SWNCC Flies
Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff to the State–War–Navy Coordinating
Committee
1
top secret
SWNCC 360/1, Enclosure “B”
[Washington,] May 12, 1947.
Subject: Policies, Procedures and Costs of Assistance by the
United States to Foreign Countries
Enclosure: J.C.S. 1769/1
(Copy No. 39).
The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered an interim report by a Special Ad Hoc Committee of the State–War–Navy Coordinating
Committee on the subject of “Policies, Procedures, and Costs of Assistance
by the United States to Foreign Countries” (SWNCC 360). They note that the subject matter of this report
parallels in many respects a study undertaken by them for the purpose of
determining, from the
[Page 735]
standpoint
of national security, the countries of the world, in order of their urgency
and their importance to which the United States should, if possible, give
current assistance (J.C.S. 1769/1)
(Appendix).
The Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that the conclusions in their
study provide a sound broad basis for study from the viewpoint of national
security and should be considered in connection with the political basis set
forth in the foreign policy assumptions in Section II of Appendix “A” of the
State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee report.2 In this connection, they would point out that
strategic implications, together with the facts that our national security
is paramount and our powers of assistance are not without limitation, make
it necessary to apply more specific consideration to individual cases than
that set forth in the foreign policy assumptions referred to above.
The study of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this matter, based upon the
strategic implications and national security, is presented in J.C.S. 1769/1 (Appendix).
Referring to the listing of countries as set forth in J.C.S. 1769/1 as needing assistance,
this differs from the listing in the subject paper (SWNCC 360) in that China has been inserted
after Austria and Turkey has been moved to the position next below China.
Also, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland have been removed from the list.
It will also be noted that application of the criterion of importance to the national security to [of] the
United States results in a priority listing of countries that
differs considerably from the priority listing of those that should be
assisted based on need alone.
[Page 736]
The three major points of variance between the subject paper and J.C.S. 1769/1 are:
-
a.
- The subject report proposes certain measures of aid to countries
which very probably cannot in the foreseeable future be removed from
predominant Soviet influence—Hungary, Poland, and
Czechoslovakia—while the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that
exclusion from current assistance of every region under Soviet
control is desirable from the point of view of national
security.
-
b.
- The subject report gives no particular consideration to the
relationship between the future security of the United States and
the positions of Germany and Japan in the postwar world.
-
c.
- Specific application of national security considerations changes
the priority listing made in the subject paper as to the countries
that should be assisted.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff would suggest that in the interest of national
security, consideration be given to their views as set forth above in the
revision of the subject paper and in the more comprehensive report which it
is understood the Special Ad Hoc Committee is to
undertake. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are enclosing J.C.S. 1769/1 on which their opinions, set out above, were
based. This study (J.C.S. 1769/1) does not
represent the final views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff since certain changes
and additions are now being considered. However, it may be of value in its
present form to the Special Ad Hoc Committee as
background material for its further study. The further views of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff will be furnished when available.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
W. G. Lalor
Captain, U.S. Navy Secretary
Appendix
[Washington, April 29, 1947.]
United States Assistance to Other Countries From
the Standpoint of National Security
Report by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee
the problem
1. On the assumption that the next war will be ideological, to prepare a
study, from the standpoint of national security, to determine the
countries of the world, in the order of their urgency and their
importance, to which the United States should, if possible, give current
assistance.
[Page 737]
discussion
2. See Enclosure.
conclusions
3. a. A sound program of United States assistance
to other countries along the line indicated in the remainder of these
conclusions will greatly assist in the realization of the major
objectives currently supported by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the
interest of strengthening the national security of the United
States.
b. The area of primary strategic importance to
the United States in the event of ideological warfare is Western Europe,
including Great Britain.
c. Other areas of major strategic importance to
the United States (North America including Greenland and Alaska) in the
event of ideological warfare, arranged in order of importance are:
- The Middle East
- Northwest Africa
- Latin America
- The Far East
d. No current assistance should be granted the
USSR.
e. Every region under Soviet control should be
excluded from current assistance, except in those rare instances which
present an opportunity for the United States to gain worldwide
approbation by an act strikingly humanitarian; for example, the recent
provision of food for the famine areas of Roumania.
f. If assistance is given it should, in each
instance, be sufficient to positively assist the nation aided to
achieve, or retain, a sound economy, to maintain the armed forces
necessary for its continued independence and to be of real assistance to
the United States in case of ideological warfare.
g. Conclusion f may
prevent the United States giving assistance to all nations which it is
desirable to aid, but adherence to conclusion f
is necessary if the national security of the United States is to receive
maximum strengthening from a United States program of current assistance
to other nations.
h. The nations it is desirable to aid because of their need, listed in order of the
urgency of current need, are as follows:
- Greece
- Italy
- Iran
- Korea
- France
- Austria
- China
- Turkey
- Great Britain
- Belgium and Luxembourg
- Netherlands—N.E.I.
- The Philippines
- Portugal
- The Latin American Republics
- Canada
[Page 738]
i. The nations it is desirable to aid because of their importance to the national security
of the United States, arranged in order of importance are:
- Great Britain
- France
- Germany
- Belgium
- Netherlands
- Austria
- Italy
- Canada
- Turkey
- Greece
- Latin America
- Spain
- Japan
- China
- Korea
- The Philippines
j. The nations it is desirable to aid listed in
an order of importance arrived at by consideration of their importance to the national security of the United
States and the urgency of their need, in combination, are as
follows:
- Great Britain
- France
- Germany
- Italy
- Greece
- Turkey
- Austria (assuming conclusion of peace treaty)
- Japan
- Belgium
- Netherlands
- Latin America
- Spain
- Korea
- China
- The Philippines
- Canada
recommendation
4. It is recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff approve the foregoing
conclusions.
[Enclosure]
discussion
- 1.
- At the outset, it should be firmly fixed in mind that the mere
giving of assistance to other countries will not necessarily enhance
the national security of the United States. The results obtained by
such assistance will determine whether our national security is
strengthened thereby. What, then, are the desired results? These are
firm friends located in areas which will be of strategic importance
to the United States in the event of war with our ideological
enemies, and with economies strong enough to support the military
establishments necessary for the maintenance of their own
independence and national security.
- 2.
- The problem envisages aid for two reasons; namely, urgency of need
and importance to the national security of the United States. The
past months have proved that United States assistance to some
countries whose inhabitants urgently needed aid did not increase the
military security of the United States, but that, on the contrary,
it was
[Page 739]
used by governments
ideologically opposed to the United States and representing a
minority of the people, to strengthen their control of suppressed
majorities. For this reason, it is believed that the question of
which countries to exclude from receipt of United States aid is as
important as the question of which countries should receive
assistance. Keeping in mind that the United States cannot give
substantial aid to all countries of the world, it is evident that,
if we spread our available resources for aid over too large an area,
no country is likely to receive assistance sufficient to be of major
importance in the resurgence of its economy and military potential.
The primary rule governing assistance by the United States should be
that the USSR and every country now under her control should be
specifically excluded from assistance. No country under Soviet
control should receive assistance from the United States until every
vestige of Soviet control has been removed therefrom.
- 3.
- The first step in determining the countries which should receive
assistance because of their importance to our national security is
to establish the areas of primary strategic importance to the United
States in the event of ideological warfare.
- 4.
- The area of United States defense commitments includes, roughly,
the lands and waters from Alaska to the Philippines and Australia in
the Pacific and from Greenland to Brazil and Patagonia in the
Atlantic. This area contains 40% of the land surface of the earth
but only 25% of the population. The Old World (Europe, Asia and
Africa) contains only 60% of the land surface of the earth but 75%
of the population. The potential military strength of the Old World
in terms of manpower and in terms of war-making capacity is
enormously greater than that of our area of defense commitments, in
which the United States is the only arsenal nation. It is obvious,
therefore, that in case of an ideological war we must have the
support of some of the countries of the Old World unless our
military strength is to be overshadowed by that of our
enemies.
- 5.
- In the case of an ideological war the most vulnerable side of our
defense area will be in the Atlantic. Also, unless we can retain
allies on the eastern side of the Atlantic strong enough, in the
event of an ideological war, to hold the Soviets away from the
eastern shores of the Atlantic, the shortest and most direct avenue
of attack against our enemies will almost certainly be denied to us.
Further, almost all potentially strong nations who can reasonably be
expected to ally themselves with the United States in such a war are
situated in western Europe. Moreover, two world wars in the past
thirty years have demonstrated the interdependence of France, Great
Britain and the United States in case of war with central or eastern
European powers. In war these nations not only need one another but
are in mortal peril if
[Page 740]
they do not combine their forces. In the past war it was
demonstrated that France could not stand without Great Britain and
that when France fell the British Isles were in mortal peril. If
Britain had fallen, the Western Hemisphere would have been
completely exposed, and the United States would have had to defend
itself in the Atlantic before it could have thought of resisting the
Japanese conquest of China, the East Indies, the Philippines and the
Far Pacific. That the defense of the United States and Canada in
North America and of Great Britain and France in western Europe is
inseparable from the combined defense of them all is not a question
of what men think now, but is something that has been demonstrated
by what we have had to do, though tardily, and therefore at greater
risk and cost, in actual warfare in the past. In the light of this
past experience the burden of proof is upon anyone who opposes the
thesis of the interdependence of these four countries. The opponent
would have to show that an assault by our ideological opponents on
any one of these nations would not be of vital consequence to the
other three nations. No one can show this, nor how Britain could
live in security if France were not independent and her friend, nor
how Canada and the United States could live safely if France and/or
Great Britain were under Soviet domination either by reason of
military conquest or for the reason that communists had taken over
control of their governments. While the conquest or communization of
other countries would adversely affect the security of the United
States, the conquest or communization of no other country or area
would be so detrimental as that of France and/or Great Britain. The
maintenance of these two countries in a state of independence,
friendly to the United States and with economies able to support the
armed forces necessary for the continued maintenance of their
independence, is still of first importance to the national security
of the United States as well as to the security of the entire
Western Hemisphere. This means that the entire area of western
Europe is in first place as an area of strategic importance to the
United States in the event of ideological warfare.
- 6.
- Potentially, the strongest military power in this area is Germany.
Without German aid the remaining countries of western Europe could
scarcely be expected to withstand the armies of our ideological
opponents until the United States could mobilize and place in the
field sufficient armed forces to achieve their defeat. With a
revived Germany fighting on the side of the Western Allies this
would be a possibility. Further, the complete resurgence of German
industry, particularly coal mining, is essential for the economic
recovery of France—whose security is inseparable from the combined
security of the United States, Canada, and Great Britain. The
economic revival of Germany is therefore of primary importance from
the viewpoint of United States security.
- 7.
- France is, however, still the leader of those countries of Europe
west of Germany and all indications are that France will vigorously
oppose any substantial revival of German heavy industry. The fear of
a revived Germany is still strong in France and this fear is
compounded by the activities of French communists who, in accordance
with Soviet desires, seek to make post-war Germany weak industrially
and militarily. Yet the German people are the natural enemies of the
USSR and of communism. If treated without undue harshness by the
Western Allies they would in all probability align themselves with
the Western Allies in the event of ideological warfare unless the
countries of Europe to the west of Germany had previously fallen
under communist domination. In this latter case Germany would be
between two hostile factions and her alignment in such a war would
be problematical.
- 8.
- From the viewpoint of the security of the United States it appears
that our efforts should be directed toward demonstrating both to the
leaders of France and to the leaders of Germany that the emergence
of a principal world power to the east of them, ideologically
opposed to all of their traditional way of life, whose ultimate aim
is world conquest, and which they can successfully oppose only if
both are strong and united against the new eastern menace, makes
them interdependent just as France, England, Canada, and the United
States are interdependent. Further, France, as one of the victors of
the past war, must be made to see that diplomatic ideological
warfare is now going on and that if the diplomatic war can be won
the shooting war will be delayed and perhaps even avoided. Most
important of all, France and the United States and Great Britain
must acknowledge that the decisive diplomatic contest between
totalitarian Russia and the democracies of the West is taking place
in Germany today. The western democracies can win this contest only
if there is drastic change in their economic policies for Germany.
Further, Germany can aid in European recovery and become an ally of
the West against their ideological opponents only if her economy is
restored. In fact, such a course should appeal to France and Great
Britain as well as to the United States in view of the high cost
that devolves upon these countries for the mere feeding of the
German population so long as German industry and foreign trade are
paralyzed. This cost to Great Britain and the United States has been
estimated by Mr. Herbert Hoover to be $950,000,000 before July of
1948.
- 9.
- Other countries in the Western European area which are of more
than ordinary importance to our national security for military or
political reasons are Italy, Spain, Belgium, the Netherlands, and
Denmark. To assign priority of assistance to these countries on the
basis of importance to our national security is most difficult, but
on the basis of urgency of need they appear to line up as follows:
Italy, Belgium,
[Page 742]
the
Netherlands, Spain, and Denmark. The reasons for the importance of
these countries to our national security, aside from geographic
positions, deserve brief mention. Italy and Spain are of primary
importance in connection with control of the Mediterranean sea
lanes, shortest route to the oil and processing facilities of the
Middle East. Further, Italy, like Greece, is a border nation in the
current diplomatic ideological war between the western democracies
and the Soviets. Denmark has sovereignty over Greenland which, by
reason of geographic position, is a major outpost for defense of
North America. Belgium controls, in the Belgian Congo, the area
containing the largest and richest known deposits of uranium ore in
the world.
- 10.
- The area of secondary strategic importance to the United States in
case of ideological warfare is the Middle East, not only because of
the existence of great oil reserves and processing facilities in
this area but also because it offers possibilities for direct
contact with our ideological enemies. However, a program of aid to
Greece and Turkey in this area has already been approved by the
Senate of the United States. Other countries in this area—Iran,
Iraq, and Saudi Arabia—are of importance, but their need for aid is
not urgent and they could not repel Soviet attack until United
States military assistance could reach them. In fact, since they
could offer practically no military assistance to the United States
in case of ideological warfare, direct assistance to these countries
can be considered as of minor importance from the viewpoint of
United States security. However, in order to retain their good will
they should be granted favorable terms for the purchase from the
United States of supplies needed for the modernization and
improvement of their industries, living conditions and armed forces.
Further, technical assistance, both military and civilian, should be
granted if they request it.
- 11.
- Central and South America and northwest Africa comprise the
remainder of the United States Atlantic area of defense commitments.
If Western Europe, particularly France and the Low Countries, falls
under Soviet domination for any reason, the United States would
immediately have to take the action with armed forces necessary to
exclude the Soviets from northwest Africa. However, if Western
Europe can be kept out of the sphere of Soviet domination and
friendly to the United States, no immediate threat to the security
of the United States can be expected to develop in western Africa.
In any event, there are no countries in this area to which direct
current assistance should be given.
- 12.
- The defense of South America is of vital importance to the
national security of the United States. But, since South America
contains no principal military power which can help greatly to
insure that defense, the United States must regard the defense of
South
[Page 743]
America as a heavy
commitment and should seek to alleviate it by actions which will
gradually increase the level of military self-sufficiency of South
America as a whole.
- 13.
- However, the commitment of the United States for the defense of
South America can be challenged by only one of the great powers of
the Northern Hemisphere, and the fulfillment of our commitment
depends upon whether, in our relations with the great powers, we and
our friends outweigh our foes. In spite of technological
developments it is still true that only a great power can
successfully challenge or resist another great power and that, total
resources being equal, the strength of a number of small nations
will not combine to balance that of one of the great powers. For
this reason the bulk of United States assistance should be given to
nations who are potentially powerful and also potential allies of
the United States.
- 14.
- Thus, current direct assistance to the
individual countries of South America is not of critical importance
to our national security at this particular time. However, policies
designed to lessen the potential burden of our commitment for the
defense of South America are of great importance. There can no
longer be doubt that the communist party is gaining strength in that
area. In consequence, anything less than complete rapprochement between the United States and every one of
her neighbors to the south is entirely unacceptable from the
viewpoint of United States security. To stand by and watch a fifth
column grow stronger and stronger to the south of us is to invite
disaster. The United States is, by reason of its strength and
political enlightenment, the natural leader of this hemisphere. But,
there is always jealousy of the leader and in this case the
injurious effects of that jealousy are compounded by the actvities
of our ideological opponents in that area. Further, the opposition
has plainly undertaken to overthrow by one means or another the
ideology which we champion. How better to combat us than by taking
over the leadership of the southern half of the Western Hemisphere?
They are attempting it now and it must be realized that in this
hemisphere we cannot combat them by dollar credits alone. Individual
and national want is not sufficient in this hemisphere to make this
an effective method here. The most important specific act required
is the completion and implementation of a treaty embodying the
agreements concerning the defense of the Western Hemisphere which
were reached at Chapultepec.
- 15.
- Of almost equal importance is the passage of a bill embodying the
provisions of H.R. 6326 (79th Congress) which would permit the
standardization of the armaments of the American republics by the
transfer of United States equipment, and the maintenance of United
States military missions in those countries. Apparently the support
[Page 744]
for such a bill, other
than by the War and Navy Departments, has been withdrawn. The public
press has suggested that the reason for the withdrawal of support is
that implementation of the provisions of the bill might weaken the
economies and the political stability of the governments of South
America. Whether or not this be so is of little consequence from the
viewpoint of national security, since our present policy is reacting
unfavorably upon the security of the United States and of the
Western Hemisphere. An important fact is that most of the Latin
American Governments are dependent upon the military for stability.
In consequence, contact with Latin American military men would in
reality mean contact with very strong domestic political leaders. It
is suggested that it is now advisable to attempt to bring about the
economic and the domestic conditions which we desire to see in South
America through these men and through passage of a bill similar to
H.R. 6326 instead of attempting to attain these ends through direct
diplomatic pressure. We need offer these countries no current
financial assistance in the interests of our own security. However,
in the interest of this same security we should take our hemispheric
neighbors into full partnership in the affairs of our hemisphere;
should conclude one formal blanket mutual defense treaty with all of
them; and should definitely, positively, and tactfully lead them
toward true democracy while publicizing the misery and the slavery
to the state which would result should they come under the control
of our ideological opponents whether by the communization of their
governments or by conquest.
- 16.
- In the Pacific area of United States defense commitments, from the
standpoint of urgent want, Korea, China, and Japan deserve
consideration for current United States assistance. From the
security viewpoint the primary reasons for current assistance to
Korea would be that, as a result of the 38° parallel agreement, this
is the one country within which we alone have for almost two years
carried on ideological warfare in direct contact with our opponents,
so that to lose this battle would be gravely detrimental to United
States prestige, and therefore security, throughout the world. To
abandon this struggle would tend to confirm the suspicion that the
United States is not really determined to accept the
responsibilities and obligations of world leadership, with
consequent detriment to our efforts to bolster those countries of
western Europe which are of primary and vital importance to our
national security. However, this suspicion could quite possibly be
dissipated and our prestige in these same western European countries
enhanced if a survey of our resources indicated we could not afford
to resist our ideological opponents on all fronts and we publicly
announced abandonment of further aid to Korea in order to
concentrate our aid in areas of greater strategic importance to
us.
- 17.
- If the present diplomatic ideological warfare should become armed
warfare, Korea could offer little or no assistance in the
maintenance of our national security. Therefore, from this
viewpoint, current assistance should be given Korea only if the
means exist after sufficient assistance has been given the countries
of primary importance to insure their continued independence and
friendship for the United States and the resurgence of their
economies.
- 18.
- China’s greatest military asset is manpower. However, China does
not have the industry to equip this manpower for warfare nor does
she produce sufficient food to maintain this manpower in fighting
condition. Therefore, in the case of warfare with our ideological
opponents, China could be a valuable ally only if we diverted to her
great quantities of food and equipment manufactured in this country.
It is extremely doubtful that the end result would be any great
assistance to our war effort. On the other hand, there is in
existence in China an army which embraces the ideology of our
opponents and which, given assistance by our opponents concurrent
with the withdrawal by the United States of assistance to opposing
forces in China, could possibly conquer all of China with very grave
long-range jeopardy to our national security interests. If, however,
we abandoned aid to China in order to concentrate our forces for a
crushing offensive from the West against our primary ideological
opponents and the success of this offensive resulted in the
isolation of communism among the undeveloped countries of the Far
East, it might be possible to keep it isolated there by the
imposition of an economic quarantine. The assumption that the next
war will be ideological and the thesis that current aid shall be
given only in the interest of our national security places China
very low on the list of countries which should be given such
assistance.
- 19.
- Japan is the most important arena of ideological struggle within
our Pacific area of defense commitments. Like Germany, Japan is a
defeated nation and the idea of assistance to her is probably
offensive to the majority of our people. However, Japan left to
herself grew strong enough to challenge American power in the
Pacific. Japan is still a potentially powerful nation and one which
we cannot forever keep militarily impotent. Japan is the one nation
which could contain large armed forces of our ideological opponents
in the Far East while the United States and her allies in the West
launched a major offensive in that area. For this very simple
reason, on the assumption that the next war will be ideological, of
all the countries in the Pacific area Japan deserves primary
consideration for current United States assistance designed to
restore her economy and her military potential.
- 20.
- The question of assistance for the Philippine Republic is unique
since the islands have long been closely associated with the United
[Page 746]
States and since the
republic was formed, and remains, under United States guidance.
There is need in the Philippines for financial assistance, but the
importance of the republic to our national security in case of
ideological warfare is not great. Financial assistance should be
continued, however, in order to assist in the stabilization of the
republic’s budget and economy and for the maintenance of United
States prestige throughout the Far East. We cannot afford to
renounce our primary moral obligation in this area.
- 21.
- In view of this general consideration of the areas of primary
strategic importance to the United States in the event of
ideological warfare, it appears that current assistance should be
given if possible to the following countries arranged in order of
their importance to our national security:
- 1.
- Great Britain
- 2.
- France
- 3.
- Germany
- 4.
- Belgium
- 5.
- Netherlands
- 6.
- Austria
- 7.
- Italy
- 8.
- Canada
- 9.
- Turkey
- 10.
- Greece
- 11.
- Latin America
- 12.
- Spain
- 13.
- Japan
- 14.
- China
- 15.
- Korea
- 16.
- The Philippines
- 22.
- The Joint Chiefs of Staff are currently supporting certain
specific objectives, the attainment of which they believe will
enhance the national security. These objectives are:
-
a.
- A system of military base rights as approved by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff on 4 June 1946 in J.C.S. 570/62.3
-
b.
- The accomplishment of a treaty formalizing the agreements
concerning the security of the Western Hemisphere which were
reached at Chapultepec.
-
c.
- The continued availability of the oil of the Middle
East.
-
d.
- The elimination from national armaments of atomic and
other weapons of mass destruction preceded by the conclusion
of agreements which provide effective safeguards against
their production and use.
-
e.
- The realization of a United Nations organization capable
of playing an effective role in the maintenance of
international security, thereby making it possible to scale
down the military establishments presently required for
maintenance of the security of the individual nations of the
world.
-
f.
- The prevention of communist control over those areas from
which offensive air, ground and naval action could be most
effectively and economically launched against our enemies in
the event of ideological warfare.
- 23.
- It is axiomatic that any program of aid to other countries of the
world should aim at making it easier to attain these security
objectives and that no assistance adversely affecting our ability to
attain these objectives should be undertaken. The relationship of a
program of United States assistance to these security objectives
will therefore be treated briefly.
- 24.
- The United States desires base rights, considered essential to her
security, from Portugal, Ecuador, France and Spain. Of these, base
rights from Portugal and Spain are the more essential. There are
other base rights listed in Joint Chiefs of Staff papers as required
if reasonably obtainable but not absolutely essential to the base
system. The majority of these are in the Pacific and have been
obtained by the United States by reason of the mandate4 granted
under the United Nations. Those desired in the Atlantic belong to
Great Britain, France, Portugal, Cuba, Liberia and Newfoundland.
This study envisages United States assistance to Great Britain,
France and the Latin American countries. The program should
therefore enhance our possibilities of receiving the base rights
desired from these countries.
- 25.
- A program of aid to other countries should not adversely affect
our objective of accomplishing a treaty formalizing the agreements
concerning the security of the Western Hemisphere which were reached
at Chapultepec. On the contrary, since assistance to the Latin
American countries of the Western Hemisphere is envisaged, this
objective of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be made easier of
attainment by such assistance.
- 26.
- Whether a program of assistance will make it easier for the United
States to insure the continued availability of the oil of the Middle
East or whether such a program will cause Russia to take equally
forehanded action to deny us this oil in event of ideological
warfare is problematical. It is true, however, that the availability
of this oil in case of war cannot be
adversely affected by the program of United States assistance and
that assistance given to countries in the Middle Eastern area may
prevent these countries from falling within the Russian orbit,
thereby making the task of protecting this area less difficult if
war occurs.
- 27.
- The objective of eliminating from national armaments atomic and
other weapons of mass destruction will certainly not be adversely
affected by United States assistance to other countries. However,
this is only one part of the United States objective in this respect
and the other part, the conclusion of agreements which provide
effective safeguards against the production and use of atomic and
other weapons of mass destruction, may be so adversely affected that
its realization will be impossible. The elimination of atomic and
other weapons of mass destruction would be to Russia’s advantage at
present so that,
[Page 748]
instead
of resisting this, she will continue her present maneuvers to
accomplish it without safeguards if possible. The United States
cannot accept elimination without safeguards and therefore, since
the Soviets will correctly interpret a program of United States
assistance as aimed at containing them, they may become increasingly
adamant on the question of safeguards with resultant failure of the
United States to attain this objective.
- 28.
- The realization of a United Nations capable of playing an
effective role in the maintenance of international security, thereby
making it possible to scale down the military establishments
presently required for maintenance of the security of the individual
nations of the world, will be made more difficult by a program of
United States assistance to countries strategically important to the
United States in the event of ideological warfare. This follows from
the fact that the realization of a United Nations capable of playing
an important and useful role in the maintenance of world security is
entirely dependent upon the achievement of a general over-all
understanding and peace settlement by the great nations of the
world. A program of United States assistance to countries outside
the Soviet orbit will certainly prevent achievement of the general
over-all understanding and peace settlement required for the
accomplishment of this objective. However, this result would not
necessarily adversely affect our national security since the United
Nations as presently constituted can in no way enhance that
security. On the contrary, faith in the ability of the United
Nations as presently constituted to protect, now or hereafter, the
security of the United States would mean only that the faithful have
lost sight of the vital security interest of the United States and
could quite possibly lead to results fatal to that security. Yet, it
is partially an earnest desire to make the United Nations a capable
and useful instrument for the maintenance of world security which
has led the United States to try to attain a settlement with our
ex-enemies before we have stabilized our relations with our allies
in the past war, and before we have a clear idea of the role we wish
our ex-enemies to play in the post-war world. The drawing up of a
comprehensive program of assistance to other countries may clarify
United States policy in this regard with possibly very beneficial
effect on the national security of the United States.
- 29.
- Finally, there can be little doubt that a program of United States
assistance will aid in the realization of the objective of
preventing communist control over those areas from which offensive
air, ground, and naval action could be most effectively and
economically launched against our enemies in the event of
ideological warfare.
- 30.
- It appears, on balance, that a program of United States assistance
would be desirable if the major objectives of the Joint Chiefs of
[Page 749]
Staff are considered
as a whole, and that, since the attainment of these objectives would
increase our national security, the program is, from the military
point of view, highly desirable.
- 31.
- An initial step in this study was to list the countries of the
world to which assistance should be given in order of urgency of
need. For this purpose documents of the Department of State prepared
in connection with a preliminary similar study for the
State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee have been consulted (J.C.S. 1769—SWNCC 360). These documents support the following
listing of countries in order of the urgency of
their need:
- 1.
- Greece
- 2.
- Turkey
- 3.
- Italy
- 4.
- Iran
- 5.
- Korea
- 6.
- France
- 7.
- Austria
- 8.
- Hungary
- 9.
- Great Britain
- 10.
- Belgium
- 11.
- Luxembourg
- 12.
- Netherlands—N.E.I.
- 13.
- The Philippines
- 14.
- Portugal
- 15.
- Czechoslovakia
- 16.
- Poland
- 17.
- Latin American Republics
- 18.
- Canada
- China does not appear on this list although the documents referred
to indicate that China will need an undetermined amount of
post-UNRRA aid in the near
future. The Department of State wishes further time to determine
China’s real needs before determining a priority for aid to that
country. On the basis of actual current needs, however, it is
believed that China should be placed after Austria and be followed
by Turkey.
- 32.
- Notwithstanding the listing given above, no aid of any sort to
Hungary or to Czechoslovakia and Poland is advocated. The reason for
this is that the United States cannot give aid to all countries
requiring aid on the basis of their need in sufficient amounts to
have any real effect on the ability of all of these countries to
retain, or regain, freedom from predominant Soviet influence. From
the military point of view, it is firmly believed that assistance
should be concentrated on those countries of primary strategic
importance to the United States in case of ideological warfare,
excepting in those rare instances which present an opportunity for
the United States to gain worldwide approbation by an act strikingly
humanitarian; for example, the recent provision of food for the
famine areas of Roumania. Therefore, from the viewpoint of the
national security of the United States, assistance should be
extended to the following countries listed in order arrived at by
considering their importance to United States
security and the urgency of their need in combination:
- 1.
- Great Britain
- 2.
- France
- 3.
- Germany
- 4.
- Italy
- 5.
- Greece
- 6.
- Turkey
- 7.
- Austria
- 8.
- Japan
- 9.
- Belgium
- 10.
- Netherlands
- 11.
- Latin America
- 12.
- Spain
- 13.
- Korea
- 14.
- China
- 15.
- The Philippines
- 16.
- Canada
- 33.
- It is emphasized that assistance in each instance should be
sufficient to positively assist the nation aided to achieve, or
retain, a sound economy, to maintain the armed forces necessary for
its continued independence, and to be of real assistance to the
United States in case of ideological warfare. This requirement,
since the ability of the United States to give assistance is not
unlimited, may mean that not all nations listed above will receive
assistance. However, it is felt that the requirement is necessary if
the national security of the United States is to receive maximum
benefit from a United States program of assistance to other
nations.
