is Germany. Without German aid the remaining countries of western Europe could scarcely be expected to withstand the armies of our ideological opponents until the United States could mobilize and place in the field sufficient armed forces to achieve their defeat. With a revived Germany fighting on the side of the Western Allies this would be a possibility. Further, the complete resurgence of German industry, particularly coal mining, is essential for the economic recovery of France—whose security is inseparable from the combined security of the United States, Canada, and Great Britain. The economic revival of Germany is therefore of primary importance from the viewpoint of United States security.
7.
France is, however, still the leader of those countries of Europe west of Germany and all indications are that France will vigorously oppose any substantial revival of German heavy industry. The fear of a revived Germany is still strong in France and this fear is compounded by the activities of French communists who, in accordance with Soviet desires, seek to make post-war Germany weak industrially and militarily. Yet the German people are the natural enemies of the USSR and of communism. If treated without undue harshness by the Western Allies they would in all probability align themselves with the Western Allies in the event of ideological warfare unless the countries of Europe to the west of Germany had previously fallen under communist domination. In this latter case Germany would be between two hostile factions and her alignment in such a war would be problematical.
8.
From the viewpoint of the security of the United States it appears that our efforts should be directed toward demonstrating both to the leaders of France and to the leaders of Germany that the emergence of a principal world power to the east of them, ideologically opposed to all of their traditional way of life, whose ultimate aim is world conquest, and which they can successfully oppose only if both are strong and united against the new eastern menace, makes them interdependent just as France, England, Canada, and the United States are interdependent. Further, France, as one of the victors of the past war, must be made to see that diplomatic ideological warfare is now going on and that if the diplomatic war can be won the shooting war will be delayed and perhaps even avoided. Most important of all, France and the United States and Great Britain must acknowledge that the decisive diplomatic contest between totalitarian Russia and the democracies of the West is taking place in Germany today. The western democracies can win this contest only if there is drastic change in their economic policies for Germany. Further, Germany can aid in European recovery and become an ally of the West against their ideological opponents only if her economy is restored. In fact, such a course should appeal to France and Great Britain as well as to the United States in view of the high cost that devolves upon these countries for the mere feeding of the German population so long as German industry and foreign trade are paralyzed. This cost to Great Britain and the United States has been estimated by Mr. Herbert Hoover to be $950,000,000 before July of 1948.
9.
Other countries in the Western European area which are of more than ordinary importance to our national security for military or political reasons are Italy, Spain, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Denmark. To assign priority of assistance to these countries on the basis of importance to our national security is most difficult, but on the basis of urgency of need they appear to line up as follows: Italy, Belgium, [Page 742]the Netherlands, Spain, and Denmark. The reasons for the importance of these countries to our national security, aside from geographic positions, deserve brief mention. Italy and Spain are of primary importance in connection with control of the Mediterranean sea lanes, shortest route to the oil and processing facilities of the Middle East. Further, Italy, like Greece, is a border nation in the current diplomatic ideological war between the western democracies and the Soviets. Denmark has sovereignty over Greenland which, by reason of geographic position, is a major outpost for defense of North America. Belgium controls, in the Belgian Congo, the area containing the largest and richest known deposits of uranium ore in the world.
10.
The area of secondary strategic importance to the United States in case of ideological warfare is the Middle East, not only because of the existence of great oil reserves and processing facilities in this area but also because it offers possibilities for direct contact with our ideological enemies. However, a program of aid to Greece and Turkey in this area has already been approved by the Senate of the United States. Other countries in this area—Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia—are of importance, but their need for aid is not urgent and they could not repel Soviet attack until United States military assistance could reach them. In fact, since they could offer practically no military assistance to the United States in case of ideological warfare, direct assistance to these countries can be considered as of minor importance from the viewpoint of United States security. However, in order to retain their good will they should be granted favorable terms for the purchase from the United States of supplies needed for the modernization and improvement of their industries, living conditions and armed forces. Further, technical assistance, both military and civilian, should be granted if they request it.
11.
Central and South America and northwest Africa comprise the remainder of the United States Atlantic area of defense commitments. If Western Europe, particularly France and the Low Countries, falls under Soviet domination for any reason, the United States would immediately have to take the action with armed forces necessary to exclude the Soviets from northwest Africa. However, if Western Europe can be kept out of the sphere of Soviet domination and friendly to the United States, no immediate threat to the security of the United States can be expected to develop in western Africa. In any event, there are no countries in this area to which direct current assistance should be given.
12.
The defense of South America is of vital importance to the national security of the United States. But, since South America contains no principal military power which can help greatly to insure that defense, the United States must regard the defense of South [Page 743]America as a heavy commitment and should seek to alleviate it by actions which will gradually increase the level of military self-sufficiency of South America as a whole.
13.
However, the commitment of the United States for the defense of South America can be challenged by only one of the great powers of the Northern Hemisphere, and the fulfillment of our commitment depends upon whether, in our relations with the great powers, we and our friends outweigh our foes. In spite of technological developments it is still true that only a great power can successfully challenge or resist another great power and that, total resources being equal, the strength of a number of small nations will not combine to balance that of one of the great powers. For this reason the bulk of United States assistance should be given to nations who are potentially powerful and also potential allies of the United States.
14.
Thus, current direct assistance to the individual countries of South America is not of critical importance to our national security at this particular time. However, policies designed to lessen the potential burden of our commitment for the defense of South America are of great importance. There can no longer be doubt that the communist party is gaining strength in that area. In consequence, anything less than complete rapprochement between the United States and every one of her neighbors to the south is entirely unacceptable from the viewpoint of United States security. To stand by and watch a fifth column grow stronger and stronger to the south of us is to invite disaster. The United States is, by reason of its strength and political enlightenment, the natural leader of this hemisphere. But, there is always jealousy of the leader and in this case the injurious effects of that jealousy are compounded by the actvities of our ideological opponents in that area. Further, the opposition has plainly undertaken to overthrow by one means or another the ideology which we champion. How better to combat us than by taking over the leadership of the southern half of the Western Hemisphere? They are attempting it now and it must be realized that in this hemisphere we cannot combat them by dollar credits alone. Individual and national want is not sufficient in this hemisphere to make this an effective method here. The most important specific act required is the completion and implementation of a treaty embodying the agreements concerning the defense of the Western Hemisphere which were reached at Chapultepec.
15.
Of almost equal importance is the passage of a bill embodying the provisions of H.R. 6326 (79th Congress) which would permit the standardization of the armaments of the American republics by the transfer of United States equipment, and the maintenance of United States military missions in those countries. Apparently the support [Page 744]for such a bill, other than by the War and Navy Departments, has been withdrawn. The public press has suggested that the reason for the withdrawal of support is that implementation of the provisions of the bill might weaken the economies and the political stability of the governments of South America. Whether or not this be so is of little consequence from the viewpoint of national security, since our present policy is reacting unfavorably upon the security of the United States and of the Western Hemisphere. An important fact is that most of the Latin American Governments are dependent upon the military for stability. In consequence, contact with Latin American military men would in reality mean contact with very strong domestic political leaders. It is suggested that it is now advisable to attempt to bring about the economic and the domestic conditions which we desire to see in South America through these men and through passage of a bill similar to H.R. 6326 instead of attempting to attain these ends through direct diplomatic pressure. We need offer these countries no current financial assistance in the interests of our own security. However, in the interest of this same security we should take our hemispheric neighbors into full partnership in the affairs of our hemisphere; should conclude one formal blanket mutual defense treaty with all of them; and should definitely, positively, and tactfully lead them toward true democracy while publicizing the misery and the slavery to the state which would result should they come under the control of our ideological opponents whether by the communization of their governments or by conquest.
16.
In the Pacific area of United States defense commitments, from the standpoint of urgent want, Korea, China, and Japan deserve consideration for current United States assistance. From the security viewpoint the primary reasons for current assistance to Korea would be that, as a result of the 38° parallel agreement, this is the one country within which we alone have for almost two years carried on ideological warfare in direct contact with our opponents, so that to lose this battle would be gravely detrimental to United States prestige, and therefore security, throughout the world. To abandon this struggle would tend to confirm the suspicion that the United States is not really determined to accept the responsibilities and obligations of world leadership, with consequent detriment to our efforts to bolster those countries of western Europe which are of primary and vital importance to our national security. However, this suspicion could quite possibly be dissipated and our prestige in these same western European countries enhanced if a survey of our resources indicated we could not afford to resist our ideological opponents on all fronts and we publicly announced abandonment of further aid to Korea in order to concentrate our aid in areas of greater strategic importance to us.
17.
If the present diplomatic ideological warfare should become armed warfare, Korea could offer little or no assistance in the maintenance of our national security. Therefore, from this viewpoint, current assistance should be given Korea only if the means exist after sufficient assistance has been given the countries of primary importance to insure their continued independence and friendship for the United States and the resurgence of their economies.
18.
China’s greatest military asset is manpower. However, China does not have the industry to equip this manpower for warfare nor does she produce sufficient food to maintain this manpower in fighting condition. Therefore, in the case of warfare with our ideological opponents, China could be a valuable ally only if we diverted to her great quantities of food and equipment manufactured in this country. It is extremely doubtful that the end result would be any great assistance to our war effort. On the other hand, there is in existence in China an army which embraces the ideology of our opponents and which, given assistance by our opponents concurrent with the withdrawal by the United States of assistance to opposing forces in China, could possibly conquer all of China with very grave long-range jeopardy to our national security interests. If, however, we abandoned aid to China in order to concentrate our forces for a crushing offensive from the West against our primary ideological opponents and the success of this offensive resulted in the isolation of communism among the undeveloped countries of the Far East, it might be possible to keep it isolated there by the imposition of an economic quarantine. The assumption that the next war will be ideological and the thesis that current aid shall be given only in the interest of our national security places China very low on the list of countries which should be given such assistance.
19.
Japan is the most important arena of ideological struggle within our Pacific area of defense commitments. Like Germany, Japan is a defeated nation and the idea of assistance to her is probably offensive to the majority of our people. However, Japan left to herself grew strong enough to challenge American power in the Pacific. Japan is still a potentially powerful nation and one which we cannot forever keep militarily impotent. Japan is the one nation which could contain large armed forces of our ideological opponents in the Far East while the United States and her allies in the West launched a major offensive in that area. For this very simple reason, on the assumption that the next war will be ideological, of all the countries in the Pacific area Japan deserves primary consideration for current United States assistance designed to restore her economy and her military potential.
20.
The question of assistance for the Philippine Republic is unique since the islands have long been closely associated with the United [Page 746]States and since the republic was formed, and remains, under United States guidance. There is need in the Philippines for financial assistance, but the importance of the republic to our national security in case of ideological warfare is not great. Financial assistance should be continued, however, in order to assist in the stabilization of the republic’s budget and economy and for the maintenance of United States prestige throughout the Far East. We cannot afford to renounce our primary moral obligation in this area.
21.
In view of this general consideration of the areas of primary strategic importance to the United States in the event of ideological warfare, it appears that current assistance should be given if possible to the following countries arranged in order of their importance to our national security:
1.
Great Britain
2.
France
3.
Germany
4.
Belgium
5.
Netherlands
6.
Austria
7.
Italy
8.
Canada
9.
Turkey
10.
Greece
11.
Latin America
12.
Spain
13.
Japan
14.
China
15.
Korea
16.
The Philippines
22.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff are currently supporting certain specific objectives, the attainment of which they believe will enhance the national security. These objectives are:
a.
A system of military base rights as approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 4 June 1946 in J.C.S. 570/62.3
b.
The accomplishment of a treaty formalizing the agreements concerning the security of the Western Hemisphere which were reached at Chapultepec.
c.
The continued availability of the oil of the Middle East.
d.
The elimination from national armaments of atomic and other weapons of mass destruction preceded by the conclusion of agreements which provide effective safeguards against their production and use.
e.
The realization of a United Nations organization capable of playing an effective role in the maintenance of international security, thereby making it possible to scale down the military establishments presently required for maintenance of the security of the individual nations of the world.
f.
The prevention of communist control over those areas from which offensive air, ground and naval action could be most effectively and economically launched against our enemies in the event of ideological warfare.
23.
It is axiomatic that any program of aid to other countries of the world should aim at making it easier to attain these security objectives and that no assistance adversely affecting our ability to attain these objectives should be undertaken. The relationship of a program of United States assistance to these security objectives will therefore be treated briefly.
24.
The United States desires base rights, considered essential to her security, from Portugal, Ecuador, France and Spain. Of these, base rights from Portugal and Spain are the more essential. There are other base rights listed in Joint Chiefs of Staff papers as required if reasonably obtainable but not absolutely essential to the base system. The majority of these are in the Pacific and have been obtained by the United States by reason of the mandate4 granted under the United Nations. Those desired in the Atlantic belong to Great Britain, France, Portugal, Cuba, Liberia and Newfoundland. This study envisages United States assistance to Great Britain, France and the Latin American countries. The program should therefore enhance our possibilities of receiving the base rights desired from these countries.
25.
A program of aid to other countries should not adversely affect our objective of accomplishing a treaty formalizing the agreements concerning the security of the Western Hemisphere which were reached at Chapultepec. On the contrary, since assistance to the Latin American countries of the Western Hemisphere is envisaged, this objective of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be made easier of attainment by such assistance.
26.
Whether a program of assistance will make it easier for the United States to insure the continued availability of the oil of the Middle East or whether such a program will cause Russia to take equally forehanded action to deny us this oil in event of ideological warfare is problematical. It is true, however, that the availability of this oil in case of war cannot be adversely affected by the program of United States assistance and that assistance given to countries in the Middle Eastern area may prevent these countries from falling within the Russian orbit, thereby making the task of protecting this area less difficult if war occurs.
27.
The objective of eliminating from national armaments atomic and other weapons of mass destruction will certainly not be adversely affected by United States assistance to other countries. However, this is only one part of the United States objective in this respect and the other part, the conclusion of agreements which provide effective safeguards against the production and use of atomic and other weapons of mass destruction, may be so adversely affected that its realization will be impossible. The elimination of atomic and other weapons of mass destruction would be to Russia’s advantage at present so that, [Page 748]instead of resisting this, she will continue her present maneuvers to accomplish it without safeguards if possible. The United States cannot accept elimination without safeguards and therefore, since the Soviets will correctly interpret a program of United States assistance as aimed at containing them, they may become increasingly adamant on the question of safeguards with resultant failure of the United States to attain this objective.
28.
The realization of a United Nations capable of playing an effective role in the maintenance of international security, thereby making it possible to scale down the military establishments presently required for maintenance of the security of the individual nations of the world, will be made more difficult by a program of United States assistance to countries strategically important to the United States in the event of ideological warfare. This follows from the fact that the realization of a United Nations capable of playing an important and useful role in the maintenance of world security is entirely dependent upon the achievement of a general over-all understanding and peace settlement by the great nations of the world. A program of United States assistance to countries outside the Soviet orbit will certainly prevent achievement of the general over-all understanding and peace settlement required for the accomplishment of this objective. However, this result would not necessarily adversely affect our national security since the United Nations as presently constituted can in no way enhance that security. On the contrary, faith in the ability of the United Nations as presently constituted to protect, now or hereafter, the security of the United States would mean only that the faithful have lost sight of the vital security interest of the United States and could quite possibly lead to results fatal to that security. Yet, it is partially an earnest desire to make the United Nations a capable and useful instrument for the maintenance of world security which has led the United States to try to attain a settlement with our ex-enemies before we have stabilized our relations with our allies in the past war, and before we have a clear idea of the role we wish our ex-enemies to play in the post-war world. The drawing up of a comprehensive program of assistance to other countries may clarify United States policy in this regard with possibly very beneficial effect on the national security of the United States.
29.
Finally, there can be little doubt that a program of United States assistance will aid in the realization of the objective of preventing communist control over those areas from which offensive air, ground, and naval action could be most effectively and economically launched against our enemies in the event of ideological warfare.
30.
It appears, on balance, that a program of United States assistance would be desirable if the major objectives of the Joint Chiefs of [Page 749]Staff are considered as a whole, and that, since the attainment of these objectives would increase our national security, the program is, from the military point of view, highly desirable.
31.
An initial step in this study was to list the countries of the world to which assistance should be given in order of urgency of need. For this purpose documents of the Department of State prepared in connection with a preliminary similar study for the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee have been consulted (J.C.S. 1769—SWNCC 360). These documents support the following listing of countries in order of the urgency of their need:
1.
Greece
2.
Turkey
3.
Italy
4.
Iran
5.
Korea
6.
France
7.
Austria
8.
Hungary
9.
Great Britain
10.
Belgium
11.
Luxembourg
12.
Netherlands—N.E.I.
13.
The Philippines
14.
Portugal
15.
Czechoslovakia
16.
Poland
17.
Latin American Republics
18.
Canada
China does not appear on this list although the documents referred to indicate that China will need an undetermined amount of post-UNRRA aid in the near future. The Department of State wishes further time to determine China’s real needs before determining a priority for aid to that country. On the basis of actual current needs, however, it is believed that China should be placed after Austria and be followed by Turkey.
32.
Notwithstanding the listing given above, no aid of any sort to Hungary or to Czechoslovakia and Poland is advocated. The reason for this is that the United States cannot give aid to all countries requiring aid on the basis of their need in sufficient amounts to have any real effect on the ability of all of these countries to retain, or regain, freedom from predominant Soviet influence. From the military point of view, it is firmly believed that assistance should be concentrated on those countries of primary strategic importance to the United States in case of ideological warfare, excepting in those rare instances which present an opportunity for the United States to gain worldwide approbation by an act strikingly humanitarian; for example, the recent provision of food for the famine areas of Roumania. Therefore, from the viewpoint of the national security of the United States, assistance should be extended to the following countries listed in order arrived at by considering their importance to United States security and the urgency of their need in combination:
1.
Great Britain
2.
France
3.
Germany
4.
Italy
5.
Greece
6.
Turkey
7.
Austria
8.
Japan
9.
Belgium
10.
Netherlands
11.
Latin America
12.
Spain
13.
Korea
14.
China
15.
The Philippines
16.
Canada
33.
It is emphasized that assistance in each instance should be sufficient to positively assist the nation aided to achieve, or retain, a sound economy, to maintain the armed forces necessary for its continued independence, and to be of real assistance to the United States in case of ideological warfare. This requirement, since the ability of the United States to give assistance is not unlimited, may mean that not all nations listed above will receive assistance. However, it is felt that the requirement is necessary if the national security of the United States is to receive maximum benefit from a United States program of assistance to other nations.
  1. SWNCC 360/1 consisted of two enclosures, memoranda commenting on SWNCC 360, (April 21, p. 725). Enclosure “A”, by the War Member of the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee, Assistant Secretary of War Howard C. Petersen, indicated fundamental agreement with SWNCC 360, but expressed the need for further studies on both economic and military aid questions and suggested the revision of certain sections of the subject paper. Enclosure “B”, printed here, was transmitted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to SWNCC on May 10; it was circulated in the Committee as SWNCC 360/1 on May 12.

    SWNCC 360/2, not printed, a memorandum by the Department of State Member of SWNCC, Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas John H. Hilldring, was circulated on June 30 in connection with the Committee’s consideration of SWNCC 360 and 360/1. In addition to several suggested amendments to SWNCC 360, SWNCC 360/2 contained three appendices. Appendix “A” dealt with the possible use of the United Nations in administering foreign assistance. Appendix “B” consisted of a draft directive to the Rearmament Subcommittee of SWNCC with respect to studies it should undertake. Appendix “C” was a copy of SWN 5383 of May 12, a memorandum to SWNCC from its Secretary referring to the Committee SWNCC 360 and 360/1.

    At its 59th Meeting, July 23, SWNCC noted SWNCC 360 as amended by SWNCC 360/1 and 360/2 and referred the subject papers to the Special Ad Hoc Committee for consideration in connection with its final report. That report, SWNCC 360/3, October 3, a document of approximately 200 pages, is not printed. The Special Ad Hoc Committee prefaced the report with the statement that much of the data on which it was based had been made obsolete by events. The Special Ad Hoc Committee also stated that the report was intended as “a survey of the present world situation and to indicate countries to which the United States for its own security and national interests may find it desirable to extend aid during the next three to five years . . . . The attached report recommends that US capabilities be reviewed once the Marshall Plan becomes firm insofar as the application of US support to other areas of the world is concerned.” (SWNCC Files)

  2. Vol. iii, p. 208.
  3. For expression of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to military base rights, see the following: SWNCC 38/25, November 8, 1945, Foreign Relations, 1946, Vol. i, p. 1112; SWNCC 38/30, February 11, 1946, Ibid., p. 1142; and SWNCC 38/35, June 5, 1946, Ibid., p. 1174.
  4. Trust Territory of the Pacific.